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THE ONTOLOGICAL SCANDAL OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD AND SPEECH:
A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF KEY SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

by
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Under the Direction of M. Lane Bruner

ABSTRACT
The power of the corporation is pervasive in every aspect of human life. This situation initiates a
question: how did the modern corporation become so powerful? To answer this question, as well
as to understand the implications of the modern corporate form and its power in contemporary
society, this dissertation explores how the corporation’s power stems from three historical
developments that have had lasting significance: 1) its legal personification under the Fourteenth
Amendment; 2) the development of its “voice” in the form of public relations and; 3) the
acquisition of First Amendment political speech rights. Independently and collectively, each of
these developments contributed to the corporation’s rise to dominance within society and to its
hegemony in the U.S. and around the world. In addition, the growth and expansion of corporate

power is also connected to several landmark Supreme Court rulings on corporate rights. Thus,
this dissertation provides a rhetorical, ideological analysis of Supreme Court rulings that have
contributed to the ongoing protection and expansion of corporate rights and power under the law.
These rulings include Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886), which endowed the
corporation with Constitutional personhood rights; and Buckley v. Valeo (1976), First National
Bank v. Boston (1978), Nike v. Kasky (2003) and Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Commission (2010), which all enabled, granted or protected corporate First Amendment rights.
The analysis is guided by a close reading of these judicial texts. In sum, this study aims to
uncover the ideological underpinnings of these Supreme Court decisions as it shows what
interests are served through these rulings. It also describes how these rulings contribute to the
expansion of corporate power and shape the relations between human beings and corporations in
our society, in ways that are ontologically controversial.

INDEX WORDS: Corporations, Corporate discourse, Corporate Voice, Public Relations,
Rhetoric, Ideology, Artificial Persons, Economic Liberalism, Neoliberalism, Critical
Race Theory, Reification
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1. INTRODUCTION
What began as a simple idea to organize and operate business more efficiently and
effectively has materialized into one of the most dominant institutions in society. 1 The
corporation has insinuated its “self” into every aspect of human life. It influences, and in some
cases determines, every aspect of the human experience: the food we eat, the water we drink, the
homes in which we live, the education we receive, our modes of transportation, our access to
healthcare, and more than could ever be listed here. Since the Supreme Court gave “birth” to the
modern corporation in 1886, no aspect of human life has escaped its roaming and increasingly
interventionist powers, especially the democratic political process. The goals of this study are to
explore how and why the corporation has become one of the most dominant institutions in
society, to reveal the mechanisms that reproduce its power, and to discuss the implications of the
corporation for human agency. In doing so, I aim to identify key sources of corporate power and
explore the ideological, rhetorical relationship between the Supreme Court, corporate rights and
corporate power as I also explore the implications of the corporate form as legally configured
today.
My curiosity and concerns about the corporation stem from my graduate coursework in
communication studies. This education was heavily influenced by rhetorical training that often
focused on analyzing the relationship among language, power, institutions and societal
organization from a critical standpoint. Time spent in corporate America gave me the kinds of
insights that come with significant exposure to the inner-workings of the corporate form – from
the lowest to highest levels – and those experiences also inspired my interest in the corporation.

1

John Mickelwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea
(New York: The Modern Library, 2005).

2
But this is not a dissertation about my personal experiences, although, in the tradition of critical
race theory and autoethnography, I touch on a few experiences that are relevant to this study in
the conclusion. 2 This is a dissertation about the evolution of corporate power and it implications
for human beings.
A curiosity about the corporation has led me to advance several critical questions
including the following: What are some of the primary sources of corporate power? What is the
nature of the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court, the expansion of corporate rights and
rise of corporate power? What are the implications of corporate rights and power for the human
experience? To address these questions and more fully explicate the evolution of the corporation
and its power, I turn to the scholarly pathways of communication studies. In the same ways that
political economists believe that in order to get to the truth of an issue one must “follow the
money,” I assert, from a communicative perspective, that one must follow the discourse, unravel
its textual constructions, and explore them within context, while also examining the relationship
between language and power operating in any particular scenario.
To address my critical questions in a way that provides a rich understanding of the nature,
functions, and implications of the modern corporate form and its power in contemporary society,
it is necessary to consider the historical origins of the corporation to see how the past shapes the
present. Therefore, in the following pages, I argue that much of the corporation’s contemporary
2

I will draw upon autoethnographic and critical race theory because they both highlight the importance of
personal experience as a form of knowledge. See Kimberle Crenshaw et al., eds., Critical Race Theory:
The Key Writings that Formed the Movement (New York: The New Press, 1995). See also Damion
Waymer, “Does Public Relations Scholarship Have a Place in Race?” The SAGE Handbook of Public
Relations, Ed. R. L Heath (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2010) 237-246; Waymer, “Each
One, Reach One: An Autobiographic Account of a Black PR Professor’s Mentor-Mentee Relationships
with Black Graduate Students,” Public Relations Inquiry 1 (2012): 398-414; Stacy Holman Jones,
“Autoethnography: Making the Personal Political,” The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, Eds.
Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2005)
763-791.

3
power stems from three historical phases that have had lasting significance: 1) its legal
personification under the Fourteenth Amendment; 2) the development of its “voice” in the form
of the public relations field; and 3) the acquisition of its First Amendment rights to free speech.
Independently and collectively, each of these developments contributed to the corporation’s rise
to dominance within modern society and to its institutional, global hegemony in a postmodern
world. Some background information about these three central themes of this dissertation will
help bring my assertions into clearer view.
Like many scholars, I locate the source of corporate power in corporate personhood as
established in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad
(1886).3 This ruling was vital because it facilitated the extension of the personhood rights of
human beings to corporations under the Fourteenth Amendment. Personification under the
Fourteenth Amendment was important because it gave corporations the Constitutional rights of
American citizens such as due process and equal treatment under the law. These rights made it
much easier for corporations to produce, protect, and leverage their great wealth. Possessing the
rights of natural persons, along with the special legal privileges reserved for corporations such as
perpetual life and limited liability, translated into huge economic advantages for corporations.
These economic advantages led to the vast accumulation of wealth which led to widespread
corporate influence that allowed business organizations to emerge as very powerful “people” at
the dawn of the twentieth century. Corporations remain powerful today, and their sphere of
influence is ever expanding.
3

Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). See also Natasha
Aljalian, “The Fourteenth Amendment and Personhood: Fact or Fiction,” St. John’s Law Review 73.2
(1999): 495-540; Ted Nace, Gangs of America: The Rise of Corporate Power and the Disabling of
Democracy (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publisher, Inc., 2005); Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection:
How Corporations Became “People” – And How You Can Fight Back (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler
Publishers, Inc., 2010).
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As I explore the evolution of the modern corporate form through a critical, rhetorical
analysis grounded in methods of ideological criticism in my examination of Supreme Court
discourse on corporate personhood, I also draw attention to the racialized roots of the corporation
using Critical Race Theory (CRT).4 I examine the evolution of corporate personhood within the
context of race by looking at how the Fourteenth Amendment – a law enacted to protect natural
persons (i.e., human beings), specifically the newly freed slaves – was appropriated to protect
artificial persons in the form of corporations. I argue that while the evolution of the corporate form
flourished, the conditions of some natural persons languished under the Supreme Court’s
applications and interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment at the turn of the century. While this
obviously and negatively impacted African Americans, it had broader societal implications. The
ruling offers a preview into the Supreme Court’s treatment of natural persons as compared to
artificial persons, generally speaking. These tendencies of the Court seemingly functioned to
empower artificial corporate persons at the expense of natural persons. The point is that this
process of human disenfranchisement through law can happen because of, or regardless of, race.
Therefore, I argue that all natural persons should be concerned if there is a judicial tendency to
privilege corporate interests above human interests because that would have consequences for
humanity in general.
As the corporate person evolved through the Industrial Revolution, the accumulation of
profit began to become much less problematic than the securing of favorable public opinion.
Therefore, another important aspect of the corporation’s rise to power was the evolution of its
“voice” via the development of the public relations field. At the turn of the twentieth century the
great fortunes amassed by the industrial titans of business, in combination with questionable
4

See Kimberle Crenshaw et al.
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labor practices and other abuses, led to public mistrust of corporations. At the same time
corporate leaders began to realize there was a direct correlation between profits and positive
public perceptions.5 Thus, some corporate leaders hired journalists-turned-public relations
professionals to develop the corporate “voice.”6 The main purpose of the corporate voice was to
persuade publics – internal employees and external stakeholders (such as local communities) –
that the corporation was a productive and benevolent member of society. Sometimes the
corporate voice, articulated through the public relations field, functioned as the ethical
conscience of the organization, genuinely concerned for the corporation and public welfare. At
other times, it functioned as propaganda, manipulating the public for profit. Critical public
relations scholars have argued that the field’s practice and scholarship have too long been
dominated by corporate mandates and that this tendency should be resisted. 7 There is little
disagreement, however, that the public relations field played a pivotal role in the production of
corporate wealth and power. This was accomplished through establishing the corporate voice as
a persuasive force within the public sphere. My study contributes a rhetorical, ideological
understanding of how these circumstances unfolded and their implications.

5

Rowland Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1998).

6

To describe this evolution in detail, literature about public relations history from several scholars is
incorporated including Margot Opdycke Lamme and Karen Miller Russell, “Removing the Spin: Toward
a New Theory of Public Relations History,” Journalism Communication Monographs 11.4 (2010): 281362; Marvin N. Olasky, Corporate Public Relations: A New Historical Perspective (Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1995).
See Bruce K. Berger, “Power Over, Power With, and Power to Public Relations: Critical Reflections on
Public Relations, the Dominant Coalition, and Activism,” Journal of Public Relations Research 17.1
(2005): 5-28; Derina R. Holtzhausen and Rosina Voto, “Resistance From the Margins: The Postmodern
Public Relations Practitioner as Organizational Activist,” Journal of Public Relations Research 14.1
(2002): 57-84; Jacquie L’ Etang and Magda Pieczka, Public Relations: Critical Debates and
Contemporary Practice. (New York: Routledge, 2006). See also L’Etang and Pieczka’s earlier volume,
Critical Perspectives in Public Relations (London: International Thomson Business Press, 1996).
7

6
My efforts here also address the uses and implications of the corporate voice as
constituted through the public relations field via an analysis of Nike v. Kasky (2003), an
important Supreme Court case concerning corporate public relations. 8 In Kasky, the corporation
sought legal protection for materials from its public relations campaign, such as press releases,
even though the materials may have contained falsehoods. Nike cited First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti (1978),9 which gave corporations First Amendment speech rights to political
expression, to bolster the company’s assertions that their communications deserved political
speech protections. The case was controversial because it appeared as if Nike wanted the legal
right to disseminate falsehoods. This study provides a rhetorical analysis that addresses the
ideological aspects of the case in relation to the role and function of public relations as the
corporate voice. I will also address the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision not to rule.
Kasky is an important case because it offers insights into how corporations may use their
voice in misleading ways regarding the nature of their products and services when given First
Amendment political speech protections for their communications. Kasky is also an important
case because of the ways in which it implicates the public relations field by drawing attention to
the tension between ethical practice and advocacy at all costs. Should the public relations field
operate as the ethical “conscience” of corporations, or should the field prioritize communicating
the client’s wishes with less regard for the consequences? How can a rhetorical analysis sensitive
to the historical origins of the corporate voice and the ideological nature of corporate discourse
as constituted via the public relations field provide guidance to answering this and similar

8

Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).

9

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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questions relevant to the relationship between corporate power and the human experience? My
study will address these questions in ways that enhance our understanding of the corporation.
While the corporation had evolved into a “person” with a “voice” during the Industrial
Revolution, its speech rights remained limited until a series of Supreme Court cases in the 1970s.
These decisions established the idea that corporations had the same rights to free speech as
human beings (i.e., American citizens) under the First Amendment. As such, these rulings
functioned as the foundation for Nike’s arguments against Kasky nearly twenty years later. More
importantly, however, these rulings functioned to redefine the spending of money by artificial
corporate persons as political expression commensurate with the physiological speech of natural
persons. My study explains how these processes unfolded and addresses their ongoing
implications.
Corporate speech rights10 are a key source of corporate power, especially political power.
The Supreme Court’s declaration that money equals speech in several landmark decisions –
Buckley v. Valeo (1976), First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), and most recently
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010)11 – dramatically affects the political
process by creating conditions that make it easy for corporations to use their massive wealth to
“out speak” natural persons in the public sphere.12 As Robert Kerr notes with a hypothetical
10

The mention of “corporate speech” and “corporate speech rights” refers to “corporate political
expression.” Greg Lisby, “Regulating Public Relations,” Communication and the Law, Ed. W. Wat
Hopkins (Northport, AL: Vision Press, 2010) 181.
11
12

Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

It should be noted that Buckley is not a corporate speech rights case in the purest sense. Neither party
involved in the litigation was a corporation. However, Buckley is often discussed within the context of
corporate speech rights cases because its transformation of money into speech paved the way for
corporations to more directly influence political elections. In this dissertation, I discuss Buckley in the
context of corporate speech rights cases and as an enabler or prerequisite for corporate political
expression.
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example, corporate lobbyists could now tell candidates, “We have got a million we can spend
advertising for you or against you – whichever one you want.”13 With First Amendment legal
protections for their unlimited spending as speech, corporations are well-positioned to use their
money as speech to affect the outcome of political elections.
In analyzing the implications of corporate speech rights cases, my point of departure is to
look at the very concept of money as speech as an articulation of the ideological principles of
economic liberalism, more recently termed “neoliberalism.” 14 These principles encourage the
protection of private property, private enterprise, and the expansion of the free market and
corporate rights. They also advocate for decreased public oversight and fewer government
regulations. My study aims to determine if – and if so, how – these ideological principles are
present in several key Supreme Court rulings on corporate rights. I will suggest that forms of
these ideological principles of economic liberalism may be present in major landmark rulings on
corporate rights from Santa Clara, which introduced a new form of corporate personhood, to
Kasky, which revealed how the corporation sought to use its voice, to all of the corporate speech
rights rulings including Buckley, Bellotti, and Citizens United.15
In order to identify these ideologies of economic liberalism and neoliberalism to
determine if they are operating in judicial texts, and to unpack their functions and implications, I
13

Robert L. Kerr, “Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating Lochner’s Error in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission,” Communication Law and Policy 15.4 (2010): 312.
14

The terms “economic liberalism” and “neoliberalism” are sometimes used interchangeably in this study
because they share so many common principles. However, I do make a distinction, and the distinction I
make between the two is a historical, chronological one. Because the term neoliberalism did not begin to
be used until the 1970s, I use “economic liberalism” to discuss economic and political economic relations
prior to that time. Analysis and commentary on Supreme Court cases after 1970 use the term
“neoliberalism” to reflect that chronological distinction.
15

Buckley is not a corporate speech rights case, but I am discussing it in the context of corporate speech
rights cases because it is often discussed with other landmark rulings on corporate rights.
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engage in an ideological analysis of each landmark ruling. My analysis includes an examination
of majority and dissenting opinions that take into account the context of their emergence. 16 The
analyses also contribute to an awareness of how and why ideologies of economic liberalism may
appear in and be reproduced through presumably neutral judicial texts. In sum, my analysis
focuses on how certain Supreme Court rulings on corporate speech rights may function to
promote and legitimate the interests of corporations based on the principles of economic
liberalism. 17 These principles have a tendency to privilege profit above people and operate in
opposition to human interests.
There are many good reasons to study the corporation. Corporations are important and
necessary institutions in society. They are undoubtedly a source of creativity, innovation and
jobs. Their wealth provides the economic stability necessary for democratic, capitalist societies
to function peacefully. However, their wealth and power are also cause for concern because
corporations have too often advanced their interests at the expense of natural human beings
through environmental pollution, disregard for product safety regulations, and so on.18 Of course,
this is nothing new.
Skepticism of corporate power is part of our nation’s history. In 1816, Thomas Jefferson
wrote, “I hope we shall…crush in its birth the aristocracy of our moneyed corporations which
dare already to challenge our government in a trial of strength, and bid defiance to the laws of

16

The discussion of Supreme Court decisions is augmented with scholarly and popular literature and/or
media coverage in some instances to provide additional historical and contemporary context.
17

Here I draw primarily from the work of Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso,
2007). See also David Hawkes, Ideology: The New Critical Idiom (London: Routledge, 2003). These
works are addressed more specifically in the next chapter.
18

These are defined as externalities. Externalities are the costs of doing business that are not included in
the corporation’s operational budget and that are displaced on to society.
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our country.”19 A year later James Madison warned, “There is an evil which ought to be guarded
against in the indefinite accumulation of property from the capacity of holding it in perpetuity
by…corporations. The power of all corporations ought to be limited to this respect. The growing
wealth acquired by them never fails to be a source of abuses.” 20
The founding fathers did not hate corporations. They knew that the long-term success of
the nation depended on the economic strength that business organizations could provide.
However, like American citizens today, they were fearful of what could happen when private
enterprise gained too much wealth and power. They had not forgotten the colonies’ experiences
with the East India Company. The company was known for its brutality toward both the human
beings that it forced into slavery (or otherwise compelled to labor) and the smaller businesses
that it ousted from the marketplace to stomp out competition. 21 Despite early concerns about the
wealth and power of business organizations, the corporation was certainly not “crushed in its
birth” as Jefferson had hoped. By the end of the nineteenth century the exact opposite had come
true. The Supreme Court had given legal “birth” to a new corporate person. Since this
“personification” took place, corporations have continued to secure more Constitutional rights
and expand their sphere of influence.
Today, modern corporations are far more than mere business organizations. As Ted Nace
explains, “Because it is so adaptable, the corporation seems on an inexorable course toward
19

Thomas Jefferson, Letter to George Logan, Lynchburg, VA, 12 Nov. 1816, Rpt. in The Works of
Thomas Jefferson, Federal Edition, vol. 12 (New York and London: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1904-1905)
1 Aug 2012 <http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/808/883522009635>.
20

James Madison, “Document 64, Detached Memoranda,” The Founders’ Constitution, Volume 5,
Amendment I (Religion), Eds. Philip B. Kurner and Ralph Lerner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2000) 10 Aug 2012 <http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions64.html>.
21

See Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press,
1944); Nace; Hartmann.
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permeating every aspect of human life, not just the traditional economic spheres but
increasingly…public spheres.”22 Today, corporations are so thoroughly ingrained into every
aspect of the human experience that they not only provide products and services, but they also
endorse or oppose political candidates, and they even suggest potential friends and mates.23
Nace elaborates further:
In many ways the corporation is coming to know us better than we know it. It involves
itself with us intimately. It participates in our birthing, our education, even our sexuality;
it tracks our personal habits, entertains us, imprisons us; it helps us fight off dread
diseases, manufactures the food we eat, barters and trades with us in a common economic
system, jostles us in the political arena, talks to us in a human voice, sues us if we
threaten it.24
As Nace describes, corporate influence has become so pervasive that corporations seem to have
become the new ideological state apparatus (ISA). Louis Althusser defines an ISA as “a certain
number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct
and specialized institutions.” 25 Like other ISAs, including churches, schools, the family, the law,
the political system, trade-union, media and culture, the corporation26 is a significant contributor
22

Nace 226-227.

23

Examples of this are companies like Facebook, eHarmony and Match.com which specialize in
suggesting friends and potential mates.
24

Nace 227.

25

Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation,”
“Lenin and Philosophy” and Other Essays, Ben Brewster, trans. (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1971) 14, Rpt. on Marxists Internet Archive <http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/
1970/ideology.htm> 10 Aug 2012.
26

It should be noted that, in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Althusser did not include
corporations on his list of ISAs (see Althusser 15), but corporations seem to meet the criteria for ISAs laid
out in his essay.
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to the production and reproduction of social relations. 27 It inculcates, disciplines, and punishes,
but persuades mainly through ideological means. 28
Is it fair to say that the corporation has supplanted the authority and influence of the
state? Stanley Deetz goes so far as to claim that “the commercial corporation has eclipsed the
state, family, residential community, and moral community…. Corporate organizations make
most decisions regarding the use of resources, the development of technologies, the products
available, and the working relations among people.”29 If Deetz is correct, perhaps we are now
living in a new age defined by the ideological corporate apparatus.
The sheer speed and magnitude with which the corporation has come to infiltrate nearly
every aspect of human life, rising to nearly omnipotent power, is astounding considering that the
modern corporation is a relatively new institution compared to the family, church, and state.
Until the late nineteenth century, business in this country was generally handled by sole

27

Althusser 15.

28

History shows that corporations have not been shy about using repressive measures. Corporations have
had security teams and police-type forces. Corporations have also launched SLAPP (strategic lawsuit
against public participation) lawsuits as a method of repression or punishment. A SLAPP is filed by
corporations and designed to suppress or eliminate public criticism or opposition. The SLAPP plaintiff
essentially forces its opponent into a war of financial attrition. SLAPP suits are often effective because
average members of the public cannot afford to mount a long-term legal defense, so they are ultimately
forced to abandon the lawsuit and their criticism of the corporation. Fear of a SLAPP suit can easily
intimidate other members of the public from joining the debate. For more on SLAPP lawsuits, see Nace
145-146; Hartmann 204-205. See also “Responding to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
(SLAPPs),” Citizen Media Law Project, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, 19
Jul 2012 <http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/responding-strategic-lawsuits-against-publicparticipation-slapps>.
29

Stanley A. Deetz, Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization: Developments in the
Communication and Politics of Everyday Life (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992)
2-3.
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proprietorships, partnerships and joint stock companies – not corporations (like the kinds of large
corporate business entities that have arisen since the advent of the Industrial Revolution). 30
There is no question that the modern corporation would not be what it is today absent
certain landmark Supreme Court decisions, especially the ones selected for analysis in this study.
These decisions have changed the very idea of the corporation. When we consider the magnitude
of these decisions, questions arise: how, why and when did the Supreme Court become so
powerful? In many ways, the vast powers of the Court can be conceived of as an outcome of the
political struggle between John Adams and the Federalists and Thomas Jefferson and the
Republicans that began in the late 1700s. This struggle for political power set the tone for the
ongoing battle between economic liberals and political liberals that is discussed in the next
chapter. For now, suffice it to say, “The very heart of Federalism was its hatred of democracy,”
according to Claude Bowers. 31 While Federalists favored wealthy interests and big business,
Republicans were more sympathetic to the plight of the common man and wanted to ensure that
his interests were represented in the democratic process. The Federalists of yesterday have much
in common with the neoliberals of today who favor the expansion of private enterprise, the
protection of private wealth, and the rise of the free market and corporate rights, as I will argue
in the following pages. Now, however, it is important to continue the focus on how the Supreme
Court rose to legal omnipotence.

30

John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea
(New York: The Modern Library, 2005); Gregory A Mark, “The Personification of the Business
Corporation in American Law,” The University of Chicago Law Review 54 (1987): 1441-1442.
31

Claude Bowers, Jefferson in Power: The Death Struggle of the Federalists (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1964) 168. See also Per Fjelstad, “Legal Judgment and Cultural Motivation: Enthymematic Form in
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The political acrimony between the Federalists and the Republicans intensified in 1801 as
Thomas Jefferson prepared to assume the presidency, wresting power from former President
John Adams and the Federalist Party, who also lost control of Congress to the Republicans.
Although the Federalists lost the battle for the presidency and their majority in Congress, they
had no intention of losing the war for power and control of the country and its future direction.
They set their sights on sustaining and expanding their power within the judicial branch. 32
Just before the official transition of presidential power, President Adams appointed John
Marshall, a leading member of the Federalist Party, to Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. On
his last evening in power, Adams appointed forty-two new judges to the federal circuit court.
These new justices were called the “midnight justices” by those suspicious of or in opposition to
their appointment.33 In order for the “midnight justices” to be officially appointed, documents
had to be delivered to incoming President Jefferson and signed. James Madison, Jefferson’s new
Secretary of State, was responsible for delivering the documents and securing signatures. No
official record of exactly what happened next exists, but four of the forty-two documents were
apparently never delivered to President Jefferson and never signed. William Marbury’s
paperwork was among the missing documents. Marbury decided to file suit against Madison in
the Supreme Court.34 In Marbury v. Madison (1803), the plaintiff asked that the Secretary of
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State show cause why the documents were not or should not be delivered, and the suit requested
that Marbury be instated as a justice.35
Given the tumultuous political climate of the time that sharply divided Federalists and
Republicans, and given the suspicion surrounding Marshall’s appointment and the appointment
of the “midnight justices,” 36 the Supreme Court in general and Marshall in particular faced a
dilemma. If the Court ruled for Marbury, it would appear to be overtly taking part in mere
partisan politics, and of course partisan politics is supposed to be beneath a judiciary that prides
itself on neutrality, objectivity, and its ability to provide impartial interpretation of legal
discourses. If the Court ruled against the plaintiff, the Federalist goal of expanding its power
through the judiciary could be compromised, because, numerically, fewer Federalist judges
would assume office. Moreover, if the Court ruled against Marbury, it could appear as though
Marshall had acquiesced to Jefferson and the Republicans, which could possibly weaken the
overall authority of the judiciary. 37
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, which essentially ruled against Marbury, but
firmly established the judicial authority of the Supreme Court. Justice Marshall wrote:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret
that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of
each. So, if a law be in opposition of the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution
apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to
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the law, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is the very essence of judicial duty. 38
This is considered one of the most brilliant legal maneuvers in history because Marshall
compromised neither Federalist power nor Supreme Court authority in this “court-empowering
precedent.”39
According to H.L. LaRue, the heart of Marshall’s strategy lay in his interpretation of the
Constitution and in his conception of the Supreme Court’s role in society. LaRue wrote,
He reread the statute that was supposedly the basis of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction
over the case and decided that it was unconstitutional. He informed Congress that it could
not force the Supreme Court to take this case and dismissed it! Of course, the members of
Congress did not want him to take the case, and so there was nothing practical they could
do to reverse his ruling. Marshall asserted the power to do nothing, and since nothing is
what they wanted him to do, they were powerless to reverse him. 40
As LaRue’s assertions indicate, Marshall’s decision reinforced the Court’s position as the official
interpreter of the Constitution and as the final authority on the law of the land. From this
position, the Supreme Court’s judicial discourse has shaped life in this country – from who is
considered a person to what laws govern personhood and relations between persons,
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organizations, and institutions. This is particularly evident within the context of the “artificial”
person and the rise of the modern corporation. 41
The rise of the modern American corporation is a fascinating story, and one that can be
told from a number of angles. Many popular accounts of the corporation’s successful ascension
to power credit American business ingenuity and the hard work of savvy individuals. Without
discounting the work of smart, entrepreneurially-minded business people who made tremendous
sacrifices to help corporations attain vast wealth and power, this dissertation approaches the
corporation’s evolution from another angle.
I enter the conversation by nuancing our understanding of the corporation by analyzing
what I argue are the primary catalysts for the expansion of its power: the personification of the
corporation, the development of the corporate voice as represented through the public relations
field, and the establishment of corporate speech rights. While other studies have examined each
of these aspects of corporate power, these aspects are typically not united in a single study to tell
the story of the corporation’s evolution. Few use ideological theory as a critical lens to analyze
the Supreme Court decisions featured in this dissertation, and studies have not generally united
the eclectic mix of theories displayed here to analyze the corporation, its evolution and power as
constituted through Supreme Court discourse.
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Following this introduction is Chapter Two: a theoretical overview and description of my
methodological approach. My critical, theoretical approach to the analysis of the Supreme Court
rulings is outlined in detail. 42 I explicate how I will use the method of ideological criticism to
determine if or how statements in Supreme Court rulings on corporate rights promote and
legitimate the corporate interest at the expense of human beings by adhering to the ideological
principles of economic liberalism that privilege profit above people as a taken for granted norm.
Once I lay out my theoretical framework and methodological approach, I turn my attention to the
analysis of the first landmark Supreme Court ruling under study.
Chapter Three provides an analysis of Santa Clara. I engage in an ideological critique of
the judicial discourse constituting the case that is sensitive to the racialized roots of corporate
personhood. The chapter explains how the corporation was able to appropriate the Fourteenth
Amendment to seize personhood rights, which functioned to contribute to an ongoing ontological
conflation between artificial and natural persons. This conflation positioned the corporation to
receive more and more rights intended for human beings. I also augment my rhetorical and
ideological analysis with critical race theory to show how conceptualizations of race destabilized
notions of personhood, paving the way for people to be regarded as things, and things (such as
corporations) to be treated as people in American jurisprudence. In addition, I address the
ongoing implications of corporate personhood for human beings.
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In Chapter Four, I describe the evolution of the corporate voice via the public relations
field. I show how the corporate voice and public relations developed together during the Industrial
Revolution to help big business persuade the public that it was a benevolent member of society.
Then I provide an ideological critique of Nike v. Kasky that explores how the corporate voice may
be used in ways that are perceived as deceptive. In addition, the critique addresses how the
corporate voice sometimes articulates the principles of neoliberalism. 43 The chapter also draws
upon ideological, rhetorical and public relations theories to address how the Supreme Court’s
ruling – or lack thereof – functioned to protect corporate rights and power.
Chapter Five expands the exploration of the corporation’s rise to power via Supreme
Court rulings by focusing on the evolution of corporate speech rights. I engage in an ideological
analysis of Buckley v. Valeo, First National Bank v. Bellotti, and Citizens United. I focus on how
these key landmark rulings functioned to transform money into speech, making it possible for
corporations to outspend natural persons in ways that challenge the effectiveness of natural
persons’ voices in public debates or political contests. The analysis also describes how Supreme
Court rulings on corporate speech rights can function to support the ideological principles of
economic liberalism by expanding corporate rights and facilitating the participation of
corporations in political elections. Finally, the chapter addresses how the idea of “corporate
speech rights,” especially as articulated in certain Supreme Court decisions, functions to
reinforce the improper ontological conflation of human beings and corporations in ways that
advantage corporations.
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I conclude by discussing the broad implications of corporate power as constituted through
corporate personhood, voice, and speech rights. I discuss how these three aspects of the modern
corporate form are central to the corporation’s evolution. In fact, they form a veritable trinity of
corporate power. There is solid evidence to suggest that this trinity, or trifecta even, has been
enabled by Supreme Court decisions that serve a reifying function by treating people as things
and things as people in American jurisprudence. I also address how this reifying function is
informed by the ideological principles of economic liberalism, which seek to maintain the
power-hold of the power elite and appear in Supreme Court discourse on corporate rights.
It would be far too easy to arrive at the conclusion that corporations are bad and we
should simply do away with them. Corporations, however, are fundamental to the nation’s
economic survival. As Greg Lisby wrote:
The economy – the foundation and fiber of the United States – is based upon the
exchange of goods and services and upon the marketing and promotion of those
exchanges. In no other country does capitalism exist as such a crucial part of society. As
a result, corporate entities have many of the same rights and privileges as natural persons
under the Constitution. 44
Lisby accurately describes the reality of the circumstances under which we live. In doing so, he
illuminates the difficulty of accepting arguments that suggest we simply should do away with the
corporation altogether.45 Instead of attempting to eradicate the corporation, it seems more
appropriate to find ways to strike a more sensible balance of power between human beings and
44
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corporations. Whether or not we like it, in advanced capitalism, the viability of our future has
become tied to the viability of corporation’s future. As one example, our retirement and
investment funds, or the ones that we hope to have or will one day need, are deeply dependent on
the financial well-being of corporations, even ones we dislike.
The interests of the common man have become perhaps inextricably intertwined with
those of the corporate conglomerates. If it is true that, as the old saying goes, “we’re all in this
together,” then we as in “We the people,” the citizens of the United States, must figure out what
to do. One important step is to develop a sophisticated understanding of the corporate form and
the key components of its power, which is the goal of this dissertation. From that point, we can
begin to figure out how to better manage corporations and our relations with them. Analyzing the
three key aspects of the modern corporate form – its personification, voice and speech rights –
and how they have contributed to its power will provide significant insights. Because
corporations are so pervasive and powerful, it is incumbent upon human beings to take up this
effort.
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2. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
It is impossible to understand the complexity, nature, and functions of the corporation,
including the magnitude of its power and influence, without a discussion of the law. This chapter
includes such a discussion, and begins with an overview of the theoretical approach that this
study will take. The initial overview lays the foundation for the subsequent description of my
methodological approach to analyzing the key Supreme Court decisions that I argue are the basis
of the modern corporate form and its power.
Many people still believe that the law is unequivocally neutral, impartial, and objective,
and why shouldn’t we? Most of us grow up under this assumption. The authoritative nature of
judicial discourse contributes to the law’s perceived legitimacy. As William Lewis explains:
Judicial discourse is predominantly conceived as the application of pre-existing principles
to determinate cases. The results of judicial opinions presumably arise from the
application of law to facts; except for occasional bad judges, decisions are likely to be
correct and reproducible; they are to be judged by the accuracy of their interpretation of
the law and by the quality of their deductive inference. The dominant presumption of the
legal legitimacy is that, properly applied, the process of adjudication can achieve
reasonably just and objective results, restrain individual passions and prejudices, and
apply the law fairly among cases and across time. 46
Here Lewis articulates the dominant paradigm of the law, and most Americans are socialized
to accept this perspective. Many are believers until something happens to shake their faith:
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a criminal goes unpunished, an innocent person is wrongly convicted, or the law bestows some
unfair advantage. Once our faith is shaken, we begin to question. We begin to think more deeply
about our fundamental assumptions about the law’s inherent objectivity. 47
My methodological approach emerges from this point of questioning. In contrast to the
dominant paradigm of the law, it subscribes to the notion that the law is often partial, with
justices influenced by their own attitudes, beliefs, or experiences. This makes the law an ideal
place for a rhetorical intervention – the kind that seeks to better understand and explicate the
correspondence between language, ideology and social relations, and that seeks to more precisely
reveal how judicial discourse functions to support certain aims and reinforce particular power
relations. There is scholarly support for this position.
Eileen Scallen, for example, identifies three ways in which rhetorical criticism enriches
the study of legal texts. Rhetorical criticism is instructive, which addresses the persuasive effects
of legal texts; reconstructive, which means it exposes a text’s hidden dimensions and provides
alternative interpretations and understandings; and evaluative, which explicates the quality and
soundness of legal reasoning and judgment. 48 Summarizing more of the ways in which rhetorical
criticism enriches legal studies, she writes, “Rhetorical criticism is a means to a more complete
understanding of legal discourse, an understanding not only of the reasons for its success or
failure in a time-bound context, but also its significance for the legal community and society
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as a whole.”49 In other words, when we confront the law from a rhetorical perspective we are
able to make better informed judgments about its meanings, functions, and implications on
multiple levels.
Recognizing that the law is often characterized as objective, and therefore in opposition
to rhetoric (which is often framed wrongly as linguistic manipulation or deception), Marouf
Hasian, Jr. argues that the traditional view of the law and its relationship to rhetoric requires
extensive revision. 50 His theoretical framework is inspired by work from Critical Legal Studies
(CLS). In the 1970s, CLS scholars were among the first to challenge the presumed neutrality of
the law. In response to the dominant position, CLS scholars claimed the following:
Legal discourse is often aimed at legitimating structures of power and distributions of
wealth that are unjust and illegitimate
Legal texts can be exposed as riddled with contradictions and deep-level incoherence
Legal documents are generally indeterminate.51
Incorporating the fundamental theoretical assumptions of CLS, Hasian introduced the concept of
Critical Legal Rhetoric (CLR). His approach unites the theoretical underpinnings of CLS and
rhetoric to examine how the discursive fragments of legal discourse function to hide the
contradictions and power relations inherent within legal discourse. 52 Hasian used his CLR
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method to rhetorically analyze Buck v. Bell (1927)53 and other Supreme Court decisions limiting
or expanding constitutional rights to privacy. His analysis reveals that Supreme Court judicial
discourse functions in several ways that are far from neutral. His study found that judicial
decisions can function as a sword, separating citizens from their human rights to reproduction; a
shield, protecting citizens from governmental intrusion and coercion; and a menace, bringing
harm and suffering to citizens.54 His rhetorical analysis of judicial opinions shows how the
rulings produced and reproduced particular power relationships that, in varying degrees, restrict
human agency.
Applying literary and rhetorical theory to the study of legal texts, Lewis has shown how
the law has a tendency to be framed as impartial and supreme through judicial decisions that
operate as romantic texts. As romantic texts, judicial rulings are perceived to be a “righter of
wrongs” in a society where the law supposedly functions as a “heroic character capable of
moderating, regulating and directing social action.”55 This characterization of the law fits well
with the dominant paradigm. In his analysis of the historic First Amendment flag-burning case
Texas v. Johnson (1989),56 Lewis argues that the law is most appropriately understood within a
tragic frame because “the tragic sensibility displays us all together in shared, continuing
struggles for meaning. Featuring limits as well as possibilities of human action, the tragedy of
the law can incorporate continual self-criticism.”57 Unlike the romantic frame, which requires no
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critical reflection because the law is assumed to be an unequivocal hero, a tragic view produces
adjudication that is sensitive to the power relations that give all human and organizational
relations social meaning. Lewis’ conceptualization of the law as tragic provides another way to
understand how judicial discourse functions in ways that are not necessarily objective,
specifically because it is shaped and influenced by human struggles, limitations, and selfinterested predilections.
A self-reflexive approach to the law, sensitive to its tragic nature as Lewis has described,
takes us beyond merely evaluating legal texts in terms of their persuasive efficacy (i.e., how and
why did argument A win out over argument B).58 Instead, this kind of approach helps us to
understand complexities such as why good legal arguments fail and why bad arguments
succeed. 59 A tragic view also enables us to see contradictions such as the sense of good in evil
and the evil in good that can characterize the authoritative and dynamic nature of judicial texts. 60
In short, for Lewis, attention to the rhetorical nature of legal discourse allows us to understand
that the law is “more a cultural construction than objective description, more a source of social
meaning than a force for behavioral control.” 61
James Boyd White’s work also challenges the dominant conception of the law as neutral
and impartial. White instead emphasizes the cultural aspects of the law. For White, the law is
inherently rhetorical. He explains, “It is at once a social activity – a way of acting with a certain
set of materials found in the culture. It is always communal, both in the sense that it always takes
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place in a social context, and in the sense that it is always constitutive of the community by
which it works.”62 Legal discourse within his perspective is a form of constitutive rhetoric, which
he defines as the “study of the ways we constitute ourselves as individuals, as communities, and
as cultures whenever we speak.”63 White also characterizes constitutive rhetoric as “all language
activity that goes into the constitution of actual human cultures and communities.” 64 When legal
discourse is situated as constitutive rhetoric, the close connection between rhetoric, the law, and
culture emerges. White summarizes the relationship this way: “The law is an art of persuasion
that creates the objects of its persuasion, for it constitutes both the community and the culture it
commends.”65
Work from these scholars helps us to see how the law can function in a variety of ways –
even as the heroic “righter of wrongs,” as Lewis’ romantic frame describes. Rhetorical and
critical approaches to analyzing legal discourse are valuable because they show how the law can
operate in accordance with the dominant paradigm as an objective righter of wrongs, and they
also show how the law can operate in ways that are subjective and ideological. Even if we accept
the dominant paradigm of the law as objective, its presumed neutrality still should not insulate it
from rhetorical or critical investigation. As Philip Wander has noted, “No credo, however lyrical,
authentically expressed or truly believed should escape cross-examination.”66 I believe that
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Wander’s assertion has direct relevance for the study of judicial texts, especially because the
work of rhetorical-legal scholars confirms that the law is not necessarily objective, neutral or
impartial. In my view, rhetorical and critical approaches to the law illuminate the need for an
ideological analysis and understanding of legal discourse. Here it is appropriate to embark upon
a more in-depth discussion of ideology.
Historically speaking, the French first used the term “ideology” to describe the critical
study of ideas. Ideas are important because as, Ernest J. Wrage points out, “The rhetorical analysis
of ideas provides an index to the history of man’s values and goals, his hopes and fears, his
aspirations and negations, to what he considers expedient or inapplicable.”67 Ideas are significant
because they live on long after the people who introduce them and imbue them into the social
fabric. Current ideas continue to shape and organize social relations until they are eclipsed by
new ideas that compete and jockey for position and prominence in the public sphere.68
After the French, Marx later defined ideology as the dominant ideas of the ruling class.
The German philosophers of the Frankfurt School followed with their own conception of
ideology as a partiality masking itself as a totality that aims to serve particular interests. 69 At the
most basic level, ideology can be understood as a system of beliefs, values and attitudes that
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form a consistent pattern influencing how its adherents view and act in the world. 70 Ideologies
may reflect and reproduce a group’s political, economic, social, and/or cultural interests. 71
Ideologies are also important because they have a material component that takes shape when
beliefs are actualized in human interactions. Ideologies become dominant or hegemonic when
the particular interests they serve are masked or otherwise become obscured from view, and they
enter into the politics of everyday life as taken-for-granted norms, natural occurrences, and
universal truths. Hegemonic ideologies instill “the sense that things are as they have to be.” 72 To
remain hegemonic, ideologies must be constantly produced, reproduced, articulated, and
defended through an array of rhetorical strategies and practices. 73 Thus, ideologies come to
dominate by processes of normalization. Ideology is the substance of the rhetoric of “the true
believer” – meaning that it does not need to be supported by data or facts in order to be believed
because its inculcation is so complete that the ideology has become doctrinal, representing the
ultimate symbolic and conceptual closure. 74 It is also important to point out that ideologies are
not always bad or negative. Similar to Foucault’s conception of a “good” hegemonic power-hold,
ideologies always come with rewards in return for submission or adherence. 75 In addition, some
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ideologies are qualitatively good, as in life-affirming, such as one that would encourage the kind
and gentle treatment of others.
As this discussion suggests, the term “ideology” has several meanings. Most often,
ideology is thought of as a form of false consciousness or in terms of the domination thesis,
which suggests that power relations emanate from the ruling class. 76 Terry Eagleton, however,
offers several additional understandings of ideology: the production of ideas, beliefs, and values
in social life that shape social thought; ideas and beliefs that symbolize the conditions and life
experiences of socially significant groups or classes of people; the promotion and legitimation of
the interest of these socially significant or dominant groups in opposition to other interests; the
promotion of the ideas that function to unify a social formation in ways that are convenient to the
ruling class or dominant group; the legitimation of the ideas of the ruling group via “distortion
and dissimulation; and false or deceptive beliefs arising not from the dominant class but from the
structure of society as a whole.”77
Eagleton explains that within the context of ideological studies, the most efficient and
effective “oppressor is the one who persuades his underlings to love, desire and identify with his
power.”78 This means the act of emancipation requires us to divorce ourselves from that part of
ourselves which is constituted through and complacent with an ideology that is comfortable, but
hindering our liberation. The belief that judicial discourse is inherently objective is a perfect
example of what Eagleton describes. In the U.S. we have been socialized into accepting the law’s
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inherent objectivity and fairness, and that belief provides us with a certain sense of comfort, even
if deep down we suspect that it is not always or necessarily true.
Eagleton’s conceptualization of effective ideology aligns well with Kenneth Burke’s
theory of identification. Identification takes place when an individual or a group convinces
another that they have shared interests whether they actually do or not. Theories of identification
can be applied in a variety of contexts. For example, identification has been taken up in
organizational communications studies: George Cheney showed how identification could be used
by corporations as a rhetorical strategy to align employee interests with corporate interests.79 In
political communication studies, Mary Stuckey and Frederick J. Antczak use the theory of
identification to analyze how images in political campaigns create particular meanings and can
establish a sense of “interpretive dominance.” 80 Considering the role of identification is useful in
ideological analysis because it provides a way to understand how individuals come to participate
in their own domination and demise, and it also confirms Eagleton’s assertion that the best, most
effective criticism is that which “makes sense to the mystified subject itself.” 81
Rhetorical scholars have taken up the concept of ideology in a variety of ways. 82 Wander
described ideology as the partiality of a world view, body of belief or universe of discourse that
79
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can only be revealed through careful analysis. 83 This is his purpose for criticism, which he argues
must go beyond the mere appreciation of texts. Wander responded to the dominance of neoAristotelian criticism, including its strong commitment to textual appreciation, by asserting that
ideological criticism was necessary because we live in a society that is constantly engaged in
political conflicts, social struggles, battles for power, and competition over resources. Under
such conditions, it is irresponsible for criticism to purely focus on textual form and beauty. The
world cannot afford for criticism to take a politically neutral stance. Criticism must make
judgments about discourse in order to help the public make decisions from a more enlightened or
informed perspective. For Wander,
Criticism takes an ideological turn when it recognizes the existence of powerful vested
interests benefiting from and consistently urging policies and technology that threaten life
on this planet, when it realizes we search for alternatives. The situation is being
constructed; it will not be averted either by ignoring or placing it beyond our province.
An ideological turn in modern criticism reflects the existence of crisis, acknowledges the
influence of the established interests and the reality of alternative world-views, and
commends rhetorical analyses not only of the actions implied but also of the interests
represented.84
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My study explores how the powerful interests of corporations may have benefitted from certain
Supreme Court landmark decisions on personhood and speech rights. It will also explore some of
the ways that these interests benefit at the expense of human life and agency. Exposing these
relations of power will be done in an effort to discover how to disrupt and challenge them.
Raymie McKerrow’s critical rhetoric approach is also focused on discovering ideological
discourses, unmasking them, and identifying ways to resist them to achieve a more just and
egalitarian social order. McKerrow draws upon work from critical theorists such as Foucault and
Adorno, using their ideas as a theoretical toolbox to enrich his own critical approach, which is
dedicated to demystifying discourses of power. For McKerrow, critical rhetoric means many
things. First, it is “a perspective on rhetoric that explores, in theoretical and practical terms, the
implications of a theory that is divorced from the constraints of a Platonic conception.” 85 Thus
McKerrow dismisses the kinds of characterizations of rhetoric that mistake it for mere linguistic
artifice disconnected from, and artificial to, the “real world.” Instead, he acknowledges that
rhetoric is constitutive of the human experience. 86 According to McKerrow, “The task of a
critical rhetoric is to undermine and expose the discourse of power in order to thwart its effects
in a social relation.” 87 McKerrow also lays out eight principles of critical praxis:
1) Ideologiekritik, which infers that ideological critique is a practice and not a method;
2) the discourse of power is material, meaning it has more than just abstract, intangible
aspects and consequences; 3) rhetoric constitutes doxastic rather than epistemic
knowledge and therefore critical rhetoric must focus on how knowledge is created
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through social and persuasive means, not scientific knowledge; 4) naming is the central
symbolic act of a nominalist rhetoric; 5) influence is not causality; 6) absence is as
important as presence in understanding and evaluating symbolic action; 7) fragments
contain the potential for polysemic rather than monosemic interpretation; and 8) criticism
is a performance. 88
Most importantly for McKerrow, critical rhetoric should serve an emancipatory purpose that
eliminates oppression to achieve an improved human experience. In the chapters that follow,
several of McKerrow’s eight principles of critical praxis are peppered throughout the analyses
(where appropriate) to enhance the discussion by illuminating specific points. For example, the
sixth principle, “Absence is as important as presence in understanding and evaluating symbolic
action” is especially significant to my analysis of the Santa Clara ruling. In this ruling, the
Supreme Court essentially created corporate personhood even though any mention of the phrase
“corporate personhood” was noticeably absent from the opinion.
Work from these ideological theorists and critics supports assertions that judicial
discourse is not necessarily neutral and that those discourses that are presumed or assumed to be
neutral probably need the most rhetorical intervention. Authoritative judicial discourses such as
Supreme Court rulings are an ideal site for a rhetorical analysis based on ideological criticism
because this approach exposes the underlying interests inherent in any legal text. Ideological
criticism also reveals the many ways that legal texts shape our sense of the social world and the
material conditions under which we live.
The methodological approach to the analysis of Supreme Court discourse undertaken in
this study draws from the tradition of ideological and rhetorical scholarship presented above.
88

McKerrow 102-108.

35
Eagleton’s conceptualization of ideology as the “promotion and legitimation of the interest of
socially significant or dominant groups in opposition to other interests” 89 is particularly central to
my work. In the chapters that follow, it will function as a critical lens through which I interpret
the judicial discourse under examination. In doing so, I attempt to show if, or how, landmark
Supreme Court rulings on corporate rights promote and legitimate corporate interests with
corporations being understood clearly to be a socially significant and dominant group. My
analysis of these rulings will also attempt to show if or how the corporate interests promoted in
the rulings are oppositional to the interests of human beings. 90
In order to analyze the key Supreme Court rulings on corporate rights, I engage in close
textual analyses that look at the myriad ways that these judicial discourses might promote and
legitimate the interests of socially significant and dominant groups, which in the context of this
discussion are corporations. This close textual analysis, in the tradition of Michael McGee,
examines fragments of discourse, including how texts operate within contexts to engender a
sense of shared meaning. 91 In this case, the Supreme Court rulings are the texts, the
circumstances in which they occurred are the contexts, and this swirl of discourse, including
historical and social events, constitute the discursive fragments for my ideological analysis.
Essentially this study aims to show how analyzing a combination of texts within their
contexts functions to constitute meaning and shape social relations in ways that can serve the
ideological interests of corporations and their owners. With this ideological approach to
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rhetorical criticism, I am not forced to privilege text over context in my analysis. I can read both
in tandem, with the text and context reverberating against each other, allowing meaning to
emerge from the points of friction as my analysis of Supreme Court discourse unfolds. As the
critic, my goal is to identify and comment on what I perceive are the most significant emergent
meanings and central themes within these landmark rulings on corporate rights. An ideological
critique sensitive to the mutually constitutive nature of text and context is ideal for analyzing
something as complex as Supreme Court discourse on corporate rights. Methodologically,
ideological critique is ideal because it is flexible and easily accommodates augmentation by the
addition of other theories.
Because I argue that the source of modern corporate power corresponds to three historical
developments including the personification of the corporation under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the development of the corporate voice, and the acquisition of speech rights in the form of
political expression protected by the First Amendment, I need to be able to take into account
theories central to these three areas of the corporation’s development. The purpose is to unite
them with my overarching ideological analytical framework in order to make informed
judgments about how certain landmark Supreme Court decisions function in the specific
instances under study in this dissertation. So, for example, because the first case study on Santa
Clara deals with the Fourteenth Amendment, I incorporate theories of race into my ideological
analysis of the ruling. This means that in addition to examining the opinion to see if and how this
judicial text promotes and legitimates the ideological interests of corporations in opposition to
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human beings, 92 I also incorporate critical race theory (CRT) to illustrate how race played an
important role in the evolution of corporate personhood.93
Similarly, the next chapter addresses the evolution of the corporate voice through the
public relations field and includes an analysis of Nike v. Kasky – an important Supreme Court
case that involved public relations communications. Because of the focus on public relations
here, I incorporate theories from that field, along with rhetorical theories of identification. They
augment my overarching methodological approach of ideological criticism by illuminating
nuances specific to public relations and other forms of persuasive advocacy. This diverse array
of scholarly insights helps me to more fully explicate the role and function of public relations,
including the corporate voice, in contributing to the corporation’s rise to power.
Finally, because landmark Supreme Court rulings on corporate speech rights have
famously transformed money into speech with Buckley, then Bellotti, and most recently Citizens
United, I argue that economic liberalism is an ideological principle foundational to landmark
Supreme Court rulings on corporate speech rights, and I incorporate these theories into my
analysis of the cases. However, because I also argue that, more broadly conceived, Supreme
Court rulings on corporate rights betray principles of economic liberalism and neoliberalism,
these theories are woven throughout the study.
David Hawkes’ work, for example, is useful because he explores ideology within the
social and material influences of capitalism. According to Hawkes,
While the market exchange is obviously present in and necessary to any civilized society,
our postmodern society is historically unique in elevating the mercantile principle to a
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position of complete dominance over the economy, and I argue, over every area of public
and private experience. When it attains this degree of power, the market ceases to fulfill
its necessary but subordinate function as a means towards the end of civilized life. It
becomes, rather, an end in itself, and in consequence it takes on the aspect of a tyrannous,
destructive force, whose impact is felt within each of our minds as well as in our material
lives. The market becomes an ideology. 94
Hawkes’ characterization of ideology as a set of market relations inspired by capitalism is useful
to my discussions of Supreme Court rulings on corporate speech rights, which literally
transformed money into speech. Those rulings contextualize the spending of money by
corporations as equivalent to the speech of natural human beings. Within Hawkes’ approach to
ideology, “Money is not merely a convenient vehicle for exchange; money has significance, it
means something. In short, money talks, and it speaks the language of ideology.” 95 My
dissertation explores how Hawkes’ claim that money talks is exemplified in corporate speech
rights cases where money became First Amendment-protected speech. I explore how, within this
context, money, as well as Supreme Court discourse, speaks the language of economic liberal
ideology.
As Hawkes commentary suggests, the ideological principles of economic liberalism are
based on the model of Western capitalism. In my view, the overall gist of this model can be
summarized with a simple equation: low cost, high efficiency. 96 The ideological orientation of
this model adheres to a few fundamental principles, including free trade, strong private property
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rights, and self-interested competition. Proponents of this position assert that the market, when
left to self-oversight (meaning mostly free of governmental regulation and societal
accountability), will provide more political stability and more social freedoms than government
oversight can attain. 97 Within this paradigm, the role of the government is to protect the market
and ensure that big business can operate with as few restrictions as possible.
Critics of economic liberalism disagree with arguments that self-interested competition,
free markets, and minimally restrained capitalism can sufficiently provide the social stability and
democratic participation necessary for a healthy society to survive. 98 As Žižek notes of too many
western political systems, “The electoral system is increasingly conceived on the model of
market competition. Elections are like commercial exchange where voters ‘buy’ the option that
offers to do the job of maintaining social order, prosecuting crime, and so on, most efficiently.” 99
From this perspective, the principles of economic liberalism are obstacles to democratic
processes because they serve the special interests of powerful economic forces at the expense of
other, less powerful members of society.
One could say this group of critics is politically liberal yet economically conservative.
Unlike the economic liberals akin to the Federalists of yesteryear, political liberals argue that the
97
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power of the wealthiest members of society must be kept in check, massive concentrations of
wealth can pose a serious threat to just forms of government, and public virtue should be the
cornerstone of an ideal public sphere. 100 These are the principles of Jefferson and the antiFederalists, and they are as old as our nation itself. Though philosophically sound and seemingly
practical, political liberalism has failed to achieve the hegemonic strength of economic liberalism
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The upcoming chapter on corporate speech
rights will discuss some of the reasons why this has been the case. The principles of economic
liberalism have become dominant, hegemonic even, and currently prevail under the moniker of
“neoliberalism.”
Neoliberalism is a political and economic philosophy committed to advancing the
interests of big business and private enterprise through policies that encourage privatization,
deregulation, and the expansion of corporate rights and power. Identical to economic liberalism,
within the neoliberal paradigm, individual freedoms, social stability and widespread prosperity
are best guaranteed by the freedom of the market, which must have as few limitations as
possible. Neoliberalism began rising to dominance in the 1970s as a response to the FordistKeynesian policies of full employment, home ownership and strong government that dominated
economic policy from the 1930s to the 1970s.101 As Walter Greene wrote, “Today, the
hegemonic form of capitalism is neo-liberal, a rationality that governs the economy by ‘freeing
markets’ from regulation. More radically, it calls for the organization of all social life as a
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market.”102 But this transformation of social relations into market relations cannot take place
without an aggressive communication strategy, and Greene’s work highlights “how capitalism
increasingly relies on the social dimensions of communication – control, deliberation,
persuasion, cooperation, competition, creativity – for the accumulation of capital and the
appropriation of social wealth.”103 This is especially so within the context of public relations and
corporate speech rights. In light of these circumstances, I take up Greene’s charge that “we must
be sensitive to how capitalism incorporates rhetorical communication into its regime of
accumulation and its mode of regulation.”104
As I conduct my analysis of key Supreme Court decisions on corporate rights, I will
explore these judicial discourses to see what sorts of beliefs, values and attitudes – ideologies –
emanate from those texts, and what sorts of political, social, cultural and economic interests are
reproduced through them. Consistent with Eagleton’s paradigm, I look at “the promotion
and legitimation of the interests of these socially significant or dominant groups in opposition to
other interests.”105
The overarching purpose of this study is to find out if or how judicial discourse in the
form of key Supreme Court decisions on corporate rights legitimates and promotes the interests
of some groups over others in the specific instances under study in this dissertation. As I engage
in a close reading of each Supreme Court decision, I will identify statements in these texts that
comment on the role of corporations in society, especially when they attempt to persuasively
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justify the expansion of corporate rights and contribute to the proliferation of corporate
influence. Once these kinds of statements are identified, I will then be in a position to make some
determinations about what sorts of ideological positions emerge through, and are reinforced by,
the judicial discourses that constitute my objects of study. Once the ideological principles in the
decisions are identified, I will then comment on the decisions’ implications for society.
Finally, it should be noted that my methodological approach is inherently emic in
nature.106 That is, I do not apply a set of pre-existing theories and methods to uncritically analyze
Supreme Court discourse.107 I do not approach the analysis of a text from the outside. I allow the
texts, the actual decisions, to constitute the meanings derived from my analysis. In doing so, I
attempt to execute Black’s conceptualization of emic criticism as a form of critique that
“interprets its object on the object’s own terms.” 108 Thus, my close reading of key cases will
attempt to reveal if, or how, corporate power is constituted through an ideological orientation of
economic liberalism operating in Supreme Court rulings. This is done in an effort to provide a
well-rounded ideological analysis of key landmark Supreme Court rulings on corporate rights so
that some important truths, even if uncomfortable ones, might be revealed about the human
experience within the context of corporate personhood and speech.109
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The journey begins with an analysis of what I believe is the most significant event in the
history of the corporate form – its personification by the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth
Amendment in Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886).

44
3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SANTA CLARA
Slavery is the legal fiction that a person is property. Corporate personhood is the legal
fiction that property is a person.110
This chapter focuses on the personification of the corporation by the Supreme Court in
their landmark Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886) decision, because this
ruling is a fundamental contributor to modern corporate power.111 Several scholars have explored
the significance of the corporation’s personification by the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth
Amendment in Santa Clara. This chapter joins these conversations and contributes a rhetorical
analysis that is: 1) sensitive to the relationship between judicial text and social context,
2) cognizant of the ways that ideological orientations can slip into presumably neutral texts
such as judicial decisions, and 3) keenly aware of the racialized roots of corporate personhood.
I accomplish these goals by engaging in a close reading of the Santa Clara ruling within the
context of the historical events surrounding the case. As I analyze this ruling, especially its
ideological aspects, I explore how it contributes to the “promotion and legitimation of
the interests of socially significant or dominant groups in opposition to other interests.” 112 Not
all interests warrant the attention and rigor of an ideological critique. As Eagleton notes,
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“The interests in question must have some relevance to the sustaining or challenging of a
whole political form of life.” 113 In this case, the interests involved are those of corporations – a
dominant group that has transformed social and political life in the U.S. and around the world.
To orient this discussion of the rise of corporate power via the legal creation of artificial
personhood, this chapter begins with a literature review that presents a variety of theoretical
perspectives on corporate personhood and the Santa Clara decision. Following that literature
review is a discussion of the triangle trade. I argue that it is instructive to interpret the ruling and
analyze its implications within the context of the triangle trade because that contributes an
important and under-theorized contextual understanding to the emergence of corporate
personhood, especially within the context of race. Next, I discuss the Fourteenth Amendment and
its original purpose. Then I provide an overview of the Santa Clara case, which lays the
foundation for my ideological critique of the Supreme Court’s ruling. Finally, I address the
implications of the Santa Clara ruling for the concept of personhood, both natural and artificial,
and examine the implications of artificial corporate personhood for human agency. Essentially, I
argue that the Santa Clara ruling could not have taken place absent an ideological orientation –
which emerged during the triangle trade – that privileged economic aspirations over human
rights. I also maintain the transatlantic slave trade (also known as the “triangle trade”)
contributed to an ideological orientation that prioritized economic motivations in ways that
destabilized traditional notions of personhood and property, paving the way for the Supreme
Court’s transformation of property (the corporation) into a constitutional rights-bearing “person.”
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In a foundational essay on corporate personhood, Arthur Machen offers an account of
the personification of the corporation that explores the debate between those who argue that
corporations are “real” persons and those who insist that corporations are fictitious persons only.
Realists believe that “when a company is formed by the union of natural persons, a new real
person, a real corporate ‘organism’ is brought into being.… The corporate organism is an animal:
it possesses organs like a human being. It is endowed with a will and with senses.” 114 On the
other hand, the supporters of fiction theory hold that “a corporation is a fictitious artificial
person, composed of natural persons, created by the state, existing only in contemplation of law,
invisible, soulless, immortal.”115
From Machen’s perspective, a corporation is “real” because it was created through
human activity. The assertion is based on his claim that something cannot be both “artificial” and
“fictitious” at the same time because something that is fictitious is imaginary, not artificial. He
argues that “a corporation exists as an objectively real entity, which any well-developed child or
normal man must perceive: the law merely recognizes and gives legal effect to the existence of
this entity.”116
Machen also identifies the use of the word “person” as a source of confusion. When a
person is conceived of as one that is the subject of rights, a corporation fits the definition well.
But when a person is defined more narrowly as a living, breathing, human being, a corporation
clearly does not fit the bill. Machen concludes that, so far, no definition adequately accounts for
the corporate entity. However, until a more suitable definition is achieved, he advocates
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understanding the corporation as a real entity and an artificial person, despite consternation over
what this concept of “person” really means. To support this point, he presents examples of
human collectivities such as families, tribes, and villages, all of which have historically
functioned legitimately as artificial persons.
Like Machen, John Dewey also finds the definition of “person” to be a source of
contention and confusion. 117 He continues Machen’s focus on the legal sense of personhood to
explain how common sense notions of the word “person” further complicate matters. Dewey
points out that the law does not exist in a vacuum; it is intertwined with and influenced by the
philosophical, psychological, and everyday understandings of what it means to be a “person.”
After examining the arguments between the realists and the fictionists, he concludes that the
debate on the subject of corporate personhood will likely lack nuance and efficacy until a
satisfactory notion of person can be determined:
We often go on discussing problems in terms of old ideas when the solution of the
problem depends on getting rid of the old ideas, and putting in their place concepts more
in accord with the present state of ideas and knowledge. The root difficulty in present
controversies about ‘natural’ and associated bodies may be that while we oppose one to
the other, or try to find some combining union of the two, what we really need to
do is overhaul the doctrine of personality which underlies both of them. 118
Here, Dewey is suggesting that instead of trying to reconcile the various differences between
natural and artificial persons or conflating the differences, we should rethink these categories
entirely. In other words, Dewey suggests that we need a new way to think through the
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distinctions between human beings and corporations because our existing conceptualizations are
inadequate to account for these two ontological forms.
Gregory Mark explores the nature of corporate personhood with an in-depth analysis of
personification as a legal precedent and doctrine. 119 His essay discusses how the Supreme Court
actually personified the corporation twice: first in its 1819 ruling on Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, and again in 1886 when the Santa Clara ruling went further to “bring to
life” what had hitherto been considered a contractual entity created for business purposes. Mark
also describes the differences between Dartmouth’s and Santa Clara’s personification of the
corporation. While Dartmouth allowed corporations to become artificial persons for the purpose
of helping several individuals to do business collectively and efficiently as one entity, the Santa
Clara ruling went much further. It used the Fourteenth Amendment to personify the corporation,
extending the Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses to artificial corporate
persons. This move dramatically expanded corporate rights by compelling state governments to
treat artificial corporate persons as human persons under the law.
Personification of the business organization was a key step in the evolution of the modern
corporate form and marks an important milestone in the corporation’s rise to power and
dominance in U.S. society. As Mark explains:
In American and economic history, personification has been vital because it 1) implies
a single and unitary source of control over the collective property of the corporation’s
members, 2) defines, encourages and legitimates the corporation as an autonomous,
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creative, self-directed economic being, and 3) captures rights, ultimately even
constitutional rights, for corporations, thereby giving corporate property unprecedented
protections from the state.120
These three aspects of personification paved the way for the corporation to be treated less like a
contractual business entity and more like a flesh and blood human being within the law and
within society at large. Moreover, the third aspect of corporate personification listed by Mark
allows corporations to aggregate great sums of money and to protect this money from state and
local taxes as the Santa Clara ruling demonstrates.
Like Machen and Dewey, Mark maps the real-versus-artificial debates over corporate
personhood, declaring in the end that “the protests of modern legists notwithstanding, the
business corporation has become the quintessential economic man.” 121 The corporation owes this
new status as an economic “man” to its second personification under the Fourteenth Amendment
in Santa Clara. This second personification of the corporation is often cited as a key source of
the modern corporation’s power by legal scholars, sociologists, and others. It is often referenced
because of its controversial reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment, which distinguishes Santa
Clara’s personification of the corporation from the more benign kind of personification that
occurred in Dartmouth.
Natasha Aljalian’s analysis is inspired by the question, “Is corporate personhood a fact or
fiction?” 122 She critiques the Court’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment in Santa Clara, and her
essay is developed by comparing the personhood status of a human fetus to the personhood
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status of a corporation. Aljalian questions the morality and common sense of a society and
judicial system in which a contractual legal entity – in the form of a business entity designed for
the sole purpose of making money – has more personhood rights than a human being, even if in
fetal form. Based on the claim that corporate personhood is nothing more than a creative legal
fiction, she argues that a fetus, which is actually a human being, should be given the same
personhood rights as a corporation: “The Court must afford the fetus, whether through
employment of the legal fiction or the recognition of the fetus as a life from the moment of
conception, constitutional protection as a ‘person’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 123
Like Aljalian and Mark, Nace identifies the Supreme Court’s personification of the
corporation under the Fourteenth Amendment in Santa Clara as a key source of modern
corporate power. To help explain their rise to power in the U.S., Nace draws an analogy between
corporations and gangs (i.e., street gangs and/or organized crime families) that leverage their
wealth into power and unfair influence. He argues that corporate power must be curtailed
because it too often causes harm to human beings. He cites corporate scandals such as Enron and
WorldCom, in which corporations misled stockholders, employees, communities, and other
stakeholders to the detriment of individual human beings and to society as a whole. “The
emergence of a sustained attempt to openly address corporate domination in American society is
a significant achievement,” Nace writes; “Its politics reflect our country’s founding values.”124
From his perspective, unbridled corporate power hinders the democratic processes and ideals
upon which our nation was founded; thus he challenges Americans to fight harder to limit
corporate power by curtailing Constitutional rights for corporations.
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Thom Hartmann also questions the legitimacy and logic of the Court’s personification of
the corporation in Santa Clara. His work explores how corporations have appropriated
Constitutional laws intended to protect human beings. He writes:
In fact, to this day there has been no Supreme Court ruling that explicitly explains why a
corporation – with its ability to continue operating forever, its being merely a legal
agreement that can’t be put in jail and doesn’t need fresh water to drink or air to breathe –
should be granted the same constitutional rights our Founders fought for, died for, and
granted to the very mortal human beings who are citizens of the United States, to protect
them against the perils of imprisonment and suppression they had experienced under a
despot king.125
Hartmann shares Nace’s characterization of the modern corporation as an impediment to the type
of democracy envisioned by and fought for by our nation’s founding fathers. He contends that
natural persons should restore democracy by ending corporate personhood, curtailing corporate
rights and exploring new and different ways of business organization.
This overview of relevant literature on corporate personhood is not exhaustive, but it does
offer a historical perspective of the evolution of corporate personhood. It outlines the range of
perspectives and key arguments on the issue, and it also demonstrates how numerous scholars
agree that personification was a catalyst for expanding corporate rights and power in the U.S.
The Santa Clara ruling, in particular, was identified as a key source of corporate power, due to
the appropriation of the Fourteenth Amendment to endow the corporation with the Constitutional
personhood rights of human beings. Some of the work from these scholars also recognizes the
racial component of corporate personhood and its evolution. It acknowledges how the
125

Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection: How Corporations Became “People” – And How You Can
Fight Back (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2010) 17-18.

52
corporation usurped the Fourteenth Amendment – a law intended to protect newly freed slaves
from racial discrimination – to gain access to the personhood rights promised to human beings,
which were the newly freed slaves. Their work inspires my own thinking about the corporation’s
evolution and leads me to join these ongoing conversations, extending them into a few different
theoretical directions guided by rhetorical, ideological and critical race theories, for example.
Therefore, this chapter contributes a rhetorical analysis of the Santa Clara ruling that takes into
account the ideological principles that both influence the ruling and are reproduced through it,
while also exploring the role race played in the evolution of the corporate person and its rise to
power.
3.1

The Triangle Trade and the Ideological Destabilization of Personhood and
Property Rights
It is certainly possible to analyze Santa Clara without reference to the triangle trade;

however, consideration of this phenomenon adds texture to the discussion by including an
important context that has not typically been taken up in the study of the evolution of corporate
personhood. The triangle trade was a defining moment in world history that initiated new modes
of thought and human organization, culminating in ideological orientations of race, property, and
value that have had lasting influence on both social and legal relations. I argue that these
influences have contributed to the destabilization of the concept of personhood and have paved
the way for things to be treated as people and people to be treated as things in American
jurisprudence.
One of the earliest examples of globalization, the triangle trade, was a lucrative exchange
based on slaves, money, sugar, wool, cotton, and other commodities, primarily involving Africa,
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Europe, the U.S., and the West Indies. 126 The triangle trade formed the economic backbone of
many European empires and gave rise to one of the world’s most powerful corporate entities: the
East India Company. 127 In addition to engendering the kind of collective ownership structures
and formalized business processes that would eventually characterize modern private enterprise,
the triangle trade also assigned a property value to the human body that would prove to be quite
durable throughout the history of the Western world.128
Ian Baucom offers a rather grisly account of the evolving fusion between the human
being/natural person and monetary value in his description of how British officials issued
payments to soldiers wounded in service of the crown.
There is something more than a little macabre about this list, something unnerving that
exceeds the finicky mince of bureaucratic language, the formulaic translation of the loss
of a foot, a thigh, a lung, or a bladder into a misfortune. If such formulations unnerve
because of the obvious incommensurability of “misfortune” with “had his left foot shot
off,” then it is the imperturbable search for an alternate, alinguistic grammar of
commensurability, the casual pursuit of financializing, decorporealizing logic of
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equivalence that so confidently translates a lieutenant’s foot into 5 shillings a day,
a clerk’s eyes into a one-time payment of 40 pounds.…129
This equation of catastrophic injury with monetary dispensation that Baucom describes shows
how a human being or a sacred human quality can be impassively plugged into a formula and
assigned a cash value. Similarly, businesspeople, political figures and others who profited from
the enslavement of African people assigned an arbitrary and artificial property value to human
beings from Africa during the triangle trade.
This conflation of human beings with value and inanimate property produces what Georg
Lukács has termed “reification,” a phenomenon that occurs when the social relations between
human beings become objectified such that individuals are regarded as things. 130 In other words,
“Relations between human beings are crystallized into object-values and themselves take on the
character of objects, [and] individuals themselves turn into things.” 131 We can consider the
British court’s finding in Somerset v. Stewart (1677) – “that negroes being usually bought and
sold among merchants… and being infidels, there might be a property in them” 132 – as another
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instance of reification. These brief examples from British officials and the Somerset court
demonstrate some of the ways that the triangle trade destabilized traditional notions of
personhood and property through the process of reification.
The nature and consequences of reification are very clearly presented in the story of the
Zong. In 1781, the Zong, a British slave ship, ran into distress while crossing the Atlantic. The
ship’s captain claimed to fear that there was not enough food or water to last the duration of the
voyage, so he decided to toss some of the ship’s “cargo” overboard – hundreds of captured
African people. 133 More disturbing than that act was the fact that throwing human beings
overboard was not considered murder or even injurious to either the persons forced off the ship
or their families. Rather, it was considered a reasonable loss among the many costs of doing
business in the transatlantic slave trade. Furthermore, the loss incurred was credited to slavers
and traders. Their “loss” was protected by insurance regulations that placed no value on an
African person’s human life but only his or her property value as a slave, as Baucom
dramatically illustrates:
Four hundred forty slaves. Four hundred forty items of property valued at 30 pounds
each. Thirteen thousand two hundred pounds. Four hundred forty human beings. We
know almost nothing of them, almost nothing of Captain Collingwood’s conduct in
“acquiring” them, almost nothing of their entry, as individuals, into the trans-Atlantic
slave trade. Not as individuals. As “types” they are at least partially knowable, or
imaginable. Indeed what we know of the trans-Atlantic slave trade is that among the
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other violences it inflicted on millions of human beings was the violence of becoming
a “type”: a type of person, or terribly, not even that, a type of nonperson, a type of
property, a commodity, a type of money. 134
The story of the Zong is emblematic of this process of reification. Captured African people were
discursively and ideologically transformed into property values via the triangle trade, which
helped to produce the social norms of property and the corresponding legal rights that defined
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth century Western societies. Through a system of exchange
that required the African person’s value as a slave to eclipse his or her innate priceless-ness as a
natural born human being, black people came to represent monetary values and the black body
came to symbolize the property form. 135
In a recent essay, Alessandra Raengo summarized the relationship between the black
body and property that developed during the triangle trade as follows:
In the financial milieu of the Black Atlantic, race is a form of appearance of capital
because the African slave is a form of money. Just like the cycles of capital accumulation
move through the commodity-based and speculative phases, so does the body of the slave
function as money differently at different times: in some cases, the living, breathing
biological body of the slave performs as currency (as in the West African coast where
goods such as rum or firewood could be ‘reckoned’ in terms of a certain number of
slaves) and in other cases it is the ‘virtual’ body that signifies money.’136
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The slaves thrown overboard the Zong, whose worth was then determined by an insurance
formula that allowed slave traders to be compensated for this loss, is an example of the slave
body’s virtual worth. This virtual worth was based on the physical, biological body of the
African person, reconceived as a form of lost property.
Of course, property rights are hardly neutral. They are an abstraction intended to
accomplish a purpose, a method of “subtly imposing personal and moral beliefs.” 137 In the
context of the triangle trade, the tension between human rights and property rights came to be
resolved with one race declared as “property” and another designated as “owner.” Cheryl Harris
explains, “The origins of property rights in the United States are rooted in racial domination.” 138
She writes:
The social relations that produced racial identity as a justification for slavery also had
implications for the conceptualization of property. This result was predictable, as the
institution of slavery, lying at the very core of economic relations, was bound up with the
idea of property. Through slavery, race and economic domination were fused. 139
This property rights discourse led to a pervasive racialized stratification of labor based on the
commodification of human beings, conceived of as property, as the scholarly works from Harris,
Raengo and Baucom illustrate.
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With slavery thoroughly institutionalized, the property value in the black body/person
remained so ingrained that debts could be settled with “money or negroes.”140 When a slave ran
away, the law did not consider this act of flight as a desperate grasp at freedom but as a crime,
namely, the theft of labor conceptualized as property. A runaway slave was considered guilty of
depriving the master of the property value imbued in his or her body and the labor it could
perform. So beloved was the institution of slavery that when it was threatened in the West Indies
one slave owner decried, “God forbid that there should be anything like a forcing of the master to
abandon his property in the slave!” 141
If one is able to set ethics and morals aside for a moment, the slave owner’s horror is
perfectly understandable. Why? Simply put, slavery was great business. For slave owners, the
return on investment (ROI) on human property was incredible. Slaves could be bought
individually or in bulk, forced to labor, and forced to reproduce, even if by rape, making more
“property” available either for sale on the market or for labor within one’s own private
enterprise. One of the best aspects to this scheme – from the slave owner’s perspective – was that
once slaves entered the system, they would likely never see any profit even while they
functioned as the embodiment of profit and conduit of its exchange.
The property value arbitrarily assigned to the slave’s body and labor continued to be a
key commodity driving much of the wealth of the Western world. Forcing slaves to work in
factories, for example, was a common practice. In the U.S., corporate leaders realized that slave
labor could be leveraged as effectively in the factory as it was on the plantation. Earnings from
slave labor and forced black labor helped to finance the Industrial Revolution in England and
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certainly contributed to the industrialization and subsequent economic strength of the U.S. 142
Decades of the triangle trade had erased notions of black personhood and replaced it with the
conception of blacks as profit-generating property. Thus, the profit motive of the triangle trade
set in motion an ideological orientation that continually prioritized economic desires above
human rights such that blacks should be consistently thought of and treated like profit-generating
property. As Raengo puts it, “These desires strike at the heart of capital’s ontological scandals,
the collapsed distinction between the artificial and the natural person as well as the one that
pertains between person and property.”143
According to Harris, “The hyper-exploitation of black labor was accomplished by
treating black people themselves as objects of property. Race and property were thus conflated
by establishing a form of property contingent on race: only blacks were subjugated as slaves and
treated as property.”144 In fact, the ideological construction of blacks as profit-generating
property had become so pervasive, fueling racial inequality throughout society, that it eventually
compelled Congress to pass the Fourteenth Amendment.
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3.2

The Origins of Corporate Personhood and the Appropriation of the Fourteenth
Amendment
Adopted in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment consisted of five short sections. It outlined

a new post-Civil War relationship between federal and state government, established the
requirements of citizenship, defined the scope of personhood, settled war debts, and instituted
other financial arrangements.145 Arguably the most controversial part of the Amendment was
Section One, which reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws. 146
On its face, the Amendment seems clear enough. It declares that all persons should be treated
equally. There is little disagreement that those words were written to protect human beings —
the newly freed slaves — not artificial persons in the form of corporations. Justice Hugo Black
makes this point plain in an opinion delivered several decades after the Fourteenth Amendment’s
ratification. He wrote:
In 1886, this Court in the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,
decided for the first time that the word “person” in the amendment did in some instances
include corporations. [...] The history of the amendment proves that the people were told
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that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human beings and were not told that it
was intended to remove corporations in any fashion from the control of state
governments. [...] The language of the amendment itself does not support the theory that
it was passed for the benefit of corporations.147
As Justice Black indicates, and others have confirmed, the creation of a new kind of artificial
person was an unintended function of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather than establishing a
clearly defined legal space in which the question of black personhood could forever be put to
rest, the Amendment was used to expand dramatically the rights of business entities. This shift
forever complicated traditional notions of personhood in American jurisprudence.
There is no question that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to abolish slavery
and involuntary servitude, and that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect black
people from racial discrimination by establishing legal equality among all natural persons.
The Fourteenth Amendment marked a reversal of the 1857 Dred Scott decision, which declared
that no slave or descendent of a slave would ever be a full citizen of the United States. 148 Despite
its intended purposes, the Fourteenth Amendment also ended up being put to a much different
use, based on a rhetorical reconfiguration of the meaning of personhood in Santa Clara, as my
study will explore.
Santa Clara is an unlikely case to be credited with the personification of the corporation
because technically the corporation had already been declared an artificial person by the
Supreme Court under Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819). The Dartmouth
decision read: “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
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contemplation of law. Being a mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties that the
charter of its creation confers on it.…”149 The personification of the corporation established by
the Dartmouth ruling certainly made it easier for individuals to do business more efficiently by
allowing many individuals to function collectively as one distinct corporate entity. 150
The Dartmouth decision was an important first step in making it legally easier for a group
of individuals to conduct business in the United States, but since charters were given and
controlled by the state, corporations were obliged to adhere to state law. Thus, the actions
corporations could perform as a collectivity of individuals functioning as an artificial “person”
under Dartmouth remained tightly controlled by the state. Charles and Mary Beard explain:
Each state by law defined property for itself and determined what should be the limits
imposed on the use of its property. The power to charter corporations and control their
management also belonged to the states. Therefore capitalists, corporations, and other
industrial concerns that had grounds, real or imaginary, for complaining against state
laws and the actions of state officials had to resort, as a rule, to state legislatures and state
courts for relief. Only in a narrow range of cases could the federal courts accept appeals,
intervene on their behalf and afford them protection. 151
As the Beards point out, nineteenth-century corporate business leaders and lawyers were
displeased by the fact that the states retained so much power over their actions and likely thought
that this kind of state oversight was too much like the fox guarding the hen house.

149

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) 636.

150

Stephen Best, The Fugitives Properties: Law and the Poetics of Possession (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2004) 10-11.
151

Beard and Beard 316.

63
The ability of different states to levy different taxes on the same company was especially
disconcerting to corporate owners doing business in multiple states. They considered such
differential regulations “anarchy” and “a dispersion of legal authority to regulate and control the
use of property” which “if appropriate for earlier times, was unfitted to the prosecution of
industrial enterprise on a national scale.” 152 Corporations sought injunctive relief through their
lawyers who “kept appealing to the Supreme Court of the United States for protection against
state legislation adversely affecting the property interests of their clients.”153 With the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, corporate lawyers believed they had the perfect solution to their
problems, because the Fourteenth Amendment limited the authority of states over persons and
prohibited differential treatment of persons by individual states with its equal protection and due
process clauses. If corporate lawyers could manage somehow to use the Fourteenth Amendment
to create a new Constitutional form of corporate personhood, there would be almost no limit to
what these corporate persons could do.
Thus, corporations took up an ongoing legal effort in the courts to pursue personhood
under the Fourteenth Amendment.154 Railroad companies were especially well-positioned to
launch a legal assault in pursuit of Fourteenth Amendment personhood rights. As a primary
mode of military transportation during the Civil War, railroad companies had emerged from the
war years so wealthy and powerful that they could well afford to fight any state regulation they
did not like with lawsuits. After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, their efforts
increased.
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Corporate lawyers were astute enough to realize that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
explicitly spell out that it only applied to natural persons, i.e., human beings.155 This “loophole”
led to a popular corporate litigation strategy:
Acting on behalf of railroad barons, attorneys for the railroads repeatedly filed suits
against local and state governments that had passed laws regulating railroad corporations.
The main tool the railroads’ lawyers tried to use was the fact that corporations had
historically been referred to as “artificial persons.” Based on this, they argued,
corporations should be considered persons under the free-the-slaves Fourteenth
Amendment and enjoy the protections of the Constitution just like living, breathing
human persons. 156
Southern Pacific Railroad’s legal tussle with Santa Clara County was just another incident in the
long line of ongoing conflicts between corporations and states over money, power and influence.
3.3

Santa Clara and the Rise of Corporate Personhood
It is interesting that Santa Clara is credited with the personification of the corporation

because the substantive issues of the case seemingly had nothing to do with personhood —
natural, artificial, or otherwise. Santa Clara was essentially a tax case. The situation began when
California’s Santa Clara County brought suit against Southern Pacific Railroad, arguing that the
railroad company owed county and state taxes. 157 The railroad company refused to pay the taxes
and fought Santa Clara County all the way to the Supreme Court.
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According to the Court, Southern Pacific Railroad defended itself in two ways. First, the
railroad claimed that it had complied with all federal and state laws. Next, it claimed that
The provisions of the constitution and laws of California, in respect to the assessment for
taxation of the property of railway corporations operating railroads in more than one
county, are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in so far as
they require the assessment of their property at its full money value, without making
deduction, as in the case of railroads operated in one county, and of other corporations,
and of natural persons, for the value of the mortgages covering the property assessed;
thus imposing upon the defendant unequal burdens, and to that extent denying to it the
equal protection under the laws. 158
As this passage indicates, Southern Pacific’s defense was based on the Fourteenth Amendment,
which held that all persons must be treated equally under the law. This was a logical argument
for the defense to make given that the Dartmouth decision had created artificial corporate
personhood back in 1819. However, the Dartmouth ruling was quite explicit in its limitations on
artificial corporate personhood and in no way equated the artificial personhood of corporations
with the natural personhood of human beings.
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Referring to the Fourteenth Amendment, Hartmann notes, “The clause that grants all
‘persons’ equal protection under the law, in context, seems to apply pretty clearly only to human
beings ‘born or naturalized’ in the United States of America.” 159 However, as Dewey and
Machen indicated earlier, despite the widespread, common-sense understanding of “person” as
human being, the legal definition of “person” had been in flux for some time.
Just as corporate lawyers had done in their previous attempts on behalf of the railroads
and other major corporations, in Santa Clara, Southern Pacific’s lawyers interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment and the word “person” to rhetorically equate a railroad company with a
flesh-and-blood human being and to claim that artificial persons deserve the same equal
protections as natural persons. With Dartmouth as precedent, the defense argued that “because a
railroad company was a ‘person’ under the Constitution, local governments couldn’t discriminate
against it by having different laws and taxes in different places.” 160 This time, the Supreme Court
accepted the corporation’s arguments without question and without mentioning corporate
personhood in their opinion. The per curiam161 decision of the Court read:
It follows that there is no occasion to determine under what circumstances the plaintiffs
would be entitled to judgment against a delinquent taxpayer for penalties, interest, or
attorney’s fees, for if the plaintiffs are not entitled to judgment for the taxes arising out of
the assessments in question, no liability for penalties, interest, or attorney’s fees could
result from a refusal or failure to pay such taxes. Judgment affirmed.162
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From beneath a thicket of dry, legal language entangled with details of tax rules, the corporation
emerged as a new person – literally and figuratively – gaining the Constitutional Fourteenth
Amendment right to personhood with due process and equal protection under the law.
The Court’s opinion produced a sense of presence for the tax issue, which was much
more salient in the opinion than the question of corporate personhood. According to Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, presence can be understood as the “preoccupation of the speaker [or
writer]…to make present, by verbal magic alone, what is actually absent but what he [sic]
considers important to his argument or, by making them more present, to enhance the value of
some of the elements of which one has actually been made conscious.” 163 Now in this case, it is
not that the tax issue was distant. The railroad company clearly did not want to pay the taxes, and
the county definitely wanted the revenue. Money mattered, and the language of the Court
functioned to reinforce its significance, given that most of the Court’s opinion focused on the tax
issues. The bigger issue, however, that has made sociologists, historians, legal and business
scholars, and others so interested in Santa Clara is the issue of corporate personhood under the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was noticeably downplayed in the judicial decision.
Raymie McKerrow’s critical rhetoric framework reminds us that “absence is as important
as presence in understanding and evaluating symbolic action.”164 In his discussion of the IranContra hearings, he describes the effects that occur when partial answers are given to questions:
because meaning is relational, partial answers still yield a form of knowledge. The issue is that
“inferences based on such answers more often than not play directly into the hands of those in
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control of both the knowledge and the power that it provides.” 165 This certainly seems true of the
Court’s ruling in Santa Clara. The ruling serves the ideological interests of the dominant social
group in this situation – corporations. With Fourteenth Amendment rights, artificial persons in
the corporate form were well-positioned to go after an array of human rights and freedoms that
would have not have been permissible under Dartmouth with its more stringent charter
restrictions.
In Santa Clara, the Court most directly addressed the issues of corporate personhood and
the Fourteenth Amendment in the headnote, not in its official opinion.166 A headnote is an abridged
summary of the Court’s ruling, including the significant facts in the case, written by the court
reporter and without official judicial authority. It is impossible to know why the Court avoided the
question of corporate personhood in the opinion while allowing it to be addressed via the headnote.
However, the pressing concerns of capitalism, industrialization, and labor that permeated turn-ofthe-century American society should be considered. The great political power of railroad
corporations, including the close relationships between railroad executives and members of the
Court, should be taken into account.167 They likely contributed to an ontological orientation that
prioritized the economic needs of big business.
The Santa Clara headnote was authored by court reporter Bancroft Davis, a man
with long-term professional and personal ties to the railroad business. 168 Davis’ headnote read:

165

McKerrow 107.

166

See C. Peter Magrath’s study, Morrison R. Waite: The Triumph of Character (New York: Macmillan)
1963. Since corporate personhood emerged in this Santa Clara headnote, it has become accepted as law
by society. See Hartmann 17-32. See also Nace 102-109.
167

See Nace 94-109; Hartmann, 41-48

168

See Nace; Hartmann.

69
“The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the
opinion that it does.”169
The use of the phrase “any person” functions to obfuscate the Amendment’s original and
intended aim to protect specific persons under the Constitution. In addition, the Court’s refusal to
hear arguments on the Fourteenth Amendment question reveals that its commitment to the idea
that “corporations are people, too”170 was so strong that it was not necessary to hear arguments
pertaining to the subject.
Since headnotes are not authored by the Court, and since the Court made no mention of
the Fourteenth Amendment or corporate personhood in the actual ruling, one may reasonably
wonder if Davis slipped the mention of corporate personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment
into the headnote without the Court’s knowledge. However, before Davis published the
headnote, he sought the Court’s review and approval. On May 26, 1886, he sent the headnote to
Chief Justice Morrison Waite who was himself a former railroad attorney. 171 The following
response from Justice Waite was located among Davis’ private correspondence:
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I think your mem. in the California Railroad Tax cases expresses with sufficient accuracy
what was said before the argument began. I leave it with you to determine whether
anything need be said about it in the report inasmuch as we avoided meeting the
constitutional question in the decision. 172
From a rhetorical perspective, this is a very interesting exchange. Consider the tension between
absence and presence that these texts reveal. On the one hand, Waite is admittedly careful to
avoid addressing the issue of corporate personhood via the Fourteenth Amendment in the official
opinion of the court; on the other hand, he permits it to be addressed via Davis’ headnote, which
had no legal standing but clearly held symbolic sway. The end result was that corporate
personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment became ingrained into U.S. law. The acceptance
of corporate personhood as a legal, cultural, and social reality influences both the actions of
corporations and the ways in which corporations interact with human beings as equals (or at the
least as very near-equals).
This overview and analysis of Santa Clara confirms that although the ruling was
rendered under the presumption of judicial neutrality, the Supreme Court’s decision to extend
Fourteenth Amendment personhood rights to corporations can be appropriately understood as a
victory for the wealthy, corporate interests who would benefit most from an artificial entity that
had perpetual life, could easily transfer assets, was protected by limited liability from the full
consequences of its actions, and now had due process and equal protection rights.173 In this way,
the ruling seems to function to support the promotion and legitimation of the interests of socially
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significant or dominant groups – corporations – in opposition to other interests, 174 those of the
human beings who were supposed to benefit most from the Fourteenth Amendment.
3.4

The Racialized Implications of Corporate Personhood and Power
The true irony of the Supreme Court’s decision to grant corporate personhood in Santa

Clara can only be fully appreciated by examining the Court’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment
on behalf of the human beings it was intended to protect as compared to the artificial corporate
persons the Amendment was not intended to protect. Between 1868 and 1911, only twenty-eight
of the 604 Supreme Court rulings involving the Fourteenth Amendment dealt specifically with
the protection of the rights of African Americans. In those twenty-eight cases, the Court upheld
or protected African Americans’ rights only six times. 175 Aljalian considers a slightly broader
time span and finds that “of the cases in the [Supreme] Court in which the Fourteenth
Amendment was applied during the first fifty years after its adoption, less than one-half of one
per cent [had] invoked it in protection of the negro race.”176
The statistics suggest a shift in focus of the Fourteenth Amendment’s application. They
also give credence to Charles Collins’ remark that “it is not the negro, but accumulated and
organized capital, which now looks to the Fourteenth Amendment for protection from state
activity.”177 These statistics suggest a social and judicial preoccupation with matters of industry
and capital, and a deprioritization of human rights consistent with the racialized values and
practices of the triangle trade. The prioritization of economic value over human life did not end
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with the triangle trade or with the abolition of slavery; rather, it lived on in politics, culture, law,
and almost all areas of Western society. For this reason, the Court’s seemingly preferential
treatment of artificial persons can be understood as both a symptom of the historical moment in
which it occurred and as an example of the kinds of moral failures that can occur when the profit
motive is privileged ideologically.
The period between 1868 and 1911 was a particularly tumultuous time in American
history. Dewey refers to the turn-of-the-century as an “individualistic” era, mostly preoccupied
with the rights of private property, contracts, and other matters of business. 178 These priorities
are consistent with the Court’s ruling in Santa Clara and its tendency to hear more Fourteenth
Amendment cases pertaining to corporate rights than to human rights. Existing racial problems
were compounded by waves of European immigrants, further complicating notions of what it
meant to be an “American” who legitimately deserved rights to full citizenship. It also presented
challenges in terms of how new forms of work and labor would be organized.
As the U.S. economy continued its transition from an agricultural to industrial focus, an
explosion of economic opportunities arose that would likely not have taken place as quickly or
effectively without black labor, slave as well as forced. 179 Nevertheless, even as corporations
benefited from the Fourteenth Amendment, they also perpetuated a race-based division of labor
that excluded blacks from the higher status, more lucrative positions that emerged with the
economic watershed of the Industrial Revolution. 180 Despite the Fourteenth Amendment and its
original intent, the racialized implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Santa Clara were
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that a law intended to help African Americans functioned to empower artificial corporate persons
that as policy were actively engaged in oppressing African Americans and profiting from their
exploitation. In many ways, the modern corporate form was built on, and thrived off of, the
socially constructed racial burden of blackness. The following account offered by Harris
illustrates some of the ramifications of racial exclusion:
Every day my grandmother rose from her bed in her house in a black enclave on the
south side of Chicago, sent her children off to a black school, boarded a bus full of black
passengers, and rode to work. No one at her job ever asked if she was black; the question
was unthinkable. By virtue of the employment practices of the ‘fine establishment’ in
which she worked, she could not have been. 181
These conditions of exclusion persisted through the Civil Rights movement, which led to
Affirmative Action policies, which led to diversity programs, and the inclusion initiatives
continue today. The effectiveness of these efforts remains debatable given the underwhelming
number of African Americans employed by corporations today – an entity that their ancestors’
labor directly or indirectly helped build through slavery, forced labor, or other exploitative
economic and labor practices.
This contemporary racial inequality in corporate America, stemming from our nation’s
history, is exacerbated at corporate leadership levels. As Allison Linn noted, “The boards of
directors of Fortune 500 companies still look pretty much how you’d expect: primarily male, and
primarily white,” with white men holding approximately 77 percent of the board seats in the
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nation’s largest companies in 2004.182 Not until 2009 was the first black woman named CEO of
a Fortune 500 company, bringing the total number of black CEOs in Fortune 500 companies to
four.183 Similarly, a recent study has shown how the leadership landscape in the corporate public
relations field is more than 90 percent white.184
Incorporating a critical race theory perspective within this analysis of Santa Clara and
the evolution of corporate personhood facilitates an understanding of the incipient and ongoing
role race has played in the rise of corporate personhood and power. In short, when we consider
the role of race, we can see how corporations flourished while human beings languished under
the court’s adjudication of Fourteenth Amendment personhood cases at the turn of the twentieth
century. We also see how these historical happenings have had long-lasting effects.
Considering the triangle trade as context and precursor to the Santa Clara ruling also
allows us to see how ideology can play a significant role in presumably objective, impartial
judicial discourse. In my view, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court could have been able to
reasonably conceive of using the Fourteenth Amendment to enfranchise and protect artificial,
contractual entities absent an ideological orientation that prioritized economic motives above
human needs. A widely accepted ideological orientation that privileges economic desires above
human rights makes it entirely conceivable for property and things to be treated as persons, and
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for persons to be treated as things and property. This ideological work was performed in large
part by the triangle trade, which initiated a particular way of thinking about the relations between
human beings, economic aspirations, race, and property.
By destabilizing traditional notions of personhood through the reification of Africans as
property, the triangle trade opened the door for various counter-intuitive and non-traditional
ideas of personhood to emerge. This made it conceptually possible to transform people into
property and therefore property into people. This latter transformation is exactly what happened
in Santa Clara; this is why I argue that the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling can and should be
understood as an extension of the same ideological trajectory that emerged in the triangle trade.
In fact, like the triangle trade, the Santa Clara ruling introduced its own process of reification:
while the triangle trade assigned a property value to people, in Santa Clara, the Supreme Court
assigned human rights to property in the corporate form, giving birth to a new person, “the
quintessential economic man,” as Mark aptly describes it.
The Court’s ruling in Santa Clara also lends credence to the arguments of critical legal
scholars and rhetoricians who assert that although a law may be intended for one purpose, it may
well be used to achieve a different goal altogether.185 The Supreme Court’s rhetorical moves in
Santa Clara awarded wealthy business owners a tremendous expansion of privileges. Even if
that was not the Court’s intention, it was the outcome.
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This trend of serving the interests of big business continued after Santa Clara.
Corporations successfully used the Fourteenth Amendment to avoid health and safety
regulations186 and child labor laws as well as other precautions aimed at protecting all American
workers because those regulations might have curtailed the ability to maximize productivity
and profits.
The pre- and post-Santa Clara eras represented a shift in the entire social order, such that
contractual relations in the form of corporations would become similar to human beings.
According to Mark, “The transformation of the private law of corporations from 1819 to the
1920s is best described as a move from a circumstance in which a corporation could do only
those things specifically allowed by its charter to one in which a corporation could do anything
not specifically prohibited to it.”187 Since then, corporations have used their personhood to
secure even more Constitutional rights, including the right to free speech, protection from search
and seizure, and protection against double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment. These
privileges have directly contributed to the transformation of the business organization into a
“super person” that can do pretty much anything that it can afford to do.
3.5

Santa Clara’s Implications: The Ontological Conflation of Natural and Artificial
Persons
At the broadest level, the Court’s extension of Fourteenth Amendment personhood rights

to corporations in Santa Clara effectively sanctioned the rhetorical reconstitution of the very
concept of personhood. In doing so, the Court introduced an ontological conflation between
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natural and artificial persons that continues to this day, suggesting that there are no meaningful
distinctions between the two. It is reasonable, however, to acknowledge that corporations and
humans share some similarities, which several scholars do – even critics of corporate
personhood. Aljalian, for example, lists several commonalities between human beings and
corporations, including “the ability to cause death, injury, disease, and severe physical pain, to
enter into agreements and transactions and even to pay taxes.” 188 Likewise, Wolgast writes, “In
some ways corporations are like persons, for they participate in many practical transactions –
buying, selling, contracting, and doing numerous other things that humans do.”189
I argue that while these commonalities should be recognized, they must not be allowed to
overshadow the significant differences between human beings and corporations that deserve to
be more seriously reckoned with under the law if we are to achieve a truly just society. We have
to come to the understanding that it is not actually corporations that buy, sell, etc. It is the human
actors employed in a particular role who allow a corporation to act at all. Chief Justice John
Marshall offered this kind of differential reckoning when the question of corporate personhood
first arose in Dartmouth (1819):
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its
very existence.…It is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession,
with these qualities and capacities that corporations were invented and are in use. 190
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The language is chosen carefully here. A corporation is not a person, but it may serve and act as
a single individual. A corporation is not “man,” but it provides cover for bodies of men. And
while it has a legal existence apart from its human members and affiliates, it cannot exist without
them. On the other hand human beings can exist without corporations, which represents an
important difference between the two “life forms.”
Nearly two hundred years later, Justice John Paul Stevens reiterated the substantial
ontological differences between human beings and corporations by drawing attention to several
fundamental human traits not possessed by corporations: “Corporations have no consciences, no
beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.” 191 Similarly, Aljalian itemizes the tangible
differences between humans and corporations. Her comments suggest that an awareness of those
differences can resolve some of the historical and contemporary confusion surrounding the
conception of personhood. She writes:
A person is thought of as one who breathes, grows, and develops. A person has facial
attributes, a beating heart, and physical processes. In addition, a person has sensory
perceptions, is endowed with reason, and experiences emotions. However creative the
legal fiction is drawn, the corporation cannot be said to possess any of these traits. 192
This is why it is easy to understand why Wolgast insists that “it is implausible to treat a
corporation as a member of the human community, a member with a personality (but not a face),
intentions (but no feelings), relationships (but no family or friends), responsibility (but no
conscience), and susceptibility to punishment (but no capacity for pain).” 193
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These obvious and important distinctions between human beings and corporations are
blurred with the Supreme Court’s curious application of the Fourteenth Amendment in Santa
Clara and later Fourteenth Amendment cases pertaining to the concept of personhood. The
Court’s equation of natural persons with artificial persons in that decision functions to support
the assertion that “‘person’ signifies what the law makes it signify.” 194 Cable and Mix sum up the
situation well: “Instead of serving as the constitutional foundation for the protection of Black
rights, the Fourteenth Amendment was distorted to consolidate corporate power and aid in the
U.S. bid for global dominance.” 195
Before global dominance could occur, however, a good bit of “relationship building”
work had to first be done at home. Americans during the Industrial Revolution and beyond
remained skeptical of corporate power, just as they were during the days of Jefferson and
Madison. The reifying, ideological orientation of economic liberalism that had transformed a
person into a thing during the triangle trade, and then a thing into a person in Santa Clara, had
made the corporation a very rich “person” by the end of the nineteenth century. However, even
though the Supreme Court had personified the corporation, and the corporation was enormously
powerful, human beings would still need to be convinced of its benefits to society. Thus, the
corporation needed a voice – not the stark and unfeeling lawyer-speak that typified its early
communications – something much warmer and more inviting, friendly, and subtly persuasive
in tone. In short, this artificial person – the so-called economic man – needed a human voice.
Enter the profession of public relations.
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In the next chapter, I will explore how the evolution of public relations gave the corporate
person a voice and how the corporation sought to use that voice in the public sphere through an
analysis of Nike v. Kasky (2003).
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4. PUBLIC RELATIONS AS THE CORPORATE VOICE
It is the job of public relations to help management find ways of identifying its own
interests with the public interests – ways so clear that the profit earned by the
company may be viewed as contributing to the progress of everybody...196
At the end of the nineteenth century, the corporation had become a person with basically
the same rights as human beings. However, just as the Wizard of Oz’s Tin Man lacked a heart,
this new economic man lacked a voice. “He” had been made quite wealthy by the Industrial
Revolution and quite powerful by the Supreme Court, but despite those successes many
Americans remained skeptical of big business. Thus, for corporations at the turn of the century,
obtaining a voice was not an accessory – it was an absolute necessity.
This chapter chronicles the evolution of the corporate voice through the public relations
field, beginning with an overview of literature on public relations history. This overview
explains why the corporation needed a voice and provides theoretical and historical context for
what comes next: an ideological analysis of Nike, Inc. v. Kasky (2003) – a key Supreme Court
case involving public relations speech.197 The analysis is methodologically guided by a close
reading of the text – the Supreme Court’s decision198 – within the context of its occurrence. In
particular, I am mining the text to see if and how the ideological principles of economic
liberalism emerge to legitimate the dominant interest of Nike at the expense of others. Given the
complexity of issues surrounding the case, I spend significant time focusing on the context of the
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evolution of the public relations field and public relations theory to lay a foundation for the
subsequent discussion. Nike v. Kasky serves as an example of how the corporation sought to use
its voice via the practice of public relations. Consideration of this case forces us to reckon with
this question: should the public relations field operate as Hill described at the opening of this
chapter? I close with a discussion of the implications of the corporate voice for human beings,
corporations, and the public relations field.
4.1

The Economic Man’s Crisis of Legitimacy: A Historical Overview of
Public Relations
When the public relations field began at the turn of the century, 199 Americans were

entirely comfortable with the family farm, general store, small family-owned business, and
friendly partnership of equals (or relative equals) that had traditionally defined the economic
landscape of the U.S. prior to the Industrial Revolution. Compared to these familiar modes of
economic organization and business operation, corporations often appeared as impersonal
behemoths and, as Roland Marchand has described, soulless, meaning driven by a cold,
199
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economic logic that reduces every decision down to a money relation. 200 Karla Gower
illuminated the issue, writing,
Whether true, the image of the “soulless corporation” took hold as American political
thought shifted from the doctrine of laissez-faire, which permitted such business excess
on the basis of individualism, to progressivism, which called for practical responses to
the problems facing society. And the problem was that corporations had become too big
and too powerful, outstripping the ability of an eighteenth-century legal structure to deal
with them. 201
Not only that, but as Marchand explained, “The traditional potency of the family, the church, and
the local community suddenly seemed dwarfed by the sway of giant corporations.” 202 Beard and
Beard sum up the kind of harshness that characterized the industrial era: “The family system of
economic and cultural unity was giving way to the factory system which drew even young
children into its fold.”203As both Marchand and Gower indicate, this was a time of tremendous
social and political change marked by unprecedented economic growth that was a catalyst for the
rapid growth of big business. This momentous transformation of social, economic, and political
forces in the U.S. created a crisis of legitimacy for big business. 204
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Whether legitimacy is defined as “a discursively created sense of acceptance in specific
discourses or orders of discourse,”205 or as “the justified right to exist,”206 legitimacy is important
because it gives a business the informal license to operate in the marketplace and exist in society.
Legitimacy equates to acceptance by key stakeholders, and that acceptance translates into
authority. Power that is accepted as legitimate is respected, unchallenged, and celebrated, even at
times when it should not be.207 Conversely, power that is perceived as illegitimate is never stable
or as strong as it could be; it is perpetually contested or resisted in disruptive ways. Thus, the
corporation had much to gain or much to lose depending on the outcome of its struggle for
legitimacy.
The corporation’s struggle for legitimacy was often jeopardized by its leaders and their
actions. There was no shortage of corporate activities that encouraged public skepticism, if not
outrage, putting the legitimacy of the corporation further at risk. Statements from some corporate
leaders ranged from insensitive to disturbing, and were widely perceived to be indicative of the
attitude of big business toward the public. “The public be damned,” William Vanderbilt is said to
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have declared. 208 Against the rising socially-conscious progressive ethos of the time, Vanderbilt
made it perfectly clear that the only good he was concerned about doing what was good for his
business. Railroad tycoon E.H. Harriman admitted his selfishness, saying, “I don’t want anything
on this railroad that I cannot control.” 209 Then there was J.P. Morgan’s brush-off: “I owe the
public nothing.”210 In his essay “Gospel of Wealth,” Andrew Carnegie claimed to have a solution
to the poverty problem – something no king, president, union leader, or businessman had ever
been able to conquer. Carnegie’s prescription was simple: “The millionaire will be but a trustee
for the poor; intrusted…with a great part of the increased wealth of the community, but
administering it for the community far better than it could or would have done for itself,” he
proclaimed.211 His point, and the sentiment that seems to underlie each of these business leaders’
comments, was that if the public and the poor would simply stay in their place and let big
business handle everything, then all would be well. Their attitudes reflect what Cutlip describes
as a sort of “business arrogance toward employee and citizen alike.” 212
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While such beliefs, attitudes, or ideological orientations may have seemed logical to
some business leaders and like-minded others, they were hardly the kinds of comments that
would initiate widespread public confidence in the benevolence of big business. The other
problem with these statements was that they occurred within a historical context where large
corporations often behaved with an insensitive attitude towards the public. Corporations were
operating much more like repressive state apparatuses than ideological state apparatuses,
winning compliance and submission to the corporate will by way of physical force. At the turn of
the century, it was hardly unusual for corporations to rely heavily on coercion to enforce their
will. Some examples will illustrate this point.
There was the Homestead Strike of 1892, which involved one of Andrew Carnegie’s
factories. 213 When wages were cut, employees – led by the labor union – went on strike.
Eventually, Pinkerton police were brought in, violence erupted, and people were killed. When
the conflict was over, the labor union that backed the strike was run out of the town. Reflecting
on his professional life in a memoir, Carnegie wrote remorsefully, “No pangs remain of any
wound received in my business career save that of Homestead.”214 In another conflict involving
the railroad industry, soldiers were brought in to get the trains running again after negotiations
over declining wages broke down. Once again, violence ensued and several people died in what
became known as the Pullman Strike of 1894. 215 There was no shortage of similar clashes
between corporations and people during this time. “Workers were looked upon as chattels and
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the public was considered a private hunting ground for business exploitation.” 216 Of course, this
is not so surprising given the history of labor in the U.S., which was in many ways based on a
system of chattel slavery that long encouraged a form of reification that regarded things as
people and people as things. It is only logical that the labor history of the past would seep into
the labor relations of contemporary times.
Clashes and scandals involving big business at the turn of the century fueled the
corporation’s crisis of legitimacy, contributing to public skepticism and justifying the need for a
mechanism capable of persuasion without overt, violent, physical force: the corporate voice. Of
the various corporate responses to the crisis of legitimacy, public relations would have the most
positive and persuasive effect of all. 217 An example of corporate public relations’ effectiveness
was evidenced by the Mohawk Valley Formula employed by the National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM) in the 1930s.218 To resolve labor disputes on the side of big business,
NAM-affiliated public relations practitioners would flood the mass media with a variety of
messages designed to sway public opinion to support the belief that employees wanted to break
strikes and work, but labor unions were standing in the way and unfairly thwarting their efforts.
These tactics were so successful in swaying public opinion in favor of the corporation that the
Mohawk Valley Formula, as it was known, became a popular public relations’ propaganda
strategy employed in major strikes after its inception.219
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The Mohawk Valley Formula represented the propagandistic and unethical side of public
relations. A wide variety of public relations tactics and strategies that will be discussed as the
chapter develops, however, were incorporated to help corporations take a more rhetorically artful
approach to “problem solving” by considering all of the available means of persuasion in a given
situation. Describing the relationship between the Industrial Revolution and the evolution of the
corporate voice Cutlip explains, “Contemporary public relations, as a practice and as a
management concept, was to emerge out of the melee of the opposing forces in this period of the
nation’s rapid growth.”220
This constellation of forces – the rise of big business and the corresponding eclipse of the
small, family-owned business and agrarian lifestyle that characterized pre-industrial America –
was part of a complex array of factors leading to the emergence of both the corporate voice and
the field of public relations. Other important factors included the sheer size, scope, wealth, and
resources of big business; increasing literacy rates; a burgeoning national media system;
muckraking journalists; and the need for organizational transparency. 221 This atmosphere spurred
a variety of increasingly sophisticated public relations activities on behalf of big business’ quest
for legitimacy. 222 As Galambos and Pratt note:
Public relations grew directly out of the perception on the part of business managers,
especially corporate officers, that liberal or progressive political campaigns were
generating an intensely negative concept of business and threatening to create an ever
more restrictive political economy. Admittedly many of these apprehensions were
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exaggerated, suggesting a threat of radicalism in a nation dedicated to moderate reform.
But business actually had good reasons to fear that the business image was suffering
among the public during the years of 1900-1916, and their new public relations
departments labored hard to alter a negative public concept of the corporation. Public
relations departments also began to provide input into corporate decision-making,
reporting on public perceptions and advising how business might avoid antagonizing its
several publics. 223
Galambos and Pratt’s comments begin to touch on the ideological work often performed by
public relations.224 As we shall see, ideology plays a major role in crafting the corporate voice,
including its content, tone, and style. When it comes to public relations, ideology serves a
persuasive function that can complicate, distort, or dissimulate information influencing the
relationships between organizations and publics. This is evident in the circumstances
surrounding the Nike v. Kasky case that will be addressed shortly.
To establish credibility, corporations turned to a number of communication strategies.
A popular tactic was the family metaphor, in which corporations communicated to their
employees in a paternalistic manner, with employees framed as children and the owner or CEO
positioned as the benevolent father. David Boje analyzes how Walt Disney personally embraced
the family metaphor, casting himself as the father, his employees as “boys” and “girls”, and the
Disney corporation as “one big happy family,” even at times when his organization was wrought
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with scandals that would suggest Disney was anything but. 225 Family narratives and other forms
of paternalistic symbolism were supported by material offerings such as corporate welfare
programs, which could include anything from company-supplied housing to reduced workrelated transportation costs, adult education programs, socials, dances, child care, and more. 226
These early public relations efforts were framed as authentic examples of the
corporation’s innate benevolence. They functioned to humanize the corporation and imbue it
with a “soul.” There was, however, an underlying profit motive to all of these public relations
activities. As Marchand points out, “The desire to reduce labor turnover and to thwart
unionization spurred most corporate ventures in welfare capitalism.” 227 Railroad industry leaders
in particular saw public relations tactics as useful ways to stifle criticism and avoid regulation. 228
As early corporate public relations pioneers, railroads sought to influence the public with
newspaper and magazine articles, speeches, sermons, lectures, conventions, and congressional
investigations, and also hired publicity bureaus to get their message out.229 Whether supporting
corporate welfare activities or facilitating damage control, corporate public relations began to
play an increasingly significant role in shaping a persuasive, corporate voice. As the twentieth
century unfolded, the corporation and the field of public relations evolved together.
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4.2

Key Public Relations Figures Who Shaped the History of the Field
It is beyond the scope of this study to list here all of the “founding fathers” or important

pioneers of public relations. However, several of these pioneers are widely considered to be
significant, particularly in the development of the corporate voice – the communicative organ of
the corporation – and, as such, they are the focus of this section. 230 Although circus promoter
P.T. Barnum was not a corporate public relations professional per se, he is considered influential
and is often referenced in literature on public relations history. 231 He was one of the first to
employ press agentry and publicity tactics through his work with the circus. 232 Describing how
Barnum publicized one of his talent acts, Lamme and Miller write, “Barnum recognized that he
could make the public see in Heth what they wanted to see in her, that his creation of desire for
her would be more effective than his creation of an identity for her.” 233 Barnum claimed that
Heth was the former slave and nursemaid of President George Washington, more than one
hundred years old and grotesquely deformed. He used these “amazing characteristics” to
persuade people that Heth was a circus attraction worth paying to see. In their discussion of
Barnum’s promotion of Heth, Lamme and Miller point to an important function of public
230
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relations. They show that, as a practitioner, Barnum was astute enough to give the public
(specifically, his audience) what it wanted, not what he thought they might like. Barnum realized
that the public’s desire for Heth would trump any identity he could create for her and perhaps be
more interesting than the real person; thus, he developed his public relations platform
accordingly.
Ivy Lee is widely regarded as the father of the public relations field and was particularly
well-known for his work with railroad and coal companies. 234 Lee practiced at a time when most
business leaders held an attitude of “hardened arrogance” towards the public 235 and were
committed to the philosophy that the less the public knew the better.236 He ushered in a new
paradigm of public relations by asserting that public relations information should be truthful. He
also believed that the press should be provided with accurate information when they requested
it.237 Vehemently defending the noble virtues of public relations as compared to the other
persuasive arts, Lee declared: “This is not an advertising agency…our plan is frankly, and
openly, on behalf of business concerns and public institutions, to supply the press and public
of the United States prompt and accurate information concerning subjects of value and
interest to the public to know about.” 238
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In 1927, Arthur Page became the first executive-level, corporate public relations
professional. As the head of AT&T’s Information Department, Page shared Lee’s concerns about
character in public relations.239 In a 1938 speech, he stated, “Big business can afford the research
and study to do right and in the long run it cannot afford to neglect the professional spirit, which
includes relegating ‘the money motive’ to its proper place.” 240 Consistent with his beliefs, Page
set forth seven guidelines for ethical public relations management: “1) Tell the truth; 2) Prove it
with action; 3) Listen to the customer; 4) Manage for tomorrow; 5) Conduct public relations as if
the whole company depends on it; 6) Realize a company’s true character is expressed by its
people; and 7) Remain calm, patient and good-humored.”241 Known as the Page Principles, these
recommendations continue to be respected in academic and professional circles, and their
ongoing practice should be encouraged.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Edward Bernays appeared to display far less interest
in using public relations to deliver trustworthy and accurate information, enrich personal and
organizational character, or build strong, healthy relationships with the public. His approach was
similar to that of Barnum, inasmuch as both men arguably sought to manipulate the public for
profit’s sake or for other reasons.242 Bernays made a lucrative career of creating handbooks that
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explained how public relations could be used to “manufacture consent” 243 and advance corporate
or political goals.244 His work yielded such insights as, “The public’s first impulse is usually to
follow a trusted leader rather than consider the facts for itself.” 245 Kerr notes the significant
influence that Bernays’ upper-class, aristocratic background had on his worldviews, which
aligned with those of the industrial elite. Like Carnegie, Rockefeller, Morgan, and others, he held
firmly to the belief that the wealthy should remain in control. “Bernays warned business that it
must defend itself against the ‘menace’ of government regulation and taxation and continually
take measures to prevent public interference with its operations,” writes Kerr. 246
In the 1950s, John W. Hill further defined the mission of public relations.
He co-founded Hill and Knowlton, one of the field’s most prolific public relations agencies.
The agency became famous for helping tobacco companies frame their products as healthy
(and at the very least as non-life-threatening).247 Hill and his firm were also known for
employing the Mohawk Valley Formula to solve labor disputes. 248 Hill explained that the
purpose of public relations was not “to outsmart the American public” in service of the corporate
bottom line, but rather to persuade the public that profit earned by the company contributed to
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everyone’s progress, not just the corporation’s.249 Getting the public to identify their own needs
with those of corporations is a process that can only occur through discursive, rhetorical means.
In this way, the perspective Hill articulates is much like Kenneth Burke’s theory of
identification. It is explained this way: “A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as
their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even though
their interests are not joined if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to do so.” 250 Burke goes
on to explain:
Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there
would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly
of one substance, absolute communication would be of man’s very essence. It would not
be an ideal, as it is now, partly embodied in material conditions and partly frustrated by
these same conditions; rather, it would be as natural, spontaneous, and total as with those
ideal prototypes of communication, the theologian’s angels, or “messengers.” 251
This concept of identification taps into a primary persuasive function of the corporate voice at
the turn of the century and arguably beyond: to create a sense of shared purpose, shared destiny,
and shared successes, even where there are none. 252 The goal of Hill’s strategy of identification –

249

Qtd. in Robert L. Heath, “The Rhetorical Tradition: Wrangle in the Marketplace,” Heath, Toth, and
Waymer 18. See also John W. Hill, Corporate Public Relations: Arm of Modern Management (New
York: Harper Brothers, 1958) 21.
250

Kenneth Burke, On Symbols and Society, Ed. Joseph R. Gusfield (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1989) 180.
251
252

Burke 182.

For further discussion of the role identification plays in professional communication contexts, see
George Cheney, “The Rhetoric of Identification and the Study of Organizational Communication,”
Quarterly Journal of Speech 69 (1983): 143-158.

96
to get the public to believe that the profits earned by a particular corporation contribute to
everyone’s progress – is an example of economic liberal ideology in action.
It almost goes without saying that the interests of a particular corporation may not always
align with the interests of a particular public or the greater good; they may not always be viewed
as contributing to everyone’s progress. This is why from the Industrial Revolution onward, the
corporation has had to continually rely on public relations practitioners to ameliorate its ongoing
crisis of legitimacy by articulating the corporate voice. 253 If the goals of corporations and
individual human beings were truly always the same, there would be no need for the corporate
voice, at least not as it emerged through the public relations field: as an instrument of persuasion
to convince the public of the genuine legitimacy and benevolence of big business. Persuasive
strategies would be unnecessary because people would always-already know that their goals
were always-already identical to their artificial brethren – the corporations.
4.3

The Development of Corporate Public Relations Theory
The origins of the public relations field are linked to the Industrial Revolution.

Corporations were the “engine” that powered this revolution. Early corporate public relations
practices led by key pioneers in the field such as Barnum, Lee, Page, Bernays and others
contributed to the development of a linear theory of public relations. The theory held that public
relations began with the early and “crude” practices of men like Barnum and then evolved to
become increasingly ethical and socially responsible. This theory materialized into Grunig and
Hunt’s influential model of public relations, which divided public relations into four components
that, they argued, corresponded to the historical evolution of the field. The models are
summarized as follows:
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Press agentry/publicity, in which publicity is itself the goal, epitomized by Barnum;
one-way communication or public information, in which the publicist serves as an
internal reporter to disseminate information outside the organization, epitomized by Ivy
Lee; two-way asymmetrical, which is research-based but in the service of better crafting
and disseminating messages, epitomized by Bernays; and two-way symmetrical, which is
research-based in the service of crafting and disseminating messages and in receiving
feedback, identified with Arthur W. Page and utilities public relations. 254
Though dominant in the field for many years, more recently the Grunig and Hunt model has been
critiqued as historically inaccurate. Scholars also argue that the field of public relations emerged
long before the Industrial Revolution and well before the rise of the corporation.255 They have
claimed that the model naturalizes an artificial division in public relations practice through its
neat separation of the field into four sequential, historical moments. This second critique is
especially relevant if we consider current events. Thus, I assert that the earliest two strategies and
tactics of press agentry and public information are still widely practiced today. A recent example
of public information or one-way communication would be the press conference Tiger Woods
held following allegations of marital infidelity: Woods delivered a prepared speech and then
refused questions or comments from reporters. Similarly, Gower’s study of magazine,
newspaper, and journal articles published on public relations during the turn-of-the-century
contradicted the linear model. She found that some railroad companies engaged in the kinds of
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sophisticated public relations practices such as relationship building and two-way symmetrical
communications typically associated with later twentieth and twenty-first century practices.256
Despite vulnerability to criticism, Grunig and Hunt’s linear model was an important
catalyst for ongoing theorization about the field of public relations. 257 For example, in their
efforts to move beyond the limitations of the linear model, Lamme and Miller advanced a new
theory to account for public relations practice, including the history of the field. They found that
there were five motivations for public relations activities, which were neither disparate nor
historically chronological and could well function interconnectedly. These included the need or
desire to raise money, to recruit others, to establish legitimacy, and to agitate against or to
advocate for someone or something.258 “All five entail persuasion and serve as alternatives, or
complements, to coercion,” 259 they explain. “We find then, that the public relations function
emerged when a person or organization sought to secure profit, recruitment, legitimacy, or to
participate in the marketplace of ideas through agitation and advocacy.” 260
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Because persuasion is a common element of both public relations and rhetorical theory,
many scholars (as my previous discussion of Hill in terms of Burke demonstrates) have
expanded and enriched their views and analyses of the public relations field by considering
rhetorical approaches. As Heath points out:
Rhetoric is employed when matters of various kinds are to be decided, when they are
unsettled, when differences of opinion prevail, and when people are uncertain as to which
of several decisions is best. It assists management as they decide what strategies are
available to promote and publicize a product or service, and even to shape an
organization’s image. It guides how they engage in an issue, debate, manage risks, and
respond during crisis. The rationale for rhetorical theory is that it helps us understand the
process of decision making, collective efforts, and the give and take of conversation,
debate, advocacy, accommodation, negotiation, and collaborative decision making.261
Heath also outlines the value of a rhetorical perspective, writing that “the rhetorical heritage
provides an evolving body of strategic and critical insights to help practitioners be effective and
ethical as they participate in the process by which society creates meaning – for meaning is
created in society.”262
In addition to rhetorical theory, public relations scholars have incorporated critical theory
and social theory in an effort to better understand and account for the complex relationships
between the public relations field, organizations, and society. Typically, these scholars are
concerned with issues of fairness and access. 263 They are also attuned to how relations of power
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manifest in communicative exchanges.264 According to Heath, “Critical scholars attempt to
unveil hidden powers that alienate and marginalize portions of society.” 265 His assertion aligns
with those of Ihlen and van Ruler, and McKie and Munshi, who all agree that public relations
scholarship can be usefully expanded with the consideration of critical and social theories.
Work from McKie and Munshi describes how a variety of critical theory perspectives can
enrich public relations comprehension and practice. For example, they discuss how Frantz
Fanon’s views of race, Kristeva’s perspectives on feminism, and queer theory’s impact on the
relationship between gender, sexual orientation and knowledge can significantly and usefully
expand the scope of public relations scholarship and practice. 266 Other scholars have used
Critical Race Theory (CRT) to demonstrate how the field of public relations is raced through its
practices, which often deny people of color access to or ascension within the field, and its
literature, which too often reinforces dominant racial views. 267 They also reveal how public
relations historiography often omits the public relations experiences of people of color and other
traditionally minority populations, simultaneously marginalizing their perspectives and limiting
the scope, efficacy, and richness of public relations praxis and conceptualization. These
rhetorical and critical approaches are necessary because, as Ihlen and van Ruler note, “Public
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relations is often studied from a managerial, instrumental perspective. However, to understand its
role in building trust or creating mistrust and in developing – or destroying – a company’s
license to operate, public relations needs to be studied as a social phenomenon.” 268
Interdisciplinary approaches sensitive to rhetorical and critical theory will help achieve the ideals
Ihlen and van Ruler put forth above.
Examining the social nature of public relations encourages us to complicate traditional
notions of the field and its functions by more directly and explicitly considering the role of
ideology and how ideology functions through public relations as the corporate voice to produce a
specific set of values, beliefs, and attitudes. These values, beliefs, and attitudes are ideologies. In
the corporate public relations field, ideology operates to reinforce any number of pro-corporate
positions on particular issues. Public relations, as the corporate voice, plays a significant role in
creating and fostering ideological orientations that encourage an economic, political, and social
climate supportive of big business. 269
Having explored the evolution of the corporate voice via an overview of public relations
history and various theoretical perspectives on the field, it is now appropriate to turn attention to
the overview and analysis of Nike v. Kasky (2003). In the next section of this chapter, we will see
if – and if so, how – Nike’s use of the corporate voice aligns with or contradicts some of the
theoretical and historical perspectives on public relations just reviewed. By the time the first
legal brief was filed in this case, the corporation had become an institution in society, and its
voice had long been established as a persuasive force in the public sphere. The economic man
had achieved some level of legitimacy, yet he had not fully escaped public skepticism.
268

Øyvind Ihlen and Betteke van Ruler, “Introduction: Applying Social Theory to Public Relations,”
Ihlen, van Ruler and Fredriksson 1.
269

Miller 395.

102
An analysis of Nike v. Kasky offers useful insights into the relationship between the
corporation, its voice, and society, as it also exposes the ideological nature of Supreme Court
discourse pertaining to corporate rights.
4.4

Why Kasky Confronted Nike
Everyone knows Nike: the multi-billion dollar company and global brand with factories

all over the world, thousands of employees, and numerous celebrity endorsers. If Nike were a
real person – that is, a human being – Nike would be powerful and popular, a force to be
reckoned with. Marc Kasky is a real person – a runner who bought Nike shoes. Kasky became
troubled when he heard allegations that workers at some of Nike’s overseas factories were being
mistreated and underpaid. 270 These factories were not owned and operated directly by Nike, but
they were contracted by Nike to make some Nike products.271 The social conditions of
production were an important part of Kasky’s purchasing decisions. 272 Until the allegations
surfaced, he had thought Nike to be a good company that treated workers well. The company
was a pioneer in corporate social responsibility and had a code of ethics in place. 273
From 1995 onward, however, Nike became the subject of “highly negative allegations
about the working conditions, compensation, worker safety and atmosphere in various Nikecontracted facilities in Southeast Asia.” 274 When the allegations surfaced, Nike became the target
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of anti-sweat shop campaigns.275 The company was accused of “greenwashing,” a term used to
describe the actions of companies who pretend, claim, or appear to be operating in a socially
responsible manner while knowingly engaged in questionable business practices especially in
cases where human or environmental safety is at issue. 276 Nike was accused of using child
labor.277 The company’s labor practices were even likened to slavery. As its public image
deteriorated, Nike faced an avalanche of negative news coverage and also became the target of
boycotts.278
As a Harvard Business School case study explained, overzealous activists even staged a
photo of a child stitching Nike soccer balls that was to be published on the cover of Life
Magazine.279 According to the Supreme Court, “Nike was besieged with a series of allegations
that it was mistreating and underpaying workers at foreign facilities.” 280 The company would
soon launch a defense. Critics characterized Nike’s response to the accusations as defiant. For
example Naomi Klein wrote,
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Nike wasn’t really acting all that sorry about it. While Kathie Lee Gifford and the Gap
had at least displayed contrition when they got caught with their sweatshops showing,
Phil Knight had practically stonewalled: denying responsibility, attacking journalists,
blaming rogue contractors and sending out flacks to speak for the company. 281
The Harvard Business School case study also characterized Nike’s initial response to the
allegations as dismissive: “Nike’s company line on the issue was clear and stubborn: without an
inhouse manufacturing facility, the company simply could not be held responsible for the actions
of independent contractors.”282 Eventually, in response to these allegations, Nike’s leaders
embarked upon a comprehensive public relations campaign to convince key stakeholders and the
American public that the criticisms against it were unwarranted.
The campaign materials included: letters from company executives and officials to
university and college leaders, a pamphlet, a web posting, a letter to the editor of the New York
Times, press releases, and advertisements.283 The letters to American university and college
officials were intended to reassure these leaders, who likely spent (or received) hundreds of
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thousands of dollars, if not millions, each year on Nike apparel and equipment for their athletic
teams, that Nike had done nothing wrong. Nike’s overarching message in these communications
was that the allegations against the company were false. 284 The letter to university leaders
opened by saying,
As most of you have probably read, heard or seen, NIKE, Inc. has recently come under
attack from the Made in the USA Foundation, and other labor organizers, who claim that
child labor is used in the production of its goods. While you may also be aware that
NIKE has gone on the record categorically denying these allegations as completely false
and irresponsible, I would like to extend the courtesy of providing you with many of the
facts that have been absent from the media discourse on this issue: I hope you will find
this information useful in discussions with faculty and students who may be equally
disturbed by these charges.285
The letter’s opening can be interpreted as Nike’s attempt to correct misinformation about the
company’s labor practices circulating within the public sphere. The letter can be interpreted as
suggesting that Nike is innocent of the allegations against it and did not engage in wrongdoing.
Among the letter’s concluding statements was this mention: “We have found over the years that,
given the vast area of our operations and the difficulty of policing such a network, some
violations occur. However, we have been proud that in all material respects the code of conduct
is complied with.”286
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Were the concluding statements (referring to violations) intended to be an admission of
some level of guilt or responsibility? An audit sponsored by Nike confirmed workplace labor
violations had occurred in some foreign factories contracted to manufacture Nike products. 287
The contradictory and controversial circumstances surrounding Nike’s labor practices led some
critics to accuse Nike of lying. 288 The controversy led Kasky to sue. “I was outraged that Nike
held itself out as the model corporate citizen,” said Kasky. 289 He decided to sue on the grounds
that “he and a lot of people in California were buying Nike products under false assumptions or
misrepresentations.”290
4.4.1 Lower Court Ruling and Appeals
In his initial lawsuit, Kasky asked that Nike do three things: pay restitution from monies
acquired via its false advertising practices, correct the misleading statements and make them
accurate, and pay his legal fees.291 The San Francisco Superior Court dismissed the case in 1999,
because Nike’s public relations efforts were viewed by the court to be protected by the First
Amendment as political speech; that classification meant that publishing information known to
be false was not a legal infraction.292 Kasky appealed the ruling and lost again. 293 Kasky
appealed to the California Supreme Court, which ruled in his favor in May 2002. The Court said:
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The issue here is whether defendant corporation's false statements are commercial or
noncommercial speech for purposes of constitutional free speech analysis under the state
and federal Constitutions. Resolution of this issue is important because commercial
speech receives a lesser degree of constitutional protection than many other forms of
expression, and because governments may entirely prohibit commercial speech that is
false or misleading. Because the messages in question were directed by a commercial
speaker to a commercial audience, and because they made representations of fact about
the speaker's own business operations for the purpose of promoting sales of its products,
we conclude that these messages are commercial speech for purposes of applying state
laws barring false and misleading commercial messages. Because the Court of Appeal
concluded otherwise, we will reverse its judgment.294
The court essentially agreed that Nike had violated the law.” 295 Nike rejected this outcome,
setting the stage for one of the most interesting corporate communication-related cases in
Supreme Court history.
4.4.2 Kasky v. Nike Becomes Nike v. Kasky
When Nike appealed the matter to the U.S. Supreme Court, a key issue for the justices to
consider was whether Nike’s public relations communication should be protected as political
speech or restricted as commercial speech.296 This categorization was important because political
speech was protected broadly by the First Amendment and had few limitations. By contrast,
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commercial speech, or “what might be termed economic expression was historically unprotected
by the First Amendment. The assumption was that economic expression, which includes
commercial expression, was not vital to the nation’s well being.” 297 First Amendment protections
for commercial speech became more firmly outlined with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976).298
In the state of Virginia, a law prohibited pharmacists from publicizing their prices. A
citizen sued to gain access to that information. The case went to the Supreme Court. In Virginia,
the Supreme Court stated, “In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is
protected, we of course do not hold that it can never be regulated in any way. Some forms of
commercial speech regulation are surely permissible.” 299 One example where commercial speech
can be regulated, outlined by the Court, concerns the truthfulness of speech: “Untruthful speech,
commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.” 300 Ultimately, the Court
concluded, “What is at issue is whether the State may completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity…. We conclude that the answer to
this one is in the negative.”301 Thus, Virginia established First Amendment protections for
certain kinds of commercial speech – and most salient to this study, speech that was truthful
about a lawful activity. When Nike appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court, commercial speech
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was still required to be truthful in ways that free speech as political expression was not. 302 For
these reasons, it was in Nike’s best interest for the Court to rule that their corporate
communications were political expression, because that form of speech was held to a lesser truth
standard than commercial speech.
Although Nike was defending itself against public criticism related to its alleged false or
misleading statements, much of its public relations communications were still interpreted as
being in service of the profit motive. The communications were thought to be instances of
commercial speech (as the California Supreme Court opinion seemed to indicate). Noting this in
Nike v. Kasky, Justice Breyer wrote,
Marc Kasky has claimed that Nike made false or misleading commercial statements.
And he bases this claim upon statements that Nike made in some specific documents,
including press releases and letters to the editor of a newspaper, to institutional
customers, and to representatives of nongovernmental organizations. 303
Justice Breyer continued,
The California Supreme Court held that certain specific communications, exemplified by
the nine documents upon which Kasky rests his case, fall within that aspect of the Court’s
commercial speech doctrine that says the First Amendment protects only truthful
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commercial speech; hence, to the extent commercial speech is misleading, it is
unprotected.304
Predictably, the Kasky team wanted the U.S. Supreme Court to rule in a way that was consistent
with the California Supreme Court’s ruling against Nike.
In his analysis of the Nike v. Kasky, Terilli argues that Nike was operating appropriately
within the parameters of the law. In addition, he identifies three points on which Kasky’s
arguments could be called into question:
First, all parties agreed not a single statement urged the purchase of any Nike product.
Second, the statements made by Nike were responses to charges made in the media or by
labor or other organizations and reported in the news media. Third, the core of Kasky’s
allegations was that Nike’s published statements ignored or omitted specific incidents,
articles, reports or other studies that contradicted Nike’s point of view. 305
However, I would argue that these and similar criticisms of Kasky’s position might be
productively augmented by the consideration of a critical perspective. Although their points are
clearly stated, they may overlook some key factors.
First, although the statements in Nike’s public relations campaign materials did not
overtly urge the purchase of any Nike product (which would have been a more discernible
violation of commercial speech regulations under the First Amendment), the entire campaign
served to encourage the ongoing financial support of the Nike brand by reassuring the public that
the allegations against the corporation were false. 306 The company did not necessarily have to
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admit the economic motive underlying its response to the allegations because the motive was
implied. Of course, Nike wanted to maintain its contracts with university officials around the
country who bought Nike apparel and products for their sports teams. Nike also wanted to
maintain a positive reputation, given the correlation between reputation, profits, and overall
organizational health.307 Secondly, the problem is not that Nike responded to allegations leveled
against it. The problem is the intent of this response: to persuade consumers, even if through
misinformation, to continue to buy Nike products. Because the speech contained in Nike’s public
relations campaign was predominantly guided by the profit motive, I maintain that it should
count as commercial speech and be regulated as such. 308
Nike’s lawyers contended that the laws against fraud and deception were too broad to
apply to the company in this case; therefore, Nike should not be held accountable for the
contents of its speech.309 As Nace points out,
Rather than argue that the company’s advertisements were factual, the lawyers asserted
that factuality was irrelevant in the case because Nike was protected by the First
Amendment. Thus, the company could publicize any sort of information it wanted –
even “facts” that it knew to be completely false.310
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In claiming that its public relations campaign communications should be legally protected
despite concerns over truthfulness, Nike may have contributed to the perception that the
company was attempting to persuade the Supreme Court that the truth is an insignificant criterion
for public relations speech.
Writing as though he were a member of Nike’s legal team, Hartmann summarizes the
corporation’s rationale this way: “We’re a company, which is the same as a person, and so we
have the First Amendment right to say whatever we want just like anybody else. To say that we
only have to say things that are accurate violates our First Amendment right of free speech.”311
While such an assertion might be legally true, is it true morally or ethically?
Several corporations filed amicus curiae, or “Friend of the Court” briefs in support of
Nike. These included ABC, Inc.; American Society of Newspaper Editors; the Associated Press;
Forbes, Inc.; Fox Entertainment Group; Gannett Company; the Hearst Corporation; the
McClatchy Company; the National Association of Broadcasters; the National Broadcasting
Company; Newsweek, Inc.; National Public Radio; the New York Times Company; U.S. News
& World Report; the Washington Post Company; and others.312 Many of Nike’s supporters were
media companies, which are reliant on revenue from corporations and other organizations that
can afford to regularly advertise in the expensive mass media. Therefore, it is not improbable to
consider that some of these Friend of the Court companies supported Nike because they received
a portion of Nike’s advertising budget each year. Even so, their primary motive for supporting
Nike may have had more to do with protecting corporate First Amendment speech rights for
political expression than any other motive. A ruling against Nike might put the First Amendment
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rights for political expression of all corporations at stake.313 The next chapter explains in detail
why First Amendment free speech rights are so advantageous for corporations; for now, suffice it
to say that they offer corporations more legal protections and fewer restrictions for their
communicative activities than commercial speech rights.
If Nike prevailed, it could mean that, as Stoll notes, “Proctor and Gamble, for instance,
could issue a press release claiming that it does not test its products on animals, even if this is
patently false, and the action would be protected under the First Amendment.” 314 Pharmaceutical
companies could publicize medications curing cancer, but sell the public placebos without
penalty or patient recourse. In a world where the corporation has insinuated its “self” into every
aspect of human life, determining – or at the very least influencing – every aspect of the human
experience, such as our food and water supply, our homes, educational systems, modes of
transportation, access to healthcare, and more, granting Constitutional protection for untruths
told by corporations is a very scary proposition – whether in commercial or political speech
contexts.315
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In the end, the Supreme Court dismissed Nike v. Kasky by issuing this short statement:
“The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.” 316 The Court explained the nondecision by claiming the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case; that both sides – Nike and
Kasky – “lacked standing to bring a federal claim”;317 and that the issues raised by the case were
so novel that it wouldn’t be appropriate for the Supreme Court to rule on them now. 318 Hartmann
offers his own interpretation of the Court’s logic, writing this time as though he were a member
of the Court: “When we decided to listen to these arguments and look over this case, granting it
legal certification before us, we screwed up. Therefore we’re tossing out the certification and
going to pretend we never even heard this case or read its briefs.” 319
Justice Stephen Breyer dissented in Nike v. Kasky. He wrote, “In sum, I can find no good
reason for postponing a decision in this case. And given the importance of the First Amendment
concerns at stake, there are strong reasons not to do so…. I would not dismiss as improvidently
granted the writ issued in this case. I respectfully dissent from the Court’s contrary
determination.”320 As Justice Breyer indicated, the Supreme Court should take on the tough
questions, provide sound legal judgment, and set the nation on a solid course.321
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In his dissent, Justice Breyer also offered a perspective on how the Court might have
appropriately ruled in this case. In doing so, he offered a critique of the California court’s
decision.
If permitted to stand, the state court’s decision may well “chill” the exercise of free
speech rights…. The upshot is that commercial speakers doing business in California
may hesitate to issue significant communications relevant to public debate because they
fear potential lawsuits and legal liability…. This concern is not purely theoretical. Nike
says without contradiction that because of this lawsuit it has decided “to restrict severely
all of its communications on social issues that could reach California consumers,
including speech in national and international media.” It adds that it has not released its
annual Corporate Responsibility Report, has decided not to pursue a listing in the Dow
Jones Sustainability Index, and has refused “dozens of invitations…to speak on social
responsibility issues.”322
From a critical perspective, one may wonder if Justice Breyer is supporting the idea that
corporate speech should not be held to a high standard of truth because it would curtail corporate
communications. If so, such perspective would appear sympathetic to the idea that if
corporations are not allowed to communicate anything they want – including things that may not
be true and that might mislead the public – then they may not say anything to the public at all.
Neither in concurring nor dissenting opinions does the Court appear to encourage the idea that
corporations should be more truthful in their speech in general. If Nike had been more
transparent and accurate in the beginning, there likely would have been no Kasky v. Nike.
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Perhaps the brilliance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nike v. Kasky was precisely its
decision not to decide. A non-ruling, by default, can preserve the ability to decide later on.
It should not be forgotten that silence is not impotence. Often it makes a statement as a strategic
power move because inaction is every bit as significant as what is perceived as action. Recall
McKerrow’s point that what is absent in communication is every bit as important as what is
present in any discourse, and that what is hidden in discourse often functions to reinforce the
aims of the powerful. Considering McKerrow here infuses Hartmann’s assertion – that the
Court’s non-ruling also allowed corporate personhood and corporate speech rights to remain
untouched – with theoretical strength from the critical rhetorical tradition.
After the Supreme Court chose not to hear the case, Nike eventually settled with Kasky.
The corporation also made a $1.5 million financial donation to the Fair Labor Association
(FLA), an organization dedicated to helping sweatshop workers around the world by providing
education and economic assistance. 323 The settlement was “lauded as a success by both sides.”324
But something about it rang hollow to critics as Spar explained.
While some labor leaders accepted the FLA as the best compromise possible, others
decreed it as a sham agreement that simply provided cover for U.S. corporations. A main
objection of these critics was that the FLA standards included notification of factories
that were supposed to be inspected, a move criticized by some as equivalent to notifying
a restaurant when a critic was coming to dine. 325
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In addition, the seven-figure settlement from Nike, a multibillion dollar company, could be
perceived as a small drop from a very large corporate bucket.
4.4.3 Implications of Nike v. Kasky on Public Relations and the Corporate Voice
What are the implications of Nike v. Kasky? The Court’s dismissal dissatisfied those who
wanted to know definitively whether Nike’s public relations activities should be categorized as
commercial speech or political expression. Should public relations communications be forced to
comply with commercial speech regulations? Does truth matter in corporate communications?
Or to what extent should truth matter in corporate communications? These and other questions
were left unanswered by the Court. However, the Court’s silence on this issue did not squelch the
implications of the decision not to rule.
Both critics and supporters of Nike agreed that by not ruling in this case, the Supreme
Court unfortunately left the legal scope of the corporate voice and its speech rights unclear and
open for ongoing contestation.326 The circumstances resulting from the Supreme Court’s nonruling have implications for public relations practitioners. 327 For reasons that are by now
obvious, corporations may prefer their public relations communications to be classified as First
Amendment political expression. Because commercial speech only has limited First Amendment
protections, it means that public relations professionals should be very careful in how they use
the corporate voice to “speak.” Public relations professionals need to be aware of these nuances
between political expression and commercial speech so they can advise their clients and
employers wisely. 328 For example, public relations practitioners should be aware that if public
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relations is considered political expression, it is more likely to receive more First Amendment
protection. On the other hand, marketing, advertising, and other persuasive communications
aimed at generating or preserving profit, are usually characterized as commercial speech and
may receive less legal protection under the First Amendment if they contain falsehoods. Thus,
when public relations professionals allow their communications to become too inundated,
intermingled, or aligned with marketing or sales messages, they may put the corporation at legal
risk. “MarCom,” integrated marketing and communications efforts, may be particularly
susceptible to legal exposure (because of the profit-motive directly motivating marketing
efforts), while public relations proper may provide more legal latitude and cover for the
corporate voice from a practical standpoint. But because the Supreme Court never ruled in
Nike v. Kasky, all of this remains murky legal territory.
From Terilli’s perspective, Kasky “may have serious implications for all forms of
expression, including journalism. For example, if businesses or business people cannot, or
believe they cannot, speak freely on matters affecting business, the result will be a poorer
marketplace and poorer, less informed, news stories.”329 As a result, Terilli asserts that corporate
speech should receive unlimited First Amendment protection as political expression. This seems
to support the idea that truth in corporate communications to the public is not necessarily legally
relevant. On the other hand, Nace argues that nothing should warrant the corporation’s legal right
to mislead the public:
“The right to lie” under the First Amendment as a way of maintaining the “free market
of ideas” is wrongly conceived. Indeed, just as laws against fraud and monopoly are
needed to maintain the integrity of markets for goods and services, so likewise laws
329
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against deliberate corporate deception are actually quite vital to protect the “free market
of ideas.330
The “right to lie” that Nace references has been an important part of the concept of the
marketplace of ideas since its early conceptualizations as described by John Stuart Mill. Mill’s
ideas contributed to the development of the marketplace of ideas concept. He argued that
falsehoods were necessary because they facilitated an arrival at truth. He wrote:
But the particular evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the
human race, posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the
opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a
benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision
with error.331
For Mill, silencing falsehoods does not guarantee truth and in fact may obstruct it. On Liberty
situates falsehoods as a useful means to discovering the truth. However, Nace is among the
critics of this conception of the marketplace of ideas and the Court’s apparent take on the
concept in Nike v. Kasky.
According to Hopkins, common criticisms of the underlying assumptions of the
marketplace of ideas concept are, “(1) that everyone has access to the market, (2) that truth is
objective and discoverable rather than subjective and chosen or created, (3) that truth is always
among the ideas in the marketplace and always survives, and (4) that people are basically
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rational and, therefore, are able to perceive truth.”332 However, if the voices of corporations are
able to shape or even create “truth,” what are the implications for the integrity of the marketplace
of ideas?
Nike v. Kasky seems to demonstrate that the corporation and its voice need to be
regulated in order to protect the integrity of “truth” from the influence of the profit motive. It
does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the corporate voice needs to be regulated to help
temper the profit motive, because the profit motive can sometimes cause the corporate voice to
be used in ways that harm or deceive people, contributing to the corporation’s ongoing crisis of
legitimacy.
In light of earlier discussions of the corporate voice, public relations history, and theory,
how should Nike v. Kasky be understood or contextualized? From a public relations history
standpoint, Nike’s strategies and tactics seemed consistent with the practices of Barnum,
Bernays, and Hill. Thus, Nike’s public relations campaign can be said to contradict the linear,
evolutionary model of public relations by providing an example of how publicity/press agentry
are still practiced today. Like Barnum, Bernays, and Hill, Nike used the persuasive campaigns of
public relations practices to achieve a profit motive. Truth in communication was not necessarily
a significant consideration in these instances.
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Nike’s public relations efforts may have too heavily relied on press agentry, publicity,
and one-way information dissemination to communicate with the public. In doing so, their
communicative efforts may have functioned to fulfill a neoliberal economic ideological
orientation that supports the protection of corporate interests at the expense of human interests.
Certainly, the human interests of workers who believed themselves mistreated were
compromised. Similarly, the human interests of those people who care about the social
conditions of production and see that as an important part of the purchase decision-making
process, like Kasky, may have been (or considered themselves to have been) taken advantage of
by Nike.333 Perhaps to ameliorate these issues, Nike could have taken a different approach such
as robustly embracing the Page Principles, which advocate telling the truth and relegating the
profit motive to its proper place – somewhere far behind serving the greater public good.
Nike’s public relations efforts appear to be indicative of the Platonic view of rhetoric as
deception and in contrast to more evolved rhetorical principles that advocate for the “good
organization speaking well.”334 Nike’s public relations activities in this case may also stand in
opposition to critical perspectives that seek to expose and make right relations of exploitation,
build community, and lead toward more socially responsible corporate behavior. Instead, Nike’s
public relations efforts may have conformed to the ideological principles of economic liberalism
that puts profits before people. In defending its reputation, Nike’s corporate voice was perceived
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by critics to disregard truth, mislead the public through persuasion, represent the worst of public
relations practices, and ultimately confirm the negative stereotypes that have plagued rhetoric,
public relations, and the persuasive arts for many years.
Nike’s public relations effort could have taken a different approach – an approach more
in line with two-way symmetrical communications, the Page Principles, rhetorical approaches,
and self-reflexive critical approaches that exemplify public relations at its best. Specifically, the
Nike public relations team and the company’s leadership team could have started with the truth,
and telling the truth did not have to put the company at legal risk. The public relations, executive,
legal and human resources teams could have collaborated to develop an approach along the lines
of the following: 1) we’ve been informed that there is a problem; 2) we are working to find out
the exact cause, nature, and extent of the problem; 3) once the problem is identified, we will fix
it; 4) we will keep you posted regularly as things develop; 5) please post your questions and
comments to our company website, and we will respond to you as quickly as possible; and 6)
thank you for your patience and support as we work diligently to resolve this. This kind of
approach could have positioned the company to work legitimately and collaboratively with
independent organizations to create meaningful change that served the public interest, supported
employee well-being, and protected the corporation’s reputation. 335
The money Nike spent on legal fees and on the $1.5 million settlement could have gone
to support these initiatives. Then the company’s next public relations campaign could have been
all about how it tells the truth (even in tough circumstances), does the right thing proactively and
voluntarily, and is a company or brand of choice for those reasons. I admit, it is always easier to
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make recommendations after a crisis is over. However, I maintain that operating with an
awareness of critical, ideological and rhetorical theory in public relations can provide
practitioners with useful foresight. This level of foresight can be used to help the corporate voice
function as an instrument of communicative benevolence and professional leadership, and not
merely as an instrument of persuasion intended to legitimate and promote the interests of
corporations at the expense of human well-being.
We have seen how the corporation became a person, developed a voice, and used its
voice. In Nike v. Kasky, the corporate voice aimed to convince the public that Nike was not
engaged in wrongdoing even when that fact was debatable. The aim of the company’s public
relations campaign was arguably to preserve profits through preserving its reputation. So far, this
dissertation has shown how both personhood and voice have contributed significantly to the
evolution of the corporate form. One contribution of the corporate voice is that it helped to
further reify the corporation by endowing this artificial property form with additional human-like
qualities. To become arguably the most dominant institutional power in the U.S., however, the
corporation still needed one more thing – First Amendment speech rights for political expression.
Those rights could increase the corporation’s political influence and facilitate its rise to global
hegemony. As Lisby wrote, “Though philosophical questions still exist as to the full extent of the
comparative constitutional rights of natural persons and corporations, it is clear that corporations
are artificial persons under the Constitution, entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment.”336 The next chapter explores the corporate quest for First Amendment free speech
rights in greater detail and analyzes the Supreme Court’s role in granting corporations these
rights, ultimately bringing the trinity of corporate power to fruition.
336
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5. CORPORATE SPEECH RIGHTS
The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such
associations are not natural persons.337
5.1

Corporate Speech Rights, the First Amendment, and the Transformation of Money
into Speech
Speech has always been the method by which human beings have sought to express

themselves. As such, it has been the cornerstone of democratic deliberation and decision making.
Interestingly, speech is no longer the special province of natural persons at the very same time that
it has more political influence than ever. Thanks to several landmark Supreme Court decisions on
corporate speech rights, the voices of corporations play a prominent role in today’s public sphere
from a political standpoint. These rulings transformed money into First Amendment-protected
political speech and paved the way for corporations to play an increasingly influential role in
democratic political processes.
Politicians, members of the press, and others have openly criticized corporate
involvement in political affairs. President Barack Obama called the Supreme Court’s ruling on
corporate speech rights in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010) “a major
victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and the other powerful
interests that marshal their power every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday
Americans.”338 In response to the Citizens United decision, Atlanta Journal-Constitution
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editorial cartoonist Mike Luckovich published a depiction of founding father look-alikes
gathered in Independence Hall. The logos of America’s top corporations were stamped on their
chests. “We the People” was replaced by “We the Corporations,” and a sign covering the
American flag read “Your Ad Here.”339 The implication is obvious: America is for sale.
Citizens United, and indeed all of the landmark rulings on corporate speech rights
including Buckley v. Valeo (1976)340 and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978),341
have led to unprecedented and ever-increasing levels of corporate involvement in politics. 342
Many scholars have expressed concerns that these rulings are not neutral interpretations of the
law, but instead function to support the aims of big business by concentrating tremendous power
in the “hands” of corporations. 343 Some of these scholars have also argued that the Supreme
Court’s transformation of money into speech compromises, if not altogether undermines, the
participation of average citizens in democratic political processes. As Gowri writes,
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“The central issue is whether a corporation is the kind of entity that we believe should contribute
to formulating a political climate, to making crucial political decisions (such as engaging in war),
and ultimately, to building a future social world – and whether it should participate on equal
terms with human beings.” 344
I join the ongoing conversations about corporate speech rights and contribute an
ideological analysis of the landmark Supreme Court decisions, including majority and dissenting
opinions, on corporate speech rights. My analysis aims to shed light on the ideological
orientations in these judicial texts, and I make the following arguments:
1) Supreme Court rulings on corporate speech rights are not merely impartial
interpretations of law, but instead are a part of a particular ideological orientation;
2) The ideological position undergirding landmark Supreme Court rulings on corporate
speech rights is indicative of the principles of neoliberalism, which favors private
enterprise, big business, and the ongoing expansion of corporate rights, political power,
and social influence;
3) Rhetorically equating corporations with natural persons hampers human agency in the
democratic political process;345
4) Money is not speech; and 346
5) Corporations should have a role in the public sphere, but should not have direct
influence in democratic political processes.
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My ideological analysis of Supreme Court rulings on corporate speech rights will identify
statements by the Court that support the ideological principles of neoliberalism such as the
expansion of corporate rights, the protection of private enterprise, and the transformation of
social relations into economic relations. This chapter begins with a discussion outlining key
perspectives on corporate speech rights. Then I offer a historical overview of the context in
which Buckley and Bellotti, the first two landmark rulings concerning corporate speech rights,
emerged. This overview includes an analysis of a controversial memo, “Attack on American
Free Enterprise System,” authored by Lewis F. Powell just before he was nominated to the
Supreme Court as a justice. The memo articulates many of the principles of neoliberalism, and
my analysis of this text calls attention to the relationship between judges and ideology while also
serving as a contextual foundation for my subsequent discussion of Buckley and Bellotti. While
Buckley was the first ruling to transform money into speech, Bellotti was the first to declare
“corporate political expression” was an indispensible part of democratic political processes. My
analysis shows how these rulings were not impartial interpretations of law but functioned to
achieve the ideological aims of neoliberalism as outlined in the Powell memo.
After the analysis of Buckley and Bellotti, I turn attention to the latest landmark ruling on
corporate speech rights and arguably the crown jewel of the corporate rights movement: Citizens
United.347 In this ruling, the “voice” of big business was granted a broad platform because the
ruling removed many of the restrictions on corporate spending in political elections. For
example, Citizens United facilitated the introduction of the Super PAC – a political action
committee allowed to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money from corporations and other
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groups such as unions and associations, and in some cases without disclosing the origins of the
money. 348 This made it easier than ever for all corporations (including those that are foreignowned) to directly participate in American political elections. The chapter closes with a
discussion of the implications of the ongoing expansion of corporate speech rights.
Corporate speech rights are the subject of much scholarly and popular debate – and the
focus of this chapter – because without a doubt, they constitute one of the most pressing issues of
our time. First Amendment political expression rights for corporate spending, cast as “speech,”
significantly hampers human agency for average citizens within the public sphere by creating
conditions in which the money of corporations not only competes with, but ultimately drowns
out, the voices of natural persons. The ideological analysis set to unfold in this chapter will
elaborate these assertions as I engage in a close reading of the landmark rulings in relation to the
context in which they occurred.
The average human being simply does not have as much money as the average
corporation and is not in the financial position to buy comparable amounts of speech to compete
in the marketplace of ideas. This is largely because the rights of human beings, such as
personhood and free speech, have been extended to corporations while the rights of corporations,
such as limited liability and flexible transfer of wealth, have not been extended to human beings.
This arrangement puts corporations in a very powerful position. The corporate speech rights
issue is important because how it is resolved will have lasting consequences that will either
empower human beings or erode the significance of their voices in democratic political processes
for years to come.
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5.2

Discussion and Viewpoints on Corporate Speech Rights
There are a range of positions constituting the debate over corporate speech rights. This

section provides an overview of some of these positions so that we might observe how these
perspectives play out in the landmark Supreme Court rulings on corporate speech rights featured
in this chapter. Aditi Gowri opens her essay about corporate speech rights with two critical
questions: “To what extent should the expression of corporations on politically or ideologically
controversial issues be protected under the First Amendment? Should they have a right to free
speech equivalent to that of human persons?” 349 Critics of corporate rights such as Thom
Hartmann and Ted Nace would answer both questions with a resounding “No!” Gowri belongs
with them in the camp of scholars who assert that corporations are not people and cannot engage
in the act of speech. These scholars argue that First Amendment protection for corporate speech
creates excessive corporate involvement in politics, which contributes to the appearance and
occurrence of corruption, and undermines the participation of individual citizens in democratic
political processes.
“It is not only that corporations are allowed to speak on political issues,” Gowri observes,
“but rather – and most disturbing – that they are provided with a mechanism (limited liability,
combined with the understanding that spending is speech) to ensure that their voices will be
loudest of all.”350 But the corporate voice does not have to be the loudest of all for the
corporation’s information to be made available to the public and to inform the decision-making
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process. It only has to be made available, and availability does not depend on corporations
having First Amendment rights for political expression (in the same way that human beings have
traditionally enjoyed these rights).
On the other side of the debate, Robert A. Prentice asserts that because the government
has an effect on business, “It is natural, proper, and in keeping with our traditions for
corporations to react to this governmental influence by entering the political arena through
various means such as lobbying, electoral activity, and political advertising.” 351 Melvin Urofsky
is another supporter of corporate speech rights (in the form of political expression), although he
admittedly began as a critic of First Amendment speech rights for corporations. 352 Urofsky
believes that corporations provide information that is useful to public deliberation. He supports
the idea that First Amendment protection of corporate speech is good for democracy. Urofsky
advances the argument that the rising cost of mass media, the primary mechanism for the
dissemination of campaign messages, requires candidates to raise large sums of money from
corporations. He uses this combination of factors to justify First Amendment rights for
corporations:
I…still feel great sympathy for those who (legitimately) worry about the impact of large
wealth on our political system. But as I explain in the Epilogue, not only is money
essential to the political system, it is in fact a form of speech, and although the authors of
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the McCain-Feingold law had idealistic praiseworthy goals, they failed to take into
account realities other than abuses – the realities of how U.S. politics is financed, how it
has operated for many years….353
From Urofsky’s point of view, distinguishing between what is real and what is ideal is crucial.
While it may be ideal to have strong regulations of the campaign financing activities of
corporations, it is not realistic because corporate financing of elections has long been a necessary
part of our democratic political processes, and should therefore be embraced, not scorned.
Robert Kerr brings a perspective that bridges several differences between supporters and
critics of corporate speech rights. 354 He joins Prentice and Urofsky in acknowledging the
increasing costs of media and accepts that the need for campaign finance cannot be subordinated
or ignored. Several of his works recognize that corporations do have perspectives worthy of
public consideration and necessary to public deliberation. At the same time, some of Kerr’s
views are consistent with critics of corporate speech rights. Like Gowri, he is cautious of First
Amendment protections for corporations’ political expression because the voice of big business
is exactly that – big – big enough to potentially drown out the voices of everyday, average
Americans.
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While critics like Hartmann and Nace blame the Supreme Court for “giving America” to
corporations, Kerr’s analysis frames the situation in a different light. His work – particularly on
Citizens United – shows how the decision can be understood in terms of “Lochner’s Error.”355
Used colloquially, the phrase “Lochner’s error” is used to describe an instance when the court
takes an arbitrary, artificial, and discursive (i.e., non-natural) relation and naturalizes it as if were
the normal order of things, occurring without discursive, human intervention. Kerr’s analysis
also shows how corporate speech rights can be understood as legal constructions produced
through judicial writ, sometimes against the social and political pathos of the nation. 356
The U.S., for example, was the only country at the turn of the century with regulatory
laws designed for the express purpose of reigning in the activities of big business. 357 Kerr
explains that:
The concerns about big business focused upon the growing perception of the lack of a
corporate “soul.” By that expression…citizens of that time could mean many things, but
355
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they worried most about the inability of the giant corporations to maintain a personal
relationship with human beings. They feared that Americans were being reduced simply
to “units of consumption” by the corporations. 358
Reducing America’s citizens to “units of consumption” is entirely contrary to the idea of a nation
of civic-minded individuals such as the forefathers had envisioned.
Significant resistance to corporate power continued because many viewed big businesses
as encroaching on human rights and freedoms, especially in the realm of politics. The election of
President McKinley in 1896 served to highlight this point:
The general concern over corporate power around the turn of the century had been
catalyzed into major reform efforts by such revelations as wealthy financier Marcus A.
Hanna having raised huge contributions from corporations, including $250,000 from
Standard Oil (the equivalent of some $5 million today), for William McKinley in his
defeat of populist William Jennings Bryan in the presidential campaign of 1896. 359
The McKinley-Hanna incident is just one example of how early in our nation’s history there was
a clear correlation between contributions from large corporate coffers and campaign wins.
Awareness of these correlations influenced the introduction of the Tillman Act of 1907, which
prohibited corporations from direct financial involvement in federal elections. The Tillman Act
ushered in decades of significant separation between business and political arenas. During the
second half of the twentieth century, all of that began to change.
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5.3

The Powell Memo – A Catalyst for the Corporate Rights Movement
As was the case during the Industrial Revolution, the American business community of

the 1960s and 1970s was concerned about its public image. Environmental pollution, civil rights
violations, consumer abuses, and other scandals had taken a toll on the public perception of
capitalism and corporations at a time when America’s political and economic direction was still
contestable. In 1971, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., former corporate attorney and head of the American
Bar Association, was asked by his friend and associate Eugene B. Syndor, Jr. to share his
thoughts on how to provide a more “balanced view” of capitalism in America. 360 Powell did far
more than that. His pivotal memorandum, “Attack on American Free Enterprise System,” helped
to strengthen the 1970s corporate rights movement. 361
In the memo, which was distributed to U.S. Chamber of Commerce members, Powell
characterized capitalism as under assault from the left. A smart man by any measure and an
astute student of history, he was not totally opposed to criticism of big business, but he feared
the destruction of the political/economic system that defined what he saw as the American way
of life:
There always have been critics of the system, whose criticism has been wholesome and
constructive so long as the objective was to improve rather than destroy. But what now
concerns us is quite new in the history of America. We are not dealing with sporadic or
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isolated attacks from a relatively few extremists or even from the minority socialist cadre.
Rather, the assault on the enterprise system is broadly based and consistently pursued. It
is gaining momentum and converts.362
Powell was not so much concerned that there were critics. Rather, he was concerned that popular
criticism of big business was gaining so much traction. Powell was also disturbed by the business
community’s reaction to these attacks, asking his colleagues, “What has been the response of
business to this massive assault upon its fundamental economics, upon its philosophy, upon its
right to continue to manage its own affairs, and indeed upon its integrity?” 363 His answer was
unapologetic:
The painfully sad truth is that business, including the boards of directors and the top
executives of corporations great and small and business organizations at all levels, often
have responded – if at all – by appeasement, ineptitude and ignoring the problem…. They
have shown little stomach for hard-nose contest with their critics and little skill in
effective intellectual and philosophical debate.364
Powell chastised the business community as a father would a son who was afraid to “ring the
bell” of an opposing player on the gridiron. He nearly mocked his colleagues for what he called
“appeasing” their enemies. After all, business people are supposed to be tough. They do not
shrink from their problems, they crush them, or they buy them if the price is right. 365
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To Powell, an ideological war was being waged against big business from many sectors
of society including academia, the media, and the political arena, and it required a serious
response. At stake was the very survival of the free enterprise system and the livelihoods of the
businesspeople who profited from it. Powell encouraged business leaders to replace the strategy
of appeasement with a much more aggressive, proactive counter-attack. “The time has come –
indeed, it is long overdue – for the wisdom, ingenuity and resources of American business to be
marshalled against those who would destroy it,” he told the business community. 366 He then
elaborated this macro-position with specific recommendations:
Independent and uncoordinate activity by individual corporations, as important as this is,
will not be sufficient. Strength lies in organization, in careful long-range planning and
implementation, in consistency of action over an indefinite period of years, in the scale of
financing available only through joint effort, and in political power available only
through united action and national organizations. 367
Powell’s assertions are consistent with the ideological principles of neoliberalism, and he states
plainly what corporations need to do to set things right: combine their large sums of money with
political influence to promote and legitimate the interests of the corporation in ways that lead to
less regulation, more rights for corporations, and likely higher profit margins. Powell recognized
that business leaders would need to work together because, while an individual corporation was
strong, a collectivity of corporations would be unstoppable.
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Like the more enlightened business tycoons of the Industrial Revolution, Powell advised
that public relations would have to play a key role in shaping more favorable perceptions of big
business and capitalism. In addition to incorporating strong public relations strategies, winning
this ideological war would require even more modes of outreach. Therefore, a key focus for
Powell was acquiring more influence in academia. He suggested several augmentations to
correct what he saw as an academic imbalance favorable to the left. His memo advised that the
Chamber should consider acquiring a staff of scholars and speakers who could become a part of
campus life, and he thought the business community should evaluate textbooks to ensure that
business and capitalism were portrayed favorably. 368
Perhaps one of his greatest revelations was outlined in the aptly titled section of the
memo, “Neglected Opportunity in the Courts.”369 Here, Powell advised the American business
community to use the judicial system as a way to shore up its position in society. He wrote,
“Under our constitutional system, especially with an activist-minded Supreme Court, the
judiciary may be the most important instrument for social, economic and political change.” 370
Powell seemed to view the courts as under-exploited terrain through which big business could
change the laws, enter other sectors of society, influence policy, and otherwise advance its
ideological aims. Powell concluded his memo with a simple but urgent warning that “business
and the enterprise system are in deep trouble, and the hour is late.”371
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“Attack on American Free Enterprise System” was not the only catalyst in the movement
toward expanded corporate rights, but it was a significant one. Powell’s memo must have
resonated because members of the business community responded with a sense of urgency. The
same year that Powell’s memo was distributed, Joseph Coors, head of the multi-million dollar
brewery business, donated the first $250,000 to launch what eventually became the Heritage
Foundation, a conservative think tank. The following year, Frederick Borch of General Electric
and John Harper of Alcoa launched the Business Roundtable, an influential association
comprised of CEOs from the top U.S. corporations who believe that “businesses should play an
active role in the formation of public policy.” 372 Former Treasury Secretary and corporate speech
rights advocate William Simon summed up the movement’s goal: to create a “counter
intelligentsia that would help business regain its ideological footing.” 373
The response to Powell’s memo was impressive. 374 Perhaps the most dramatic incident
occurring in the wake of the memo’s distribution was Powell’s subsequent ascension to the
Supreme Court, having been nominated that same year by President Nixon. Interestingly though,
Powell’s memo was not made public until after his confirmation. This was perhaps a strategic
move intended to protect him from the public perception that his strong views would influence
his decisions as a member of the nation’s highest court. As Nace notes, “Powell identified
closely with the goals of big business both ideologically and personally.” 375
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While it is impossible to say precisely how Powell’s ideological principles would
influence his decision-making as a Supreme Court justice, one cannot reasonably argue that his
ideological principles had no bearing whatsoever on his decisions. Like any other human being,
Powell’s life experiences must have shaped his world views somehow. As James White explains,
“Any judge brings a basic set of values and orientations to his or her work.”376 It is important to
remain cognizant of the ideologies judges may hold, because ideologies are a central form of
action by which our social environments are produced. 377 With these considerations in mind, it is
appropriate to turn attention toward Buckley and Bellotti to see what sorts of ideological
principles emerge from these Supreme Court rulings.
5.4

Buckley Transforms Money into Speech and Bellotti Declares Corporate Speech
Indispensible
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” 378 Just like the Fourteenth Amendment was created to
protect human beings from discrimination, the First Amendment was intended to protect their
right to speak freely. Both amendments, however, were appropriated by corporations with the
help of the Supreme Court. An important step in extending the corporation’s right to speech in
the form of political expression was the transformation of money into speech that took place with
Buckley v. Valeo (1976).
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In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld that limits on financial contributions to political
campaigns were permitted, but concluded that limits on expenditures were unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.379 Expenditures and contributions share an important commonality in that
both are substantively money; however, the language in the Court’s per curiam decision
rhetorically construed them as substantially different.
To make this rhetorical reconfiguration of the meaning of money work, the majority
defined contributions as “gifts” to candidates in which the person giving the money does not
express a political viewpoint. Contributions do not count as political expression, according to the
Court, because the recipient of the money, not the person who donated it, determines how the
financial contribution will be used; thus, following the Court’s logic, the gifted money must be
regulated because it may or may not be used as political expression. 380 Contributions were
construed as bolstering the overall wealth of the candidate, and not as facilitating political
expression in the form of speech. As a result, the Court concluded that supporters could not give,
i.e., contribute, as much money as they wanted to political candidates or campaigns, because
unlimited contributions could lead to the appearance or reality of corruption and undermine
public confidence in the democratic political system. 381
Unlike contributions, the Court characterized expenditures as political expressions that
were understood to represent the viewpoint of the person making the expenditure, not of the
candidate who received funds. 382 Expenditures were therefore deemed as deserving of First
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Amendment political expression protection. Walter Greene summarizes, “The Supreme Court
draws a distinction between money as a contribution and money as an expenditure and allows
contributions to be more regulated than expenditures.”383
The Court, including Justice Powell, used the following justification to strike down
limitations on expenditures:
It is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity
of speech by individuals, groups, and candidates. The restrictions, while content neutral
as to the ideas expressed, limit political expression “at the core of our electoral process
and of the First Amendment freedoms. 384
Everyone would agree that protecting political expression is foundational to the ideals expressed
in the First Amendment. But the Court is not simply talking about the traditional understanding
of political expression that is based on the physiological speech of human beings. They are also
talking about protecting expenditures which are large sums of money from artificial entities like
corporations.
To resolve these substantive differences, the Court conflates money with speech and
places money alongside speech at the core of our democratic political processes. This conflation
is entirely consistent with the ideological principles of neoliberalism, which aim to bring all
social relations into the domain of the market. When money counts as political expression, the
democratic political process becomes just another marketplace with votes reified as commodities
for exchange. This conflation results in what Greene has conceptualized as “money/speech,”
defined as “the overdetermined articulation of money and advocacy that can appear in different
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rhetorical forms: political advertisements, oratory, lawn signs, lobbying.” 385 Thus, the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Buckley paved the way for the creation of money/speech, arguably the preferred
language of the “economic man.”386
After establishing that money was speech – or at least a certain type of money in
expenditures – the Court’s was in a position to claim that the government had no right to curtail
its flow:
The concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,
which was designed “to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. 387
The judicial desire to include as many voices as possible within public and political discourse is
consistent with the values and aims of our nation’s forefathers, and supports the ideals of the
Constitution. However, the language of the Court’s majority obscures the fact that the
corporation’s innate wealth and power may create conditions where their well-financed voices
drown out the expression of natural persons in both volume and frequency.
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Thus, while the Buckley decision was rendered in the name of increasing and diversifying
expression, it could actually reduce sources of antagonism and interfere with the free exchange
of ideas by allowing those with more money to buy more speech, and subsequently, more
influence. The implication here is that the perspectives of the moneyed would come to dominate
the marketplace of ideas in the same way that big trust companies of the Industrial Revolution
crushed or gobbled up their competitors in order to dominate the market resulting in less, not
more, choice for consumers. Despite these dangers to democracy, the ruling nevertheless
declared, “A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached.”388
The four justices dissenting from the decision countered the following claims put forth by
the majority: 1) that the money of corporations was the same thing as the speech of human
beings; and that 2) reducing spending reduced the amount of speech available, including the
number and depth of issues discussed. Chief Justice Warren Burger characterized the majority’s
reasoning as flawed and suggested that the decision compromised the efficacy of Congress’s
campaign finance reform efforts. 389 Justice Blackmun summed up the problem succinctly: “I’m
not persuaded that the Court makes, or is indeed able to make a principled constitutional
distinction between contribution limitations, on the one hand, and the expenditure limitations, on
the other, that are involved here.”390 Justice Marshall pointed out that the perception that wealth
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wins elections may “undermine public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process,” and
discourage potential candidates without great wealth from participating in the political arena. 391
Like Blackmun, Justice White’s criticism stemmed from the seemingly impractical nature of the
majority’s opinion:
It would make little sense to me, and apparently made none to Congress, to limit the
amounts an individual may give to a candidate or spend with his approval but fail to limit
the amounts that could be spent on his behalf. Yet the Court permits the former while
striking down the latter limitation.... As an initial matter, the argument that money is
speech and that limiting the flow of money to the speaker violates the First Amendment
proves entirely too much. 392
These dissenting opinions acknowledge that it is impossible to limit one form of spending as
speech, leave another unrestricted, and then remain confident that unrestrained spending of any
kind will not compromise democratic political processes. Buckley’s dissenting justices clearly
see that establishing money as speech, in any way, enables those with great wealth to transform
their economic advantages into political power, which compromises the very virtues of the First
Amendment that the judiciary is supposed to protect.
There have been no shortages of scholarly critiques of Buckley concerned about the
Supreme Court’s transformation of money into speech. Dale Herbeck, for example, described
Buckley’s effects as a “curious scheme”:
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Congress could limit contributions to candidates, but not the total amount spent by a
campaign. Those who sought to influence the political process soon devised legal ways to
circumvent the limits on individual contributions. One easy way to get around the limits
on “hard money” (contributions to candidates) was to give “soft money” (contributions
for activities such as voter awareness campaigns) to political parties. The law also
allowed third parties – citizens groups, unions or corporations – to spend their own
money on “issue ads.” These ads were legal as long as they did not instruct voters
to “vote for,” “elect,” or “vote against” a particular candidate.393
While Buckley was not a corporate speech rights case in the purest sense, these distinctions
between “hard” and “soft” money also ushered in a new wave of corporate advocacy fueled by
lobbyists and PACs who could flood electoral processes with soft money contributions more
easily than ever before. Essentially, Buckley provided a legal pathway for corporate money to
infiltrate politics.
Another way to understand the Buckley ruling and its implications is offered by Kerr,
who provides the following summary:
The Court upheld limits on contributions to candidates but struck down limits on
expenditures in support of candidates. The Court reasoned that direct contributions
represent a potentially corrupting influence on democratic processes but concluded that
independent expenditures did not. The decision didn’t directly address the First
Amendment questions on the use of corporate funds in election campaigns, but it did
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signal a shift in jurisprudence regarding the corporation. Buckley altered the relationship
between spending and speech and made it constitutional for contributors to corporate
segregated funds (political action committees) to participate in election campaigns on a
collective as well as individual basis.394
Commentary from Herbeck and Kerr captures the key implications of Buckley. The Court’s
characterization of expenditures as speech in Buckley provided a legal pathway for corporations
and other organizations to circumvent limitations on political contributions. In doing so, the
Supreme Court fundamentally changed the traditional and differential relationship between
spending and speech, opening the door for corporate spending to be treated as if it were the
political expression of American citizens.
Two years later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978), the Court more
directly extended First Amendment protections for corporate political expression or free speech
rights. In Bellotti, the First National Bank of Boston wanted to publicize its views in opposition to a
proposed tax referendum.395 The problem was a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the bank and
other businesses from “making contributions or expenditures for the purpose of influencing or
affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of
the property, business or assets of the corporation.”396 The bank challenged the constitutionality of
the statute, arguing that it abridged their First Amendment rights.
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The state maintained that the statute should be enforced because corporate participation
in the political process could introduce undue influence in the debate, improperly shape the
outcome of the referendum vote, or destroy the people’s confidence in both the democratic
process and the government’s integrity. Essentially, the central issue in Bellotti concerned
whether a state could stop corporations and other groups from using their funds to publicize
views on issues unrelated (or tangentially related) to their corporate businesses. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the statute, siding with the state over the bank. The bank’s
lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court. In a tight 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court sided with
the bank.
The U.S. Supreme Court claimed that the lower court had sought to address the wrong
question: whether and to what extent corporations have First Amendment rights. The majority
opinion was authored by Justice Powell. It said, “The proper question therefore is not whether
corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those
of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether section 8 abridges expression that the
First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it does.”397
Here, the Court reframed the question in a way that allowed them to avoid directly
addressing the broader and more controversial issue of corporate speech rights, while rendering a
decision with serious implications for that very issue. Gowri points out that shifting the
substance of the discussion from corporate speech rights to protecting political expression
permits Powell to frame the decision as consistent with the principles of the First Amendment.
Gowri writes:
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The decision in Bellotti, per Justice Powell, explicitly disavows any intention to attribute
First Amendment speech rights to corporations. The issue, he insists, is not whether
corporations have First Amendment rights equivalent to those of human beings but rather
whether the Massachusetts law being challenged “abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect.”398
Thus, the Court appears to use this new question to interpret the First Amendment as alwaysalready intending to encompass corporate speech even though there is no reference to
corporations or artificial persons in the First Amendment. Justice Powell went on to clarify the
Court’s understanding of the First Amendment:
The First Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. If the
speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence
their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensible to decision making in a
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather
than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporations,
association, union, or individual. 399
By emphasizing protection for the type of expression (i.e., speech) and minimizing the
significance of the speaker, the Court’s majority ignores the inextricable relationship between the
message and the speaker who delivers the message. They seemingly disregard rhetorical history
and theory as well as go against common-sense understandings that hold that what is said is
almost always as important as who said it. To illustrate this assertion with a simple example, the
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phrase “You’re fired” carries very different weight when said by your boss than when said by
your secretary.
The language of the majority also declares corporate speech “indispensible.” The
majority almost constructs an image of corporations as entities in danger of marginalization or
oppression. Notice the choice of words in the beginning of the passage: “If the speakers here
were not corporations….” This rhetorical volley seems to show a concern that corporations
might become voiceless victims were it not for the protection of the Court. What Justice Powell
and the majority do not acknowledge is that there is a desire to regulate the speech precisely
because it is speech from a corporation. Many people believe that the money and power of the
corporate form position it to wield unfair amounts of influence and to use its influence in unfair
ways. This potential for unfairness is what necessitates the regulation of corporate speech. The
majority opinion, however, remains sympathetic to corporations. I argue that the sympathy
expressed in the Bellotti opinion authored by Justice Powell is similar to that found in his memo
to the Chamber of Commerce written years earlier.
If we consider those two texts – “Attack on American Enterprise System” and Bellotti –
in chronological order, we can see a connection between a judge’s ideological orientation and his
rulings from the bench.400 Powell’s 1971 memo clearly laid out a plan for expanding corporate
influence, with specific mention of using the courts as a means to gain that control. Then, a few
years later, he authors a ruling that expands the scope of corporate speech rights, which functions
primarily to protect the flow of corporate money into political elections and
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ultimately, to increase corporate influence in democratic political processes. I claim that these
events are neither isolated nor disconnected. They are united in their support for the ideological
principles of neoliberalism that favors private enterprise and the expansion of corporate rights.
In a dissenting opinion Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, offered
an interpretation of the First Amendment that was very different from the one offered by the
majority:
An examination of the First Amendment values that corporate expression furthers and the
threat to the functioning of a free society it is capable of posing is not fungible with
communications emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions which
individual expression is not. Indeed, what some have considered to be the principle
function of the First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of selfexpression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate
speech. 401
While Justice Powell and the majority construct an ontological conflation between corporations
and human beings, the dissenting justices draw attention to the ontological differences between
humans and corporations as a way to explain why their differential treatment under the First
Amendment is necessary.
Unlike human beings, corporations are artificial, contractual, legal entities created by
people under law to further economic goals. As such, they have been given substantial
advantages not available to natural persons such as limited liability, perpetual life, special rules
for the efficient accumulation and distribution of wealth, and flexible taxation of assets.
Gowri further clarifies these differences within the context of speech rights:
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Corporations need not be accorded the same speech rights as human beings because they
are just not the kinds of beings that can express themselves in the ways that humans do.
Indeed, they have no selves to express. When we act as though there is such a thing as
corporate speech or a corporate speech right, we are actually really discussing the extent
of expression permissible to some human persons who speak under the corporate aegis
and at corporate expense.402
The dissenting justices neither conceal these fundamental facts about the corporate form, nor do
they sidestep them. “The special status of corporations has placed them in a position to control
vast amounts of economic power, which may, if not regulated, dominate not only the economy
but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral process,” remarks Justice White. 403
This rhetorical, ideological analysis of Buckley and Bellotti shows how each landmark
ruling functioned to expand corporate rights and the scope of corporate power. The Buckley
decision expanded it indirectly and Bellotti expanded protection for corporate political
expression under the First Amendment more directly. The judicial redefinition of money as
speech in Buckley provided a pathway for increased corporate participation in democratic
political processes. Now corporations could spend money to influence the outcome of political
elections, and this spending was protected as First Amendment free speech. The characterization
of corporate speech as indispensible to the decision-making process in a democracy in Bellotti
functioned to justify First Amendment protections for corporate spending, and this is entirely
consistent with the ideological principles of neoliberalism that advocate the ongoing expansion
of corporate rights. Although the language of the Court in both rulings focused on protecting a

402
403

Gowri 1840.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) 809.

152
type of speech – expenditures vs. contributions – and increasing the public’s access to
information (disseminated by corporations), the result was protection for a particular kind of
speaker – the corporation – and a particular kind of speech – spending. The conflation of speech
and spending functions to efface the inherent and innate differences between human beings and
corporations, as well as their communicative needs.
In Bellotti, the majority’s opinion gives the impression that individuals and institutions
are ontologically identical, or at least identical enough to have similar First Amendment free
speech rights. On the surface, this interpretation of the relationship between “persons”
(individuals and corporations) and Constitutional rights appears to equalize or democratize
access to First Amendment rights among types of “persons.” However, upon closer inspection, it
actually privileges corporate speakers by extending to them the rights of individual flesh-andblood human beings without extending to human beings the legal entitlements of corporations.
While the language of the majority appears matter-of-fact and neutral in terms of tone and style,
the action performed through its discourse is decidedly pro-corporate. First Amendment rights
for corporations most directly benefit corporations because they offer further legal protection for
the corporate coffers, which corporations can then use to further their “political expression” to
promote and legitimate their interests – even if it means that the voices of individual and average
American citizens will be drowned out of the political process. This landmark decision functions
to reinforce the ideological principles of economic liberalism, which seek to free corporations
from regulations and empower corporations with rights that further their economic, political, and
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social interests. As Harvey points out, neoliberalism aims to bring the entirety of the human
experience into the domain of the market.404 Corporate speech rights that transform money into
speech help to fulfill that goal by bringing business and politics closer together in very specific
ways – ones that satisfy the ideological aims of neoliberalism.
There is no doubt that Buckley and Bellotti have changed the very nature of the
democratic process in this country by dramatically increasing corporate influence within
the political arena. When money becomes speech, the economic advantages of corporations are
transformed into political advantage. 405 Not long after Buckley and Bellotti, Citizens United
pushed the issue of corporate speech rights further, seemingly ignoring Justice White’s warning
that “the State need not permit its own creation to consume it.”406
5.5

Citizens United: The Crowning Jewel of the Corporate Rights Movement
If Buckley and Bellotti laid the foundation for the contemporary corporate speech rights

movement, Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010) was its crowning jewel.
This decision ushered in the Super PAC and a new age of unprecedented corporate involvement
in political elections. 407 Reaction to the ruling was mixed. For example, a Wall Street Journal
article published after the decision was celebratory, and its lead paragraph enthusiastically
declared:

404

David Harvey, A Brief History of Neo-Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 3.

405

Kerr, “Lochner’s Error” 324.

406

Justice White’s dissent in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) 809.

407

Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

154
Freedom has had its best week in many years…. Yesterday the Supreme Court issued a
landmark decision supporting free political speech by overturning some of Congress's
more intrusive limits on election spending. In a season of marauding government, the
Constitution rides to the rescue one more time. 408
That same day, the New York Times ran an editorial that strongly criticized the ruling.
This article’s lead read:
With a single, disastrous 5-to-4 ruling, the Supreme Court has thrust politics back
to the robber-baron era of the 19th century. Disingenuously waving the flag of the First
Amendment, the court’s conservative majority has paved the way for corporations to use
their vast treasuries to overwhelm elections and intimidate elected officials into doing
their bidding.409
Another critic said the decision “wipes out a hundred years of history” during which American
laws have sought to tamp down corporate power to influence elections.” 410
These polarized reactions indicate that the road to increased corporate speech rights was
not without challenges. In fact, opposition at times came from the Court itself, as was the case in
Austin v. Michigan State of Chamber of Commerce (1990)411 and McConnell v. Federal
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Elections Commission (2003).412 Both Supreme Court rulings functioned to limit corporate
speech – or perhaps more precisely, to limit the amounts of money corporations could spend on
political candidates and campaigns – as well as the ways in which that money could be spent.413
In many ways, these rulings functioned to tame the excesses of Buckley and Bellotti’s expansion
of First Amendment rights for corporations. A brief overview of these cases helps to put the
Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision into proper context.
In Austin, business corporations were forbidden from using general treasury funds to
make independent expenditures in elections. 414 The Court ruled that corporate treasuries are a
corrosive threat in elections, not because of the amount of their wealth but because that wealth
derives from special advantages innate to the corporate form and unavailable to human beings. 415
The central point here was that the Court recognized the significant and specific advantages of
the corporate form and restricted political speech precisely because the speaker in question was a
corporation. In McConnell, the Court ruled to prevent corporations from using their general
corporate treasury funds “directly or indirectly to elect legislators who could advance the
corporate interest over the public interest.”416 In essence, Austin and McConnell functioned to
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limit corporate speech rights and distance the democratic political process from the undue
influence of corporate wealth and power. The Citizens United ruling essentially removed these
safeguards.417
The situation began when Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation dedicated to
advancing a conservative political agenda, wanted to increase promotion and expand distribution
of the documentary, Hillary: the Movie. The 90-minute film, previously released on DVD,
criticized then Senator Clinton and encouraged the public not to vote for her in the 2008
Presidential primary election. To better publicize Hillary, Citizens United wanted to broadcast
television advertisements and distribute the documentary using a Video-on-Demand (VOD)
cable service. That activity – advocating the election or defeat of a candidate by using mass
media channels within thirty days of a primary – is called “electioneering.” Electioneering was
permissible under federal law if corporations used money from their political action committee
(PAC) but not from their general treasury funds. Although Citizens United had a well funded
PAC with millions of dollars and could legally use those funds to promote and distribute Hillary,
the nonprofit instead wanted to use money from its general funds, which violated Federal
Election Commission (FEC) laws.
Citizens United’s members had good reason to believe that their plans to publicize
Hillary would be met with civil and criminal charges. As a remedy, they sought injunctive relief.
It was denied and the nonprofit took their case to the Supreme Court. Lawyers for Citizens
United argued that Hillary was “just a documentary” and that VOD was not a mass distribution
417
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service, so therefore their promotion plans should not be considered electioneering. The Supreme
Court disagreed. Then Citizens United’s lawyers asked the Court to make a one-time exception
that would temporarily lift the ban that prevented the nonprofit from promoting Hillary as
intended. The FEC even agreed to a one-time exception in this case. Members of the Supreme
Court, however, had a very different solution in mind. They believed that making a one-time
exception was too narrow and left too many restrictions in the way of the “indispensible”
political expression of corporations.
The Court’s approach to this case may be familiar. It is similar to the one seen in Bellotti,
when the Court was asked one very specific question about corporate speech rights but instead
reframed the question, shifting the agenda. In Citizens United, the Court again did not address
the specific focus of the case: namely, how, in this particular situation, Citizens United should
publicize the documentary film. Instead, the Court expanded the scope of their decision beyond
protecting the speech of one group, Citizens United, to protecting all corporate speakers in this
controversial 5-4 decision. A passage from the majority opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy
states,
“We return to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.
No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of non-profit
or for-profit corporations.”418
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On the other hand, the dissent thought the speaker’s identity mattered:419
If taken seriously, our colleagues’ assumption that the identity of the speaker has no
relevance to the Government’s ability to regulate political speech would lead to some
remarkable conclusions. Such an assumption would have accorded propaganda
broadcasts to our troops by “Tokyo Rose” during World War II the same protection as
speech by Allied commanders. More pertinently, it would appear to afford the same
protections to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual
Americans: To do otherwise, after all, could “enhance the relative voice” of some
(i.e., humans over others, i.e., corporations). 420
As the dissent points out, if one accepts the majority’s logic, it is possible to conclude that the
First Amendment was intended to allow any speaker to participate in American democratic
political processes, including foreign-owned interests that could possibly be terrorist-owned and
operated. This is a consequence of the Court’s refusal to acknowledge the significant differences
between human beings and business organizations, and to regulate speech according to these
differences.
The majority, on the other hand, maintains that there is a need for the Supreme Court to
protect corporations from government malfeasance, with malfeasance rhetorically constructed as
government regulation and oversight. It is difficult to understand why the Court’s majority has a
fear of its own government but appears to have no fear that foreign nations and organizations, as
corporations, might easily use the Citizens United ruling to directly (and negatively) influence
American politics. The majority’s confidence in corporations is exemplified by their statements:
419
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“independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption,
or the appearance of corruption.”421 The comments articulate the neoliberal ideological principles
that suggest situating social relations (including political relations) as market relations reduces
corruption instead of contributing to it.
There is a familiar theme reoccurring throughout the majority’s opinion. It is the same
one that was expressed in the Powell memo and again by the Court in Bellotti: that absent, the
protection of the Court, corporations would become powerless or voiceless victims of
governmental discrimination. But what is the probability or possibility that the modern corporate
form could become a voiceless victim? At this stage of advanced capitalism, when corporations
have permeated every aspect of the human experience, 422 that seems unlikely, yet that fear
appears to permeate Supreme Court rulings on corporate speech rights.
This abiding concern for the welfare of the corporation is entirely consistent with the
principles of economic liberalism, which presuppose an antagonistic relationship between
government and business. Within this framework, advocacy for private enterprise is imperative
because otherwise what is perceived as overreaching and arbitrary government policies would
unreasonably constrain economic liberties. Consistent with the Powell memo, such advocacy
activities would appropriately include the ongoing expansion of corporate legal rights such as the
First Amendment right to free speech.
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It is also important to remember that, although the language of the Court’s majority
admonishes limitations placed on political speech (and the negative consequences that might
result if corporate speech were limited), the issue at hand is really about limiting corporate
spending. This central issue is spending because, at the most fundamental and practical level,
money is not speech. Money can only become speech via discursive and symbolic relations.
The end result of the Citizens United decision was that the Court stripped away the last
remaining restrictions on corporate political spending and ushered in a new era of “Super PACs,”
not bound by the old PAC rules, which regulated contributions more stringently. 423 “Because
they are not bound by the old contribution limits, these super PACs have the ability to outspend
the candidate’s official campaigns,” which means that a super PAC can directly influence the
decision-making of political candidates. I would argue this invites not only the appearance of
corruption but the opportunity to corrupt.424 As Hartmann explains, “If a corporation likes a
politician, it can ensure he is elected every time; if it becomes upset with a politician, it can
carpet-bomb her district with a few million dollars’ worth of ads and politically destroy her.”425
Some might argue that the re-election of President Obama in 2012 contradicts
Hartmann’s assertions. Others might argue that it confirms them. To that I would respond that
the full ramifications of the 2010 Citizens United ruling for federal as well as state elections
remain to be seen, and that we have not yet witnessed all of the political magic that corporate
money can make. What we know for sure, however, is that Citizens United allows corporations
and other wealthy organizations to spend money from their general funds in political elections on
423
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a candidate’s behalf without restraint so long as the spending is not coordinated with the
candidate, and this will have lasting as well as unanticipated implications for electoral politics
for years to come.
Hartmann sums up the Citizens United decision as “a naked handoff of raw political
power to corporate forces.”426 If we accept his basic premise here, it is reasonable to conclude
that the ideological principles of neoliberalism that appeared in Buckley and were expanded by
Bellotti have become canonized by the Citizens United ruling: money is speech; the “speaker’s”
identity is now “irrelevant;” unlimited corporate political spending is protected by the First
Amendment; and the “voices” of corporations are now “indispensible” parts of our democratic
process.
Despite the risk of corruption facilitated by Buckley and Bellotti and now most recently
by Citizens United, Justice Kennedy justifies the majority’s reasoning:
Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the “discussion,
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks to
foster.” The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or
other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply
because such associations are not natural persons. 427
Justice Kennedy puts corporations and other forms of inanimate organization on the same
ontological plane as individual human beings. For him and the majority there seems to be no
meaningful differences between natural and artificial persons, human beings and corporations.
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The opposite is true for the dissent, whose members seem to have little trouble
identifying the significant ontological differences between human beings and corporate entities.
Justice Stevens articulates some of the basic differences:
Unlike natural persons, corporations have “limited liability” for their owners and
managers, “perpetual life,” separation of ownership and control, favorable treatment of
the accumulation of assets…that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their
resources in ways that maximize their return on shareholders’ “investments.” Unlike
voters in U.S. elections, corporations may be foreign controlled. 428
Justice Stevens also elaborates on these differences even further to drive home the ontological
differences between corporations and human beings:
Corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires.
Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and
their “personhood” often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves
members of “We the People” by whom and for whom our constitution was established. 429
Nevertheless, the language of the majority avoids the clear and present differences between
humans and corporations in ways that ultimately function to protect corporate personhood and
justify corporate speech rights.
In an opinion concurring with the Court’s majority, Justice Scalia offered this revelation:
“Indeed, to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the modern
free economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech to the public
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debate.”430 Of course, this statement immediately initiates questions. If corporations are the
“principal agents of the modern free economy,” then what are human beings? Has human agency
become a tangential, auxiliary afterthought? Returning to Gowri’s earlier point, what kind of
social world would we have if corporations were “the primary agents”?
The idea that corporations are “the principal agents” in society and are deserving of
human rights could only become an acceptable premise in a society where the principles of
economic liberalism have achieved ideological dominance. In fact, the very ideas that money
equals speech and that natural and artificial persons are more similar than different are neoliberal
fictions in the most fundamental sense.
Justice Stevens’ dissent highlights the strange logic undergirding the majority’s
arguments that corporations are people, too, and that money equals speech:
Today’s decision is backwards in many senses. It elevates the majority’s agenda over the
litigants’ submissions, facial attacks over as-applied claims, broad constitutional theories
over narrow statutory grounds, individual dissenting opinions over procedural holdings,
assertion over tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality. 431
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In this passage, Justice Stevens improperly places rhetoric in opposition to reality, overlooking
its constitutive role in the human experience. He accepts the classical, Platonic notion of rhetoric
as “grounded in its differentiation from logic.” 432 Despite this oversimplification of rhetoric’s
multitude of meanings and applications, the main point of Stevens’ argument is still salient: that
the majority’s opinion instills a false perception of both the issues surrounding the Citizens
United case and the intended purposes of the First Amendment.
The analysis offered in this chapter seems to support an observation that others have also
identified:
Attempts by corporations (and their lawyers…) to usurp American democracy are nothing
new…. Corporatism has always been a threat to democracy. The problem was that
corporations were gaining increasing traction in what had become a dire conflict with
democracy itself. The rights of “natural” persons were losing ground at an accelerating
pace, and in 2010 things got a whole lot worse very, very fast.433
The Citizens United ruling is a key reason why things deteriorated so quickly. Now, a relatively long
tradition of limiting corporate power in politics has been all but erased. Despite the Tillman Act of
1907, the FEC Act of 1971, Austin, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)/McCain Feingold
2002,434 and McConnell, corporate free speech rights are now fully ingrained into the American legal
system.
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With Citizens United, now more than ever, these assertions from Hawkes ring true: “Money
is not merely a convenient vehicle for exchange; money has significance, it means something. In
short, money talks, and it speaks the language of ideology. If money has grown more progressively
abstract and less material over the course of its historical development, the same might be said of the
things people buy with it.”435 I would only add that money speaks the language of a particular
ideology, neoliberal ideology, which has shown a tendency to put everything up for sale – even
democracy.
The Supreme Court’s latest ruling on the issue of First Amendment speech rights for
corporations contributes to the ongoing ontological conflation between natural and artificial
persons. Corporate rights are expanding and human agency often contracts under the weight of
great institutional power. That is why the political speech of corporations needs to be more
appropriately regulated and also why the institutional power of corporations requires the kind of
serious and thorough interrogation that ideological criticism can provide.
This chapter shows how statements made by the Supreme Court in landmark rulings on
corporate speech rights have expanded corporate rights, protected corporate money, enabled
corporate political influence, and helped corporations become one of the most – if not the most –
powerful institutions in the U.S. and in the world. This chapter also showed that those rulings
were not merely neutral interpretations of the law, but instead represented a particular ideological
orientation. The analysis of Buckley, Bellotti, and Citizens United revealed the ideological
principles of economic liberalism and neoliberalism operating within these texts as money was
transformed into speech; corporate speech was declared indispensible; the speaker deemed
irrelevant; and corporations were crowned the principal agents of our modern, free economy. In
435
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addition to the principles of economic liberalism being present in the text, they were also
reproduced through the rulings, with each ruling advancing the aims of big business such as the
protection of private enterprise, the expansion of corporate rights, and the growth of corporate
power and influence. Because corporations are such pervasive institutions, they should have a
role in the public sphere, but they should not have direct influence in democratic political
processes. This is because political processes are not market relations and should not be treated
as such. It is important to acknowledge that corporations are not people in the same way that
human beings are people. They cannot speak in the same ways that humans can; spending and
speech are different. Natural and artificial persons need to be treated differently.
Through an examination of the trinity of corporate power in personhood, voice, and
speech, this study has revealed that the modern corporation is an ontological scandal emerging
out of the Supreme Court’s treatment of property as people from Santa Clara in 1886 to Citizens
United in 2010. Despite these judicial reifications, the significant ontological differences
between human beings and corporations mean that corporations should not have the same
constitutional rights as natural people. We (as in human beings, and American citizens in
particular) should take meaningful steps to address this ontological scandal.
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6. CONCLUSIONS: THE ONTOLOGICAL SCANDAL OF CORPORATE
PERSONHOOD AND THE TRINITY OF CORPORATE POWER
This study began with three critical questions: What are some of the primary sources of
corporate power? What is the ideological, rhetorical relationship between the U.S. Supreme
Court, corporate rights, and corporate power? And finally what are the implications of the
corporation, as legally configured today, for the human experience? This conclusion addresses
each critical question and explains what this study teaches us about rhetoric, ideology, and their
functions as critical, analytical tools capable of exploring the evolution of the modern corporate
form through key Supreme Court decisions on corporate rights. In addition, I explain how
corporate personhood, voice, and speech rights contribute to the ontological conflation of natural
and artificial persons – human beings and corporations. In order to provide such explanations,
the dissertation embarked upon an analysis of key Supreme Court decisions on corporate rights.
The authoritative and influential nature of Supreme Court discourse proved to be useful texts for
study. A close reading of these texts showed how the ontological scandal of corporate
personhood played out on the terrain of landmark Supreme Court decisions on corporate rights. I
will summarize how these processes unfolded and their implications. Ultimately, this dissertation
provides a new way to look at the corporation, understand its evolution, and the sources of
its power.
6.1

The Primary Sources of Corporate Power
To address the first question, what are some of the primary sources of corporate power,

I argued that there are three primary sources of corporate power: its personification under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the development of its voice, and finally, its acquisition of First
Amendment speech rights for political expression. In the previous chapters, I have tried to show
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how each of these developments in the corporation’s evolution were also important aspects of
corporate power. Individually, each development contributed to the rise of corporate power in
the U.S. Collectively, however, they form a trinity of corporate power, with the first element –
personification of the corporation under the Fourteenth Amendment – setting the stage for an
unfurling of corporate rights that would dramatically change how human beings experience the
social world.
The trinity can also be contextualized as a veritable trifecta of corporate power, because
trifecta captures both the chronological and speculative nature436 of the evolution of corporate
power via the three primary sources I have highlighted in this study – personification under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the development of the corporate voice, and the acquisition of First
Amendment speech rights for political expression. It also accounts for the fact that if any of these
phases of the corporation’s evolution or aspects of its power were to be missing or if they had
never occurred (and in the order in which they occurred), then it is unlikely that the modern
corporation would have developed as it has; its power would have been unable to become so
pervasive. All three pieces of this “corporate power puzzle” were prerequisite for the
corporation’s rise to institutional hegemony. These assertions are strengthened when we take into
account a few alternative and hypothetical scenarios that omit a key component of the trinity. It
is worth taking a moment to imagine what would have happened if there were no Fourteenth
Amendment-based corporate personhood, no corporate voice, or no First Amendment free
speech rights for corporations.
The significance of Santa Clara – and its role as a primary contributor to the evolution
of the corporate form and its power – becomes magnified if we consider what might have
436
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happened had the ruling gone the opposite way; that is, if the personification of the corporation
had remained limited to the Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) rules.437 The
corporation still may have been able to develop a voice through the public relations field, but
how that voice developed and to what uses it was put would have remained tightly controlled or
at least significantly constrained by individual states, which issued and controlled corporate
charters. Similarly, the acquisition of corporate speech rights would have probably come to
fruition in some way. However, it likely would have been on a much smaller scale because some
states may have permitted corporations to have very liberal speech rights while others may not
have done so.
If the personification of the corporation under the Fourteenth Amendment had never
taken place and if corporations were regulated by Dartmouth rules, it is possible that the
transformation of money into speech would have occurred, but the reach of that money/speech
would have only gone so far, because limiting the geographic reach of corporate speech rights to
particular states would have significantly constrained the corporation’s ability to influence
political policies and electoral outcomes broadly on a national level. Thinking through these
alternate scenarios highlights the individual significance of each aspect of the trinity of corporate
power as well as illuminates the interdependent nature of the relationship between Fourteenth
Amendment personification of the corporation, the corporate voice, and corporate speech rights
as key sources of corporate power. I will continue to elaborate this point by imagining the
corporation without a voice.
Although corporations were personified under the Fourteenth Amendment and emerged
at the end of the nineteenth century as very wealthy persons, without a voice they would have
437
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been left with the raw, vulgar power of the corporate police forces that were far too often popular
mechanisms of corporate persuasion during labor conflicts. This method of persuasion relegated
the corporation to the status of a repressive state apparatus (RSA). Because repression is often
met with resistance, the development of the corporate voice was one of the most important
aspects of the development of corporate power. As a non-violent form of persuasion, the
corporate voice served a transformational function, moving the corporation from an RSA to an
Ideological State Apparatus (ISA), because it enabled the corporation to persuade with ideas and
words instead of bullets and clubs.438 Public relations as the corporate voice was a key
instrument through which pro-corporate attitudes, beliefs, and values were (and still are)
disseminated to the public and woven into everyday practices, becoming taken-for-granted
norms.
From the Industrial Revolution to the 1970s and beyond, it appears that the corporate
voice has played a significant role in establishing a corporate-friendly ideological orientation in
society that functions to legitimate the corporation as a worthy and benevolent member of the
human community attuned to major social issues, and with its own unique perspective to
share.439 This rhetorical positioning of the corporation by the corporate voice functioned as a
primer, setting the stage for the forthcoming corporate speech rights movement of the 1970s.
Essentially the personification of the corporation in conjunction with the development of its
“voice” functioned to make the idea of corporate speech rights a conceptual possibility, and
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eventually a legal reality. Noting the significance of an idea for transforming the socio-political
arrangement, Ernest J. Wrage wrote, “The study of ideas provides an index to the history of
man’s values and goals, his hopes and fears, his aspirations and negations, to what he considers
expedient or inapplicable.”440 The way that the Supreme Court has ruled on key corporate rights
cases is in many ways indicative of what the Court, and what society, finds expedient. The
battles fought on the court are emblematic of the battles fought in society.
The achievement of corporate speech rights for political expression was the crowning
jewel in the trinity of corporate power. Even if corporations were persons with a voice, without
speech rights the contemporary political power corporations hold today would have been nearly
impossible to achieve. Without First Amendment free speech rights for political expression,
corporate speech would have been restricted to commercial speech, which requires a higher level
of truthfulness in communications and did not permit the political expression of corporations.
The acquisition of free speech rights are what provided the corporation entry into the political
arena. Acquiring speech rights, or perhaps more aptly put, the “fusion of money/speech,” 441
made the corporation a much more powerful political player on the national stage. It enabled the
tremendous wealth of corporations to be used to influence the outcome of democratic political
elections because, when money counts as speech, corporations are well positioned to use their
vast treasuries to out-shout – or rather outspend – average citizens. This means that the corporate
person is able to have the loudest voice of all. When the corporate voice is the loudest, the voices
of other persons are prevented from entering the marketplace of ideas, while the ideas and
policies of the corporation circulate prominently and dominantly in the public sphere.
440
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To briefly summarize, my research reveals that personification, voice, and speech are
each independently key contributors to rise of the modern corporation and its power. In addition,
my study illuminates the less obvious fact that when these three components of corporate power
function collectively, as a trinity, they produce what is arguably among the most powerful
entities the world has ever known – the modern corporation.
6.2

Supreme Court Rulings and the Value of Rhetorical Analysis
The “red thread,” or unifying device, running through each of these aspects of corporate

power – its personification, its voice, and its speech rights – is, of course, the Supreme Court.
This leads to the discussion of the second critical question: what is the nature of the relationship
between the Supreme Court decisions that compromised the textual objects of study and
corporate power? 442 It would be a dramatic oversimplification to suggest that the Supreme Court
has only served as an enabler of corporate power, since many of its rulings have served as a
check on corporate power.443 But it is also quite true that several key Supreme Court rulings have
functioned to enable, expand, and protect corporate power in ways that have dramatically
transformed society. This transformation has tended to further corporate interests, which are
predominantly wealthy interests, while too often jeopardizing both the interests and agency of
average citizens.444 Lax environmental regulations that allow corporations to legally pollute air,
442
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soil, and water sources are an easy example. Another example would be the predatory lending
practices that led to the housing market crash that began in 2008. 445
My ideological analysis of the Supreme Court rulings in this study reconfirms two
important findings about judicial discourse. First, it demonstrates that judicial discourse,
including Supreme Court discourse, should not be thought of as always-already neutral and
objective. We should reevaluate our acceptance of what William Lewis characterizes as “the
dominant presumption of legal legitimacy…that, properly applied, the process of adjudication
can achieve reasonably just and objective results, restrain individual passions and prejudices, and
apply the law fairly among cases and across time.” 446 This is not to say that the law does not
sometimes operate objectively and neutrally. In some cases, at some points, in some instances, it
may. 447 What my analysis aimed to show is that we can no longer afford to accept taken-forgranted, unquestioned assumptions of the law as objective and impartial – especially when it
comes to judicial discourse and Supreme Court decisions concerning corporate rights.
Approaching legal discourse from a rhetorical perspective helps to pierce its surface-level
meanings. It facilitates complex judgments about the meanings, functions, and implications of
judicial decisions.
A rhetorical analysis of legal discourse that takes Philip Wander’s assertion that
“no credo, however lyrical, authentically expressed or truly believed should escape cross445
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examination”448 seriously, moves us in the right direction because it provides a more
multifaceted complex understanding of legal discourse and its societal implications. It helps us to
recognize the potential for partiality in the law and identify instances of partiality when we see it.
It helps us to accept that authoritative discourses such as Supreme Court rulings can be – and in
the case of corporate personhood, voice, and speech rights, actually are – ideological and, as my
study has shown, function to promote and legitimate the interests of corporations. Because
ideologies are not merely beliefs, but have a material component that emerges when played out
in human interactions to produce forms of truth, they become especially salient and influential
when articulated through authoritative discourses such as Supreme Court decisions.
6.3

The Role of Economic Liberalism
As my investigation into the three phases of the corporation’s evolution unfolded, in

conjunction with my exploration of the key Supreme Court rulings on corporate rights, a
particular kind of ideology operating in judicial discourse began to come into clearer view – the
ideology of economic liberalism. The ideological principles of economic liberalism, and in the
case of its most recent iteration, neoliberalism, hold that private property should be protected,
corporate rights should be expanded, and the free market should have as few restrictions as
possible because, if left unfettered, it is capable of appropriately regulating economic, social,
political and cultural relations. While the principles of economic liberalism are not inherently
problematic, they can become problematic when they function ideologically to reproduce
inequality in the economic marketplace and in the marketplace of ideas. Inequity prohibits any
marketplace from functioning optimally and living up to its ideals. My analysis attempted to
extend the conversation on corporate rights and power by showing how the ideological principles
448
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of economic liberalism played out in each of the key Supreme Court decisions addressed in this
dissertation.
While exploring the origins of corporate power via an analysis of Santa Clara, it became
apparent that the racial component invoked with Santa Clara’s use of the Fourteenth
Amendment was not the only aspect distinguishing it from Dartmouth. Of equal importance were
the economic possibilities for corporations that opened up under the Santa Clara ruling’s
application of Fourteenth Amendment personhood. The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
and equal protection clauses, intended to protect human beings from state discrimination, also
functioned to insulate the corporation from state taxation and regulation. These legal protections
facilitated the rapid amalgamation and protection of corporate wealth during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. 449 Additionally, aware that lax labor laws positively impacted
corporate profits, corporations used the Fourteenth Amendment to avoid laws attempting to limit
the number of hours employees could work per day, even though these laws were designed to
promote human health, worker well-being, and overall safety. In Santa Clara, the ideological
principles of economic liberalism not only undergird the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the
corporation, they were also reproduced by it. The ruling dramatically expanded the scope of
corporate rights, paved the way for corporations to receive more constitutional rights, and
ultimately contributed to the growth of corporate power.
In Nike v. Kasky, the ideological pillars of economic liberalism again emerged, this time
in Nike’s response to the allegations of hazardous labor practices as well as in the Supreme
Court’s ruling, or rather non-ruling, on the case. Let’s first begin with Nike. Company leaders
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were likely aware of the less-than-ideal working conditions in factories where some of its
products were made, even though its public relations campaign seemingly aimed to persuade key
stakeholders (and the public) that laws were not violated. The goal of the campaign was to
convince the public and key stakeholders that wrongdoing had not occurred in an effort to
preserve the company’s reputation, which would serve the additional purpose of preserving
corporate profits. The financial motivations arguably made this a case of commercial speech. In
addition, Nike’s use of the corporate voice also seemed more indicative of the strategies and
tactics of Bernays and Hill, because it aimed to promote and legitimate the dominant interests of
the corporation in an effort to preserve profits.
Ethical approaches to public relations such as those espoused by Arthur Page, suggesting
that the corporate voice be truthful and that the profit motive be relegated to its appropriate place
below societal well-being, were not readily evident in Nike’s public relations campaign.
Similarly, the more recent symmetrical, two-way communication approaches to public relations
in which communicative power is shared between parties did not have a strong presence in the
campaign. In short, Nike’s public relations campaign provides a recent example of how the
ideological principles of economic liberalism can emerge through the corporate voice in public
relations contexts. In addition, the Court’s response was also problematic to critics. By not ruling
on the case, the Court allowed the issues of corporate personhood and speech rights, including
their limits, to remain untouched. Because there was no ruling, the rights of big business were
protected, yielding an outcome consistent with the ideological principles of economic
liberalism. 450
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Perhaps the quintessential example of the ideological principles of economic liberalism
evidenced in Supreme Court decisions is found in cases where the Court transformed money into
speech. This trajectory of transformation may continue. For example, the Supreme Court
recently agreed to hear a case concerning limits on federal campaign contributions that could
possibly reduce the overall cap on “contributions made directly to political candidates and some
political committees.”451 According to Liptak, that case, McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Commission, No. 12-536, “may turn out to be the most important federal campaign finance case
since the court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United.”452 From Buckley to Citizens United, the
Court has frequently ruled in ways that would further the expansion of corporate spending rights
redefined as free speech rights. These decisions allow corporate money to directly infiltrate and
influence democratic political processes, empowering modern corporations to use their profits to
shape a variety of laws and policies that both pertain and do not pertain directly to their business
operations.
Taken together, all of these decisions on the rights of corporations show an ideological
orientation of economic liberalism dating back to Santa Clara. This pattern of economic
liberalism interwoven into Supreme Court decisions on corporate rights functioned both directly
and indirectly to expand corporate rights and to spread corporate power and influence throughout
society, facilitating the corporation’s rise to institutional hegemony. This leaves us with critical
question number three: what are the implications of the corporation for the human experience?
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6.4

The Racial Implications of the Corporation
The “birth” of the corporation has introduced what I would call a “role reversal,” both

literally and metaphorically. In 1885, pre-Santa Clara, corporations had to obey people. Today,
it seems that it is the people who must obey the corporations. Most of us work when, where, and
how corporate policies mandate. We vote under the influence of their politically-sponsored
advertisements, and we have essentially come to accept the corporation as an everyday part of
our lives, fully imbued into the fibers of the human experience. Our society has fully embraced
Mark’s “economic man.” But as my study has shown, this has been no automatic feat. It was part
of the long and complicated process of reification that began to unfold during the transatlantic
slave trade (also known as the triangle trade).
In the early days, slavery was less about racism and more about money and profit. 453
Racism emerged as a fiction to mask the exploitive economic relations of slavery while also
allowing its benefactors to reap the financial rewards of the cruel system. As the triangle trade
grew, and the logics of capitalism evolved, the black body – or perhaps more accurately stated,
the human bodies of people from the continent of Africa – became more and more closely
associated with property. As property to be bought, sold, loaned, traded, and shared, an entire
system of commodification sprung up all around this body such that the person was no longer
even thought of as a person. Through the enduring and reifying logics of capitalism, the black
person was only conceivable and visible as a commodified and commodifable property form.
Nowhere was this more evident than in the case of the Zong.
The Zong incident is so chilling because of its naked display of the logics of capitalism.
Aboard the Zong, the ideological principles of economic liberalism were so preeminent that the
453
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human being’s innate value as a human being – and in the tradition of Christianity, as a child of
God – is completely and thoroughly eclipsed by a man-made, arbitrary property value. This
arbitrary property value formed the basis of the insurance value that served as the only evidence
of the captured African person’s existence.
No matter how many times one hears it, the story of the Zong is still shocking. Yet we
really should not be surprised at the ways the ideological principles of economic liberalism, in
conjunction with the reifying logics of capitalism, function to assign everything, and everyone, a
price. Recall how, prior to the Zong, the British officials tallied payments for people injured in
service of the Crown – a few pounds for a damaged leg, a few more for lost eyesight. What both
incidents demonstrate – the Zong and the payments by the Crown – is that the ideological
principles of economic liberalism are transformative in their reconfiguration of humans as things.
Nothing is sacred. Everything can be reduced down to a medium of monetary exchange. Under
the logics of capitalism that developed during the triangle trade, we see vividly an ontological
scandal take place: when human beings from Africa were transformed into property for sale on
the world market.
In Santa Clara, the same ideology of economic liberalism that operated during the
triangle trade continued to operate within the Supreme Court. The Court’s ruling in favor of the
railroad company can be understood as the logic of reverse reification at work: instead of a
person being transformed into a thing/property, the thing/property – the corporation – was treated
like a human person by being given the rights of American citizens. When the Court permitted
the Fourteenth Amendment to be used to extend the rights of personhood to the corporation, they
(knowingly or unknowingly) engaged in another ontological scandal involving artificial and
natural persons: they allowed an artificial person to be treated as a natural one.
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This subsequent ontological scandal, displaying the reifying logics of capitalism, was
facilitated by the prior ontological scandal – the triangle trade. The destabilization of the
conceptual categories of “person” and “property” initiated by the triangle trade contributed to the
destabilization of the notion of “person” and “property” in Santa Clara, where the property of
the rich – the corporation – was treated in some instances as equal to, or perhaps better than,
actual people by the Supreme Court. Recall that between 1868 and 1911, only twenty-eight of
the 604 Supreme Court rulings involving the Fourteenth Amendment dealt specifically with the
protection of the rights of African Americans. In those twenty-eight cases, the Court upheld or
protected African Americans’ rights only six times.454 The Court selected an overwhelming
number of Fourteenth Amendment cases concerning corporations and ruled to protect the
personhood rights of corporations far more frequently than the personhood rights of the humans
the amendment was created to protect. Thus, Santa Clara significantly contributed to the
ontological scandal between natural and artificial persons by ascribing rights to corporations
that were intended for human beings.455
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What made Santa Clara’s personification of the corporation so scandalous was that a law
intended to help poor blacks was appropriated to help rich whites and to protect their property in
the corporation. 456 This point was echoed by Justice Hugo Black many years ago when he wrote:
In 1886, this Court in the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,
decided for the first time that the word “person” in the amendment did in some instances
include corporations. [...] The history of the amendment proves that the people were told
that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human beings and were not told that it
was intended to remove corporations in any fashion from the control of state
governments. [...] The language of the amendment itself does not support the theory that
it was passed for the benefit of corporations.457
Justice Black’s assertions here have been addressed more recently. For example, Critical Race
Theory, which began as a field of study in the 1980s, focuses on the racial constitution of the law
as well as its racial implications. It also exposes the ways in which laws intended to support
racial equality sometimes function to reinforce and reproduce racial inequality. 458 Drawing from
Critical Race Theory, my study reveals these racialized roots of the corporation, and it shows
that the raced, black body served as the ontological and legal foundation upon which the
corporate body was formed in American jurisprudence. This finding supports the theoretical
assertions of Critical Race Theory, which hold that when race is placed at the center of the
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discussion (as opposed to the periphery or not considered at all), unique and important insights
are revealed that might have otherwise remained invisible.
The reifying logics of capitalism fueled by the ideological pillars of economic liberalism
did not end with the personification of the corporation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Santa
Clara was only the beginning. The development of the corporate voice continued this process of
ontological conflation. While Santa Clara contributed to the reification of the corporation by
assigning it human rights, the public relations field contributed to the reification of the
corporation by endowing it with another human feature – a voice. The acquisition of a voice
augmented the cold “thingness” of the corporation with, in Marchand’s words, a soul. The
corporate voice performed not only a legitimating function – justifying the need for business
organizations in the corporate form to exist – but also an important humanizing function. It
rhetorically constituted the corporation as a well-meaning person with a point of view and
something positive to contribute to society. The corporate voice shaped the values, beliefs, and
attitudes of American society toward the corporation, encouraging people to accept the idea that
corporations are people too.
The ontological scandal of personhood continued with the corporation’s acquisition of
First Amendment political expression rights. While the First Amendment was intended to protect
freedom of the press, there is no evidence to suggest that the First Amendment was intended to
also protect the political expression of artificial persons in the form of corporations. This point
was clearly articulated by numerous dissenters on the Court over many years in cases concerning
corporate speech rights. Yet the Supreme Court’s extension of First Amendment speech rights to
political expression for corporations extended the reifying logics of capitalism further by treating
a thing in the corporation as a human person. Conflating the corporation’s ability to spend money
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with the physiological capabilities of human beings to produce speech is reification at its best.
Not only does it discursively graft a human quality onto an inanimate object, but the act of giving
a corporation speech rights also functions to reinforce the ontological confusion between, and
conflation of, natural and artificial persons by treating these two very different “life forms” as if
they were identical.
From the triangle trade onward, we see that the ideological principles of economic
liberalism contribute to the reifying logic of capitalism by first transforming people into things
and later treating things as people via Supreme Court rulings on corporate rights. While this
process of reification has its roots in the racial subjugation of the triangle trade, it has evolved
beyond race, ultimately affecting human beings broadly regardless of race. First Amendment
speech rights for corporate political expression affect human agency of all people as does the
persuasive “sound” of the corporate voice. These processes of reification have culminated in the
formation of arguably the world’s most powerful contemporary institution – the modern
corporation: a “person” with a “voice,” “speech rights,” and staggering amounts of wealth at its
disposal, and all natural persons should be concerned.
As Gowri put it: “The central issue is whether a corporation is the kind of entity that we
believe should contribute to formulating a political climate, to making crucial political decisions
(such as engaging in war), and ultimately, to building a future social world – and whether it
should participate on equal terms with human beings.”459 As the reader might gather, I believe
the answer here is “no.” Corporations are not the kind of entity that human beings should want
making complex decisions over life and death issues or playing a leading role in building our

459

Aditi Gowri, “Speech and Spending: Corporate Political Speech Rights under the First Amendment,”
Journal of Business Ethics 17.16 (1998): 1850.

184
social world. This is because while corporations may be legally classified as people, they are not
people in the same way that individual human beings are people.
Corporations are contractual entities born of the law, and while the processes leading up
to the ink drying on a contract may be long and arduous, they bear absolutely no resemblance to
the birth of an actual human being. Even a metaphoric comparison between the two birthing
processes seems absurd. Moreover, human persons are born with a soul. Human beings (barring
unfortunate circumstances) are born with a voice that acquires language and speech over time.
On the other hand, a group of executives and communication professionals create the corporate
voice that reinforces the idea that the corporation as an artificial person and legal entity has a
soul just like human persons do. In addition, the structural motivations of human beings and
corporations are fundamentally different. The corporation is an “economic man” as Mark
described. The corporation’s focus on profit prevents it from developing the kind of sentience,
compassion, and mindfulness necessary for adequately dealing with the kinds of issues that
Gowri raised.
Corporations, as legal contractual entities, lack the ability to manage the types of
complex issues Gowri raised because “corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings,
no thoughts, no desires,” as Justice Stevens explained so clearly in his Citizens United dissent.460
If we take Justice Stevens’ comments seriously, then Wolgast’s assertions that “it is implausible
to treat a corporation as a member of the human community, a member with a personality (but
not a face), intentions (but no feelings), relationships (but no family or friends), responsibility
(but no conscience), and susceptibility to punishment (but no capacity for pain)” 461 become even
460
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more significant. When we ignore these observations and warnings, and continually treat
corporations as people, we contribute to the ongoing ontological conflation of natural and
artificial persons – human beings and corporations – and reproduce the capitalist logic of
reification that destabilized traditional notions of what it has meant historically to be a person.
All of this conflation and confusion surrounding the concept of “person” indicates that
Dewey’s nineteenth-century argument remains relevant today. The transformation of the
corporation into a legal person means the entire concept of the word “person” must be revisited,
conceptually and ontologically. We need to think through what kinds of rights, privileges, and
responsibilities should be associated with the classification of person. We should take seriously
the positing of the question, should “person” be defined as an amalgamation of discursively
constituted rights and privileges? Should “personhood” be accounted for in terms of a
collectivity of interests? If the answer to either of the last two questions is affirmative, then there
is nothing troubling about the way that the corporations are accepted and treated as people.
Conversely, if we were to define “person” more narrowly in terms of the natural attributes of
human beings, then we would have some work to do. Where should we begin? A good place to
start is by taking a closer look at what can and should be done about the trinity of corporate
power highlighted in this dissertation.
6.5

Undoing the Trinity
Because the ontological differences between human beings and corporations are so

significant, it is uncomfortable to place business organizations, labor unions, and other nonhuman entities in the same category with human beings under the classification of “person.”
Likewise, I am not necessarily comfortable with the concept of “corporate personhood,” and it
might be productive to do away with the word “person” in reference to the corporation. We need
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a new vocabulary to account for business organizations along with a new or revised set of laws
capable of appropriately regulating the unique attributes that constitute the corporate form. This
approach to the corporation should begin with the basic premise that corporations are primarily
business organizations designed to achieve a profit. That fundamental premise should be the lens
through which we view, talk about, and regulate the corporation. The “corporation as a business
organization” should be more salient – legally, socially, economically, and culturally – than “the
corporation as a person.” Conceptual, and especially legal, space between the idea of “person”
and “corporation” should be encouraged until someday the gulf is so wide that the thought of
their ontological conflation seems ridiculous.
Creating conceptual distance between people and corporations is admittedly more
difficult than it might initially seem. This is because although corporations are not people,
ontologically speaking, they are comprised of human beings who perform various individual job
functions that allow the corporation to function as a single entity, as a person does. Nevertheless,
corporations are not people in the traditional sense of the word. No matter how many rights
intended for natural persons that the corporation is given, the corporation will never be a real
person in the same way that a human being is. The corporation will always be just a cover for the
body of men as Chief Justice Marshall stated in the Dartmouth ruling so long ago.462
If doing away with the concept of corporate personhood altogether is impossible or too
distant of a possibility, other options should continue to be explored. In the Dartmouth ruling,
for example, corporate personhood rights existed, but they were stringently regulated by the
state, and the scope of appropriate corporate activity was more clearly defined. Now granted,
Santa Clara occurred precisely because corporate owners and lawyers found Dartmouth far too
462
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restrictive. But perhaps there is a yet-to-be-explored middle-ground between the strictures of
Dartmouth and the sweeping freedoms of Santa Clara that could help to achieve a more
appropriate balance of power between humans and corporations. Perhaps there are ways to
improve the way we legally define and regulate corporate personhood. Limiting the scope of
corporate personhood might provide one way to limit the scope of corporate power.
Limiting the scope and rights of corporate personhood is important because corporate
personhood is the foundation of the trinity. Corporate personhood was the catalyst for the
unfurling of corporate rights that functioned to transform the business organization into the most
powerful of all persons. The corporate voice and speech rights function to augment the power of
personhood. However, if they were limited, then the power associated with corporate personhood
would also be limited.
Although some corporate leaders tend to resist limitations and regulations, I propose that
the constraints could be rather reasonable. For example, we do not have to do away with the
corporate voice, but is there anything wrong with requiring its communications to be true or at
the very least not intentionally misleading? Similarly, we do not have to do away with corporate
free speech rights, or perhaps more appropriately put, we do not have to eliminate the
corporation’s ability to disseminate its views to the public. But it seems reasonable to regulate
the speech of corporations substantially differently than the speech of human beings, i.e.,
American citizens. Corporations often have important information to share that the public can
use in its decision-making processes. As business organizations, however, do corporations really
need First Amendment rights to corporate political expression giving them the ability to directly
play an influential role in democratic electoral processes? And if leaders of a corporation are able
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to express themselves politically as individual citizens, then why is it also necessary for their
corporation, as a separate legal entity, to have its own political voice?
Addressing each of the components of the trinity of corporate power and defining
reasonable constraints will provide a path toward limiting not only that particular aspect of
corporate power, but also corporate power more broadly. In the same way that a correlation may
exist between the expansion of corporate rights and the constraint of human agency, I believe
there is likely a correlation between limiting corporate power and enabling human agency in
ways that enhance the human experience. In my view, it comes down to achieving an appropriate
level of balance in society.
6.6

Are Corporations Bad?
I do not want to leave the impression that I am against corporations. Corporations have an

important role to play in society. They provide jobs, innovation, economic stability, and other
important societal benefits. Corporate leaders have a vital role in shaping these efforts. Many of
them do care about more than profits.
I have seen corporate executives forgo their own bonuses to ensure that employees
received theirs.463 There have been times when they continued employee paychecks even when
business operations were disrupted. During tough times of layoffs, some corporate leaders
deliver the bad news to employees themselves, choosing to personally facing the pain and tears
of those who lost jobs when, as corporate leaders, they could simply hire another third-party
company to handle everything. The theme of George Clooney’s movie Up in the Air (which
focuses on corporate outsourcing of workforce reductions) can be observed in real life. To
463
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advance business goals, but more importantly to provide economic stability for their families,
corporate leaders often make great personal sacrifices – children’s birthdays, spousal
anniversaries, and time with family and friends. Big jobs often come with big sacrifices.
Corporate leaders often struggle personally and professionally over what it means to “do the
right thing.” While the corporate form, as a contractual entity does not have a soul, the men and
women that make up the human resources of the corporation do.
Public relations scholars and professionals are well positioned to help achieve an
appropriate balance of power. They can provide valuable counsel to corporate leaders on when,
how and to what ends, to use the corporate voice. Public relations practitioners have to be more
than “order takers” that communicate the corporate line. This means that they have to ask the
tough questions, take a stand and sometimes say “no” to corporate leaders. The public relations
function should encourage corporate leaders to think beyond the immediate implications of their
actions and take in to account the long-term and far reaching effects as part of their corporate
communication processes and as part of doing good business. My experiences in corporate
America sustain my optimism that it is possible to achieve an appropriate balance of power
between people and corporations.
However, it should also be noted that my optimism does not dull my critical edge.
Criticism is important because it shines light on areas that might otherwise be overlooked and it
facilitates a focus on areas for improvement. These are tenuous times, in large measure due to the
rise of the modern corporate form. The trinity of corporate power contributes to the ontological
conflation of natural and artificial persons in ways that can compromise human life and agency.
This study took a critical, ideological approach to illuminate these issues in order to light a path
toward creating a better social world with a more appropriate balance of power between natural
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and artificial persons. In this world, human beings are the principal agents of society; they are the
persons of primary concern, and their voices should not be drowned out by a chorus of spending
framed as corporate speech rights.
As noted in Chapter Five, following the Citizens United ruling, The Atlanta JournalConstitution’s Mike Lukovich published an editorial cartoon, Constitutional Convention
Updated. It featured the images of the founding fathers dressed in period attire. The logos of
some of America’s most popular and most powerful corporations were stamped on their chests
including McDonald’s, Google, DuPont and others. The George Washington lookalike stood
erect, ironically, with a large Nike symbol on his suit jacket. “We the People” had been replaced
with “We the Corporations.” Luckovich’s “update” to the Constitutional Convention offers some
unpleasant hints about the type of world we may one day inhabit if the expansion of corporate
rights and power proceeds without sufficient constraints. Under those circumstances, the
personhood of corporations could become more important than the personhood of natural
persons. The corporate voice could be unaccountable to the public, with corporate
misinformation protected as political expression. Money/speech instead of good ideas and sound
policies would be the primary political currency. This is not the social world the founding fathers
envisioned and it is not the social world most American citizens want to live in – even wealthy
ones. This is why it is in everyone’s best interest to reign in the trinity of corporate power.
Achieving a more appropriate balance of power between people and corporations can eliminate
the ontological scandal.
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